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B020302Sammohavinodanī aṭṭhakathā(removing delusion commentary)

English

the eye-āyatana and ear-āyatana are taught first among the internal ones. Then the nose-āyatana and the three others. Because all five are objects of experience, the mind-āyatana is last. But because the form-āyatana and so on are objects of the eye and so on, they are immediately after each of those among the external ones. Moreover, the distinction of the causes of consciousness arising This same order should be understood even in what follows. For it was said: "Conditioned by the eye and forms arises eye-consciousness… conditioned by the mind and mental objects arises mind-consciousness." Thus, the decision here should be understood as to its order. 'In brief and in detail': In brief, indeed, the twelve sense-bases are merely name and form, since the mind base and a portion of the object base are included under the name, and the remaining sense-bases are included under the form. In detail, however, among the internal bases, the eye base, by way of its kind, is merely the eye-sensitivity, but by way of causal conditions, groups, individuals, and distinctions, it is of endless variety. So too are the ear base and the other four. The mind base is of eighty-one varieties, by way of wholesome, unwholesome, result, and functional consciousness belonging to the three planes of existence, but it is of endless variety by way of base, practice, and so on. The form, smell, and taste bases are of four varieties by way of their origin, the sound base is of two varieties. But all of them are of endless variety by way of similar and dissimilar. The touch base is of three varieties as earth element, fire element, and air element, of four varieties by way of origin, and of countless varieties by way of similar and dissimilar. The object base is of countless varieties as mental objects belonging to the three planes of existence. Thus, the decision should be understood in brief and in detail. 'As to how they should be seen': Here, all these sense-bases should be seen as not coming and not going. For they do not come from anywhere before arising, nor do they go anywhere when ceasing; but rather, before arising, they are of unobtained nature, and when ceasing, they are of perished nature, and they occur dependently on conditions in the beginning, end, and middle, and they cease. Therefore, they should be seen as not coming and not going. Likewise, as inactive and without effort. For the eye, forms, and so on do not think, 'Oh, that through our combination consciousness might arise!', nor do they act as a door or base for the arising of consciousness. They intend by way of condition, or by way of object, but they do not incur any activity; but rather, it is the nature of things that when there is a confluence of eye, form, etc., eye-consciousness, etc., arise. Therefore, they should be seen as without effort and without activity. Moreover, the internal (sense bases) should be seen as like an empty village, being devoid of permanence, beauty, and happiness; the external (sense objects) as like village-plundering thieves, being destructive to the internal. For it was said: "The eye, monks, is injured by agreeable and disagreeable forms," and so on. Moreover, the internal (sense bases) should be seen as like six animals, the external (sense objects) as like their pasture. Thus, here, the determination should be understood as 'liable to be seen.' Now, to show their manner of being contemplated, "the eye is impermanent," etc., is begun. Therein, the eye, first, should be known as impermanent in the sense of being and then not being. Also, it is impermanent for four other reasons: because of having origination and dissolution, because of change, because of being temporary, and because of rejecting permanence. That same (eye) is suffering in the sense of being oppressed. Or, since this, having arisen, attains to duration, in duration it is afflicted by aging, having reached old age, it inevitably breaks up; therefore, because of constantly being oppressed, because of being of the nature of suffering, because of being a basis of suffering, and because of rejecting happiness, it is suffering for these four reasons. But it is not-self in the sense of not being under control. Or, since in these three instances—"let this, having arisen, not attain to duration, let that which has attained to duration not age, let that which has reached old age not break up"—there is no state of mastery for anyone, it is empty in that manner of mastery; therefore, because of being empty, because of being without an owner, because of acting against one's will, and because of rejecting self, it is not-self for these four reasons. It is subject to change because of its tendency to dissolution, because of its going to becoming in dependence on what precedes and follows, and because of abandoning its natural state. This is just a synonym for impermanence. The same method applies in "forms are impermanent," etc. Moreover, here, setting aside the eye, the three-world phenomena are impermanent, not the eye. But the eye is both eye and impermanent. Similarly, the remaining phenomena are suffering, not the eye. The eye But the eye is both painful. The remaining things are not-self, not the eye. But the eye is both the eye and not-self. The same method applies to forms and so on. Now, in this discourse section, what did the Tathāgata show? The characteristic of not-self of the twelve sense bases. For the Perfectly Enlightened One, when showing the characteristic of not-self, shows it through impermanence, or through suffering, or through impermanence and suffering. There, "If one were to say, 'The eye is the self,' that is not fitting. For the arising and passing away of the eye are evident. But for whom the arising and passing away are evident, it occurs to him, 'My self arises and ceases.' Therefore, it is not fitting that one should say, 'The eye is the self,' thus the eye is not-self" (Majjhima Nikāya 3.422). In this sutta, he showed the characteristic of not-self through impermanence. "Form, monks, is not-self. And if this form, monks, were the self, this form would not lead to affliction; and it would be obtainable in form – 'Let my form be thus, let my form not be thus.' But because, monks, form is not-self, therefore form leads to affliction; and it is not obtainable in form – 'Let my form be thus, let my form not be thus'" (Saṃyutta Nikāya 3.59; Mahāvagga 20), in this sutta, he showed the characteristic of not-self through suffering. "Form, monks, is impermanent, and what is impermanent is suffering, and what is suffering is not-self, and what is not-self is not mine, I am not it, it is not my self," and so on (Saṃyutta Nikāya 3.15), in these, he showed the characteristic of not-self through impermanence and suffering. Why? Because impermanence and suffering are obvious. For when a potsherd or a shard or anything falls from the hand and breaks, they say, "Alas, impermanent!" Thus, impermanence is obviously apparent. But when boils or pimples arise in the body, or when pierced by thorns or splinters, they say, "Alas, suffering!" Thus, suffering is obviously apparent. The characteristic of not-self is unapparent, dark, indistinct, difficult to penetrate, difficult to illuminate, difficult to make known. Impermanence The characteristics of suffering are apparent whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise. But the characteristic of non-self is not apparent without the arising of Buddhas; it is apparent only with the arising of Buddhas. For ascetics and wanderers of great power and influence, even teachers like Sarabhaṅga, can say "impermanent, suffering," but they cannot say "non-self." If they could say "non-self" to an assembled company, that assembled company would attain the path and its fruit. For the proclamation of the characteristic of non-self is not the domain of anyone else, but only of the all-knowing Buddhas. Thus, this characteristic of non-self is unmanifest. Therefore, the Teacher, showing the characteristic of non-self, shows it through impermanence, or through suffering, or through impermanence and suffering. Here, however, it should be understood that he shows it through impermanence and suffering. But why are these characteristics unpenetrated, uncomprehended, through lack of attention, by what are they obscured, that they do not become present? The characteristic of impermanence, first of all, is unpenetrated through lack of attention to arising and passing away, it does not become present, because it is obscured by continuity. The characteristic of suffering is unpenetrated through lack of attention to constant oppression, it does not become present, because it is obscured by postures. The characteristic of non-self is unpenetrated through lack of attention to the separation of various elements, it does not become present, because it is obscured by solidity. But having grasped arising and passing away, when continuity is disrupted, the characteristic of impermanence becomes present as appropriate. Having attended to constant oppression, when postures are uncovered, the characteristic of suffering becomes present as appropriate. Having analyzed the various elements, when the illusion of solidity is dispelled, the characteristic of non-self becomes present as appropriate. And here, "impermanent" is the characteristic of impermanence, "suffering" is the characteristic of suffering, "non-self" is the characteristic of non-self; this distinction should be understood. Therein, "impermanent" means the five aggregates. Why? Because of their nature of arising, passing away, and change, or because of their ceasing to exist after having been; arising, passing away, and change are the characteristic of impermanence, or the modification of form that is called ceasing to exist after having been. "Whatever is impermanent..." Because of the saying, "that is suffering," that very aggregate of five is suffering. Why?