English
" But one should not be subject to the mind; the mind should indeed be restrained by the power of reflection. 133-4. Stories of touching, causing to tremble, and moving from its place. just on the surface. And after that, he, with a thieving mind, took them from the ground—these are the conclusions of the stories. 135. In the story of the path of expression, he took, he seized, "You are a thief," he accused. But the other, when asked, "By whom was it taken?" replied, "It was taken by me," in the form of an admission. If indeed the other had said, "By whom was it taken? By whom was it removed? By whom was it placed?" then he too would have said, "It was taken by me, removed by me, placed by me." The mouth is made for eating and for speaking, but there is no taking without a thieving mind. Therefore, the Blessed One said, "No offense, monk, in the path of expression." The meaning is, no offense in mere conventional speech. After that, the story of the wrapping, the conclusion, all is clear in meaning. 137. In the story of the undivided body, "dwelt" means born in that very body due to craving for the robe. "Not heeding" means not accepting his words, or not paying attention. "That body having risen" means the ghost, by its own power, made that body rise. Therefore it is said, "that body having risen." "Closed the door" means the monk's monastery was near the charnel ground, therefore the fearful monk quickly entered there and closed the door. "Fell right there" means when the door was closed, the ghost, free from attachment to the robe, abandoned that body and went according to its karma, therefore that body fell right there, it is said to have fallen. "When the body is undivided" means a damp, wet body, a rag-robe should not be taken. For one who takes it, such misfortunes occur, and he incurs a dukkaṭa offense. But when it is divided, it is permissible to take it. But by how much is it divided? Even by a slight tearing by the mouth or beak or fangs of crows, owls, dogs, jackals, and so on. But if, by falling, only the skin is cut, but the hide is not cut, that is still undivided; but if the hide is cut, it is divided. And if, even when alive, the boils and skin eruptions If there is a blister or a wound, this too is broken. From the third day onwards, even if it has become a corpse, through bloating and so forth, it is still broken. However, in all cases, even if not broken, it is permissible to have it taken by cemetery keepers or by other people. If one does not obtain another, it should be taken by making a wound with a knife or something else. But in a dissimilar body, having established mindfulness, and having produced the perception of a recluse, it is permissible to take it by making a wound on the head or on the back of the hands and feet. The story of the transfer of grass. 138. In the subsequent story, "having transferred grass, he took the robe," this means that among the types of theft mentioned by name in the explanation of the meaning of the word "should take" (ādiyeyyā) — namely, theft by stealth, theft by force, theft by intention, theft by concealment, and theft by grass — he stole by means of grass. Now, the distinctions among these thefts should be understood thus: Whoever steals owner-possessed goods, whether by night or by day, by breaking in or similar acts, unseen, or deceives and takes them with false measures, false coins, and so forth, the theft by one taking in this way is to be understood as "theft by stealth." But whoever, overpowering others by force, or by threatening and showing fear, takes their possessions, like rebellious thieves committing highway robbery or village raids, plundering others' houses out of anger, or like kings and royal ministers taking by force more than their due power, the theft by one taking in this way is to be understood as "theft by force." But the theft by one taking with a specific intention is called "theft by intention." It is of two kinds: intention regarding the object and intention regarding the place. Here is the intention regarding the object: Someone desiring a robe, enters an inner chamber, and intending, "If it is a robe, I will take it; if it is thread, I will not take it," takes a bag in the darkness. If a robe is in it, he incurs a pārājika by merely lifting it. If it is a thread, he guards it. Having taken it out, released it, and knowing it to be "thread," he brings it back and puts it in its place, he guards it. Even knowing it to be "thread," if he goes thinking, "What is found, that should be taken," he should be made to pay by the step. If he places it on the ground and takes it, it is a pārājika offense by lifting. If surrounded by the owners, crying "Thief, thief!", he throws it away and flees, he guards it. If the owners see it and take it, that is skillful. If someone else takes it, it is a debt for the goods. But if, when the owners have returned, he himself sees it and thinks, "This was taken out by me earlier, now it belongs to me," and takes it, he guards it; but it is a debt for the goods. If he thinks, "If it is thread, I will take it; if it is a robe, I will not take it. If it is ghee, I will take it; if it is oil, I will not take it," and so on, and takes it, the same rule applies. However, in the Mahāpaccariya and other texts, it is said: "Even one desiring a robe, having taken only the stitching of a robe and gone out, standing outside, releasing it, and seeing 'This is a robe,' and then going, should be made to pay by the lifting of a step." Here, because it was conceived, "If it is a robe, I will take it," the conception is seen. But because it was seen and then taken, the taking with conception is not seen. In the Mahāaṭṭhakathā, however, the taking of what was conceived but not seen, remaining in the state of being conceived, is stated as an act of taking. Therefore, there, the taking with conception is seen. And it agrees with the Pāḷi, "Thinking it to be that, he took it." Here, this conception, which proceeds in the manner of, "If it is a robe, I will take it," and so on, is called "conception of goods." Conception of place, however, should be understood thus: Here, a certain greedy bhikkhu, having entered another's monastery, or a family house, or a workshop in the forest, and sitting there in conversation, looks at some desirable item. And as he looks, he sees it at the entrance to the door, below the mansion, at the door of the monastery, at the gatehouse, at a tree... having made a boundary by means of a root or the like, he plans: “If they see me within this boundary, I will show it to them as if I were carrying it around out of a desire to see it myself; if they do not see me, I will take it away.” For him, once he has taken it and crossed the boundary he planned, it is a pārājika. If he plans a boundary of proximity, and going directly towards it, he crosses the boundary of proximity unmindfully, either contemplating meditation subjects or being otherwise distracted, it is a fine. And if, when he has reached that place, a thief or an elephant or a wild animal or a great cloud rains down, and he, desiring to escape from that danger, hastily crosses that place, it is a fine. Some here say: “Since it was taken with a thieving mind from the very root, it does not protect, it is indeed a theft.” This is the method of the Mahāaṭṭhakathā. In the Mahāpaccariya, however, it is said: “Even if he, within the boundary, mounts an elephant or a horse and does not make it go or have it made to go; even if he crosses the boundary, there is no pārājika, it is only a fine.” Here, the plan that arose: “If they see me within this boundary, I will show it to them as if I were carrying it around out of a desire to see it myself,” this is called “opportunity-planning.” Thus, the theft committed by one who takes after planning in terms of both these plans should be understood as “theft by planning.” Taking away after concealing is “concealed theft.” This should be understood thus: A bhikkhu, seeing an ornamental item that people playing or entering in parks or the like have taken off and placed, and thinking: “If I bend down and take it, they will know me, thinking ‘What is the ascetic taking?’ and they might harass me,” he conceals it with dust or leaves— “I will take it later.” For him, by this much, there is no removal, so it is not yet a theft. But when those people, desiring to enter the village, even searching for that item, do not see it, and think: “Now it is dark, we will find out tomorrow…” They have gone to their dwellings. Then, for him, while taking it out, at the moment of taking out, it is a pārājika. Or, with the perception, "This is mine, it was hidden," or with the perception, "They have gone now, this is discarded property," if he takes it, it is a bhaṇḍadeyya. Even if they come on the second day, search, do not find it, give up their claim, and leave, if it is taken, it is still a bhaṇḍadeyya. Why? Because by his action, it was not seen by them. But if someone, seeing such an object, while it is still in its place, without concealing it, with a thieving mind, steps on it with his foot and pushes it into mud or sand, for him, at the very moment of pushing it in, it is a pārājika. Moving a blade of grass and taking it away is called "taking away by grass." This too should be understood thus: A bhikkhu, when robes are being divided by dropping a blade of grass, wishing to take a portion of another, whether less valuable, more valuable, or of equal value, that is near his own portion, wishing to drop a blade of grass that has fallen into his own portion into another's portion, takes it up; he is still innocent. He drops it into another's portion; he is still innocent. But when that has fallen, if he takes up another's blade of grass from another's portion, at the very moment of taking it up, he incurs a pārājika. If he first takes up a blade of grass from another's portion