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B020101Pārājikakaṇḍa aṭṭhakathā(grave sins commentary)

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without seeing Dhammarakkhita, or being unwilling to speak to him, approaches Sangharakkhita himself and commands, "Our teacher says thus – 'Steal such and such an item.'" "The offense is a dukkaṭa," so for the command, Buddharakkhita's offense is a dukkaṭa. "He accepts, the offense is a dukkaṭa," it should be understood that when Sangharakkhita accepts, it is a dukkaṭa for the root person. But if he steals that item, it is a pārājika for both the commander Buddharakkhita and the thief Sangharakkhita. But for the root teacher, due to the broken connection, there is no offense of pārājika. For Dhammarakkhita, due to his ignorance, there is absolutely no offense. Buddharakkhita, however, having ensured the safety of the two, is himself ruined. In the subsequent four instances of command, first, "He goes and returns again," he goes to the place of the item, and seeing guards inside and out, being unable to steal, he returns. "When you can," is it stolen today? "Go, when you can, then steal it." "The offense is a dukkaṭa," thus, even with a repeated command, it is a dukkaṭa. But if that item is certainly to be stolen, the intention to achieve the purpose is like the fruit immediately following the path, therefore, he is a pārājika at the moment of this command. Even if the thief steals that item after sixty years, the commander... And if he dies in the meantime, or falls away to a lower state; he will die as a non-recluse, or fall away to a lower state. But for the one who takes, it is a pārājika at the moment of taking. In the second instance – because he, speaking slowly, or due to the other's deafness, does not make him hear the words, "Do not take it," therefore the original owner is not freed. In the third instance – he is freed because it was made to be heard. In the fourth instance – because it was made to be heard by him, and the other assented with "Good," and then took it, both are freed. The section on authorization is concluded. Distinction of Offenses 122. Now, showing the distinction of offenses based on the type of object, and the factors of taking what is not given, which is spoken of in terms of moving from place to place, it begins with "by five aspects." Here, "by five aspects" means by five reasons; it is said to be by five factors. The summary meaning here is this: for one who takes what is not given, a pārājika offense occurs by the five aspects mentioned in the manner of "it is owned by another," and so on, but not by fewer than these. These five aspects are: it is owned by another, he perceives it as owned by another, the object is heavy, the intention to steal, and moving it from its place. In the subsequent two instances, for light objects, a thullaccaya and a dukkaṭa are shown based on the type of object. 125. In the three instances mentioned in the manner of "by six aspects," these six aspects should be understood: it is not perceived as one's own, it is not taken by trust, it is not temporary, the object is heavy, the intention to steal, and moving it from its place. Here too, based on the type of object, in the first instance it is a pārājika. In the second and third, thullaccaya and dukkaṭa are stated. In the subsequent three instances, even though there is a distinction of object, because the object is not owned by others, only a dukkaṭa is stated. In this regard, what is said to be "not owned by another" refers to an uninhabited place, or a discarded, uprooted, ownerless object, or one's own property; both are "not owned by another." it is counted as such. Because there is the perception of another's possession, and it was taken with a thieving mind, therefore, it is not said to be not an offense. The section on offenses is finished. The section on non-offenses 131. Having thus shown the types of offenses by way of the object and by way of the mind, now, showing the types of non-offenses, it says, "no offense for one with one's own perception," and so on. Here, "for one with one's own perception" means for one with one's own perception, thinking, "this item belongs to me." Even if one takes another's item with such a perception of one's own, there is no offense in the taking. However, what was taken must be returned. If, when told by the owners, "give it back," one does not give it, for them, at the point of giving up, it is a pārājika. "Taking by trust" means there is no offense even in taking by trust. The characteristic of taking by trust, however, should be known from this Sutta: "I allow, monks, to take by trust from one endowed with five factors: he is seen, he is familiar, he is spoken to, he is alive, and he is pleased when it is taken" (Mahāva. 356). Here, "seen" means a friend merely seen. "Familiar" means a firm friend. "Spoken to" means one who has been told, "whatever of mine you wish, you may take; there is no need to ask permission when taking." "Is alive" means even if lying in a state of helplessness, he has not yet reached the cessation of the life faculty. "Pleased when taken" means he is pleased in mind when it is taken. It is proper to take from such a person, knowing, "he will be pleased when I take it." And these five factors are stated in terms of not completely exhausting the item. However, taking by trust succeeds with three factors: seen, alive, pleased when taken; familiar, alive, pleased when taken; spoken to, alive, pleased when taken. But if one is not alive, and is not pleased when taken; what was taken from him by trust must be returned. And when returning, the property of the deceased should be given to those who are in charge of his property, whether householders or renunciants. The property of one who is not pleased should be given back to that very person. But the first And if, having approved, either by words like, "Well done by you, taking my property," or by a mere thought, and afterwards, angered for some reason, he cannot make it be returned. Even one who does not wish to give, but assents in mind, and says nothing, he too cannot make it be returned again. But if, when it is said, "Your property has been taken or consumed by me," one says, "Whether it has been taken or consumed, I had put it aside for some purpose, it is proper to make it normal again." This one can make it be returned. Regarding temporary taking: For one who takes saying, "I will return it, I will make amends," there is no offense even in a temporary taking. But if, concerning what was taken, the owner, whether an individual or a group, permits it, saying, "Let this be yours," that is skillful. If they do not permit it, it must be given back when they demand it. But the property of the Sangha must always be returned. Regarding property of departed spirits: Here, even those born in the realm of departed spirits, and those who, having died, are reborn in that same existence, even the gods of the Four Great Kings and so on, all are counted as "departed spirits." There is no offense in taking their property. Even if Sakka, the king of gods, were sitting having spread out his wares, and a bhikkhu with divine sight, knowing this, takes a robe worth a hundred thousand for his own robes, even while Sakka says, "Do not take, do not take," and goes, it is permissible. But regarding robes hung on trees and so forth by those performing offerings to deities, there is nothing to be said. Regarding property of animals: There is no offense in taking the property of animals. Even if a Naga king or a Supaṇṇa youth spreads out wares in human form, and some bhikkhu takes their property from there in the previous manner, it is permissible. A lion or a tiger, having killed deer, buffalo, and so on, and eating, afflicted by hunger, should not be stopped from the outset. For it might even do harm. But if, after a little has been eaten, one can stop it, one should stop it. It is proper to take. And it is proper for soldiers and the like to make those who are taking the bait fall, and then take it. For one who perceives it as a rag, even if it is ownerless and one perceives "this is a rag," there is no offense in taking it. But if it has an owner, it should be given back when brought. For one who is insane, of the kind mentioned before, there is no offense. For the first offender, here the rich man is the first offender, there is no offense for him. But for the rest, for thieves of bundles of clothes and the like, for the group of six and so on, there is indeed an offense. The section on non-offenses is finished. The commentary on the analysis of words is finished. Miscellaneous Discourse Origin and action, also perception with thought; And worldly censure and karma, skillful with feeling. In this miscellaneous discourse, this training rule has three origins – direct action arises from body and mind, commanded action arises from speech and mind, direct and commanded action arises from body, speech, and mind. And it has an origin in action, for one incurs it only by acting, not by not acting. It is released by perception due to the absence of the perception "I am taking what is not given," it is with thought, worldly censure, bodily action, verbal action, unskillful mind, and one incurs it whether pleased or afraid or neutral – thus it is of three feelings. All this should be understood in the same way as stated in the first training rule. The Miscellaneous Discourse is finished. Commentary on the Regulated Matters 132. Among the stories of regulated matters, the story of the group of six is indeed stated in the supplementary regulation. In the second story – the mind of ordinary people, abandoning its natural state due to lust and so on, runs, rushes, and scatters. If the Blessed One were to declare an offense merely by the arising of a thought, even without a breach of the bodily or verbal doors, who would be able to make themselves free from offense! Therefore, he said: "Monk, there is no offense in the arising of a thought.