English
and again caused that property to be released and taken it, the bhikkhu is pārājika by the first taking. From the head, or from the ear, or from the neck, or from the hand, for one taking an ornament by cutting or releasing it, a pārājika is incurred as soon as it is released from the head, etc. But if a bracelet or an armlet on the hand, without removing it, he merely rubs the forearm, or moves it back and forth, or lifts it into the air, he is still protected (from pārājika). It does not generate a pārājika like a robe on a tree branch or a bamboo pole. Why? Because it is animate. For as long as it is on an animate part and not removed from there, it remains there. The same rule applies to finger rings, anklets, and other ornaments worn on the body. But if someone snatches another's worn robe, and the other, out of shame, does not quickly let go, the thief pulls one end, the other pulls the other end, he is still protected (from pārājika). As soon as it is released from the other's hand, it is a pārājika. Even if, while pulling it, a part of it breaks off and that part comes into his hand, and if that part is worth a pāda, it is still a pārājika. In the case of one carrying property: Thinking, "I will take the property with its carrier," he threatens the carrier, saying, "Go from here!" He, being frightened, turns towards the direction intended by the thief and moves one foot— the thief incurs a thullaccaya; on the second (foot movement), it is a pārājika. He causes it to fall: Even if the thief, seeing a weapon in the hand of the property carrier, becomes suspicious and, wishing to cause it to fall and take it, retreats to one side, threatens, and causes it to fall— as soon as it is released from the other's hand, it is a pārājika. He causes it to fall: an offense of dukkaṭa, etc. And it is said by way of supposition. Indeed, whoever causes goods to be dropped, thinking, "I will take what pleases me," and then causes them to be dropped, for him, in causing to drop and in touching, there is a dukkaṭa. In causing to stir, a thullaccaya. In moving a thing worth a foot-value from its place, it is a pārājika. Even if he later releases it, there is no monkhood for him. And whoever, seeing a carrier of goods passing by, pursues him, saying, "Stop, stop, drop the goods!" and causes him to drop them, for him too, as soon as it leaves the hand, it is a pārājika. But whoever says, "Stop, stop!" but does not say, "Drop it!" and the other, looking at him, thinking, "If he catches me, he might even kill me," being eager, places the goods in a hidden spot, and departs, thinking, "I will return and take them," due to the dropping, there is no pārājika. But if he comes back and takes it with a thievish intent, at the moment of lifting, it is a pārājika. But if he thinks, "By my causing it to be dropped, this has become mine," and then takes it with the perception of it being his own; in taking, he protects it, but it is still goods to be given back. If, when told "Give it back!", he does not give it, at the owners' relinquishing of claim, it is a pārājika. If he takes it with the perception of it being a rag from a dust-heap, thinking, "He has abandoned this and gone, now it is ownerless," the same rule applies. But if the owner, as soon as "Stop, stop!" is said, looks, sees him, and thinks, "This is no longer mine," and having relinquished his claim, without attachment, abandons it and flees, for him who takes it with thievish intent, at the moment of lifting, it is a dukkaṭa. If caused to be brought back, it must be given. If not given, it is a pārājika. Why? Because it was abandoned due to his action, so it is said in the Great Commentary. But in other cases, there is no such consideration. Even if one takes it with the perception of it being one's own, or with the perception of it being a rag from a dust-heap, the decision is the same as before. The section on taking is finished. The section on deposits. 112. Regarding a deposit: Even in a deliberate lie, "I am not taking it," because it is an act of taking what is not given, there is a dukkaṭa. "What are you b "Take it?" Even if he says, "This is not suitable for me, nor for you," and so on, it is still a minor offense. "It was placed by me secretly in his hand, no one else knows, 'Will he give it to me or not?'" the owner raises doubt, for the bhikkhu, it is a serious offense. Seeing his harshness and so on, the owner gives up hope, saying, "He will not give it to me." If, in that case, this bhikkhu is eager to give, thinking, "I will give it to him after tiring him out," he still protects it. Even if he is not eager to give, but the owner of the goods is eager to take, he still protects it. But if he is not eager to give, and the owner of the goods also gives up hope, saying, "He will not give it to me," thus, by the giving up of hope by both, it is a pārājika for the bhikkhu. Even if he says with his mouth, "I will give it," but in his mind he does not intend to give, even so, if the owner gives up hope, it is a pārājika. That, however, is called a deposit, goods placed by others in one's hand for safekeeping. Moving it from an unguarded place and taking it to place it in a guarded place, there is no offense. Even if one moves it from a place with the intention of stealing, there is no theft. Why? Because it was deposited in one's own hand, but it is still a debt of goods. The same rule applies even if one uses it with the intention of stealing. The same applies to temporary taking. "Practicing the Dhamma," and so on, is as stated. This is the explanation of the Pāli text. Here, a decision outside the Pāli, concerning a group of four bowls and so on, is stated thus: A certain bhikkhu, having conceived greed for another's expensive bowl and wishing to steal it, carefully noted its place of storage, and placed his own bowl near it. He came at dawn, had the Dhamma recited, and said to the sleeping great elder: "I pay homage, Venerable Sir." "Who is that?" "I am, Venerable Sir, a visiting bhikkhu. I wish to depart early. And in such-and-such a place, with such a shoulder-strap, and such a bowl-bag, my bowl is placed. May I, Venerable Sir, receive it?" The elder, having entered, that... He took. For the thief, it is a pārājika just by taking. If, having come, he is told, "Who are you, come at an improper time?" and being frightened, he flees, he flees having incurred a pārājika. But for the elder, due to his pure intention, there is no offense. The elder, thinking "I will take that," took another; the same method applies. This, however, applies when taking another similar object, like in a case of a human figure resembling a command. But in the Kurundī, it is said, "It should be done by the step-method," which applies when taking something dissimilar. Thinking it was that, he took his own bowl and gave it. For the thief, since it was given by the owner, there is no pārājika. But for the one who took it with impure intention, there is a dukkaṭa. Thinking it was that, he took the thief's own bowl and gave it. Here too, for the thief, since it was his own property, there is no pārājika. But for the one who took it with impure intention, it is only a dukkaṭa. In all cases, for the elder, there is no offense. Another, thinking "I will steal the bowl," paid homage to the elder who was sleeping there. And when asked, "Who is this?" he said, "I, venerable sir, am a sick bhikkhu. Please give me a bowl for now; I will go to the village gate and bring medicine." The elder, perceiving, "There is no sick person here; this must be a thief," and saying, "Take this away," pulled out his enemy bhikkhu's bowl and gave it. For both, it is a pārājika just by taking. Even when pulling out another's bowl with the perception "It is the enemy bhikkhu's bowl," the same method applies. But if, with the perception "It is for the enemy," he pulls out the thief's own bowl and gives it, by the method stated, for the elder it is a pārājika, for the thief a dukkaṭa. Then, if thinking "It is for the enemy," he gives his own bowl, by the method stated, for both it is a dukkaṭa. A certain great elder said to his attendant young bhikkhu, "Take the bowl and robe; we will go to such-and-such a village to wander for alms." The young bhikkhu, having taken it, and going behind the elder, if he generates a thieving intention and places the burden from his head onto his shoulder, there is no pārājika. Why? Because it was taken by command. If he leaves the path and enters the forest, he is to be dealt with by the foot-step rule. Then, turning back, he flees towards the monastery, enters the monastery, and goes away, at the transgression of the precinct, it is a pārājika. Or if he flees towards the village from the place where the elder changes his robes, at the transgression of the village precinct, it is a pārājika. If both, having gone for alms, and having eaten or taken it, depart, and the elder again says to him, "Take the bowl and robe, we will go to the monastery." There, if he, with a thieving mind, in the same previous manner, places the burden on his head or shoulder, he is still guarding it. If he enters the forest, he is to be dealt with by the foot-step rule. If he turns back and flees towards the village, at the transgression of the village precinct, it is a pārājika. If he flees forward towards the monastery, and having stood in the monastery, without sitting down, with an unpacified thieving mind, he goes away, at the transgression of the precinct, it is a pārājika. But for one who takes it without being told, even by placing the burden on his head or shoulder, it is a pārājika. The rest is the same as before. But for one who is told, "Go to such and such a monastery, wash and dye the robe, and come back," and says "Yes," and takes it and goes, even if a thieving mind arises on the way, and he places the burden on his head or shoulder, there is no pārājika.