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And here, defeat is to be understood only by the owner's abandonment of the burden. For one who has not abandoned the burden is not defeated. 'While acting according to the Dhamma, he is defeated': even if, because the judgment proceeded according to Dhamma, Vinaya, and the Teacher's teaching, he himself incurs defeat; even so, in false speech... not because of causing trouble to the owners does one incur a grave offense. The Commentary on Parks is finished. The Commentary on Monasteries 103. Also in the case of monasteries – what is deposited in four ways is as stated. Even in a dispute here, a monastery or a dwelling or a residence given to bhikkhus dedicated to the Sangha of the four directions, whether large or small, when disputed by one who disputes it, the dispute does not succeed. Nor can it be taken by force. Why? Because there is no laying down of the burden by all. For not all bhikkhus of the four directions lay down the burden here. But one who disputes and takes what belongs to a group, such as those of the Dīghabhāṇaka sect, or to an individual, can make them lay down the burden. Therefore, in that case, the decision should be known in the manner stated for parks. The Commentary on Monasteries is finished. The Commentary on Fields 104. Also in the case of fields – first, showing what a field is, it says: "A field is where early crops or late crops grow." There, early crops are rice and the other seven grains; late crops are mung beans, black gram, and so on; sugarcane fields and the like are also included here. Here too, what is deposited in four ways is as stated. But in the case of what grows there, for one who takes by uprooting rice ears and the like, or by cutting one by one with the hand, or by reaping with a sickle, or by pulling out many together, when the object is complete in the seed or ear or handful or mung bean or black gram fruit, a pārājika offense is incurred as soon as it is freed from its bond. But a stalk or husk or skin, however small, protects it while it is being taken. A rice stalk can be long; as long as the rice ear stalk does not emerge from the inner stalk, it protects it. If even a hair's breadth of the stalk emerges from the bottom of the stalk, it must be made to pay the value of the goods. But for one who reaps with a sickle and takes, even if the stalks in the hand are cut below, if the ears are still entangled, they protect it for a while. But if, after disentangling, even a hair's breadth is lifted, and the object is complete, it is a pārājika offense. However, if the owners reap Taking husked or unhusked grain that has been stored, when the container is filled by taking it, with that taken, it is a pārājika. If he intends, "I will crush this, winnow it, and take only the essence," he keeps it for a while. Even when moving it from its place for crushing and winnowing, there is no pārājika. Afterwards, when it is placed in a container, it is a pārājika. The accusation here is as stated before. In cases like moving boundary posts, land is indeed invaluable. Therefore, if with just one boundary post, even a hair's breadth of land is made one's own, whether the owners are watching or not, when that post is moved, whether the name is cut or not, it is a pārājika for him, and for all who share his intention. If it is to be taken with two boundary posts, at the first post, it is a grave offense; at the second, it is a pārājika. If it is to be taken with three, at the first, it is a wrong deed; at the second, a grave offense; at the third, a pārājika. Thus, even with many posts, excluding the last two, the previous ones are wrong deeds; of the last two, one is a grave offense, the other is to be known as a pārājika. And this is by the owners' relinquishment of responsibility. Thus everywhere. Regarding a rope: Wishing to make known, "This is mine," he spreads a rope, or plants a stick; it is a wrong deed. "Now, with two actions, I will make it my own" — of these, the first is a grave offense, the second is a pārājika. Regarding a fence: Wishing to make another's field his own by enclosing it, he plants posts; for each action, it is a wrong deed. When one is not yet in place, it is a grave offense; when that one is in place, it is a pārājika. If, unable to do it with just that, he can make it his own by enclosing it with branches, the same rule applies to planting branches. Thus, by whatever means he encloses it and makes it his own, for each first action, it is a wrong deed. Of the last two, one is a grave offense, the other is to be known as a pārājika. Regarding a boundary: Wishing to make known, "This is mine," concerning another's field... One's own field boundary Just as a field embankment crosses another's field, so he moves it, or by increasing it with earth, clay, etc., makes it wide, or establishes what was not made. For the previous actions, a dukkaṭa. For one of the two latter, a thullaccaya, for the other, a pārājika. The explanation of the field is finished. The explanation of the ground 105. Also in the explanation of the ground – first showing what ground is, he says that ground is "park ground, monastery ground." There, having merely cleared the land, without planting seeds or saplings, having enclosed it with any of the three types of fences, or not enclosed it, a portion of land set aside for flower gardens, etc., is called park ground. In the same way, a portion of land set aside for a single monastery, a precinct, or a dwelling, is called monastery ground. Even that which was formerly a park and a monastery, and afterwards deteriorated and remains as mere land, and does not perform the function of a park or monastery, that too is included in the category of park or monastery ground. The decision here is just like what was said in the explanation of the field. The explanation of the ground is finished. 106. In the explanation of the village, what needs to be said has already been said. The explanation of the forest 107. In the explanation of the forest – first showing what a forest is, he says, "A forest is that which is appropriated by humans." There, since a forest can be both appropriated by humans and not appropriated; but here, that which is appropriated and protected, from which wood, creepers, etc., cannot be taken without payment, that is intended. Therefore, having said "that which is appropriated by humans," it is again called "forest." By this, he shows this meaning – "The state of being unappropriated is not the characteristic of a forest. But that which is a forest by its own characteristic as a forest, and is also appropriated by humans, that is a forest in this context." The decision there is similar to what was said in the explanations of the park, etc. Among those born there, here also, if even one valuable tree is cut, a pārājika. "Creeper" is said here, And both cane and creeper are creepers. There, whatever cane or creeper is long, Having pierced through or entwined Around a large tree or bush, Even if cut at the root, It does not cause a theft; Even if cut at the top, But when it is cut At both the top and the root, Then it causes a theft. If, however, it stands entwined, Then, as soon as it is freed from the tree, It causes a theft. "Grass" is said here, Whether it be grass or leaves, All is taken by the term "grass". If one takes that, Cut by others or cut by oneself, For the purpose of roofing houses, etc., One must be made to pay the price of the goods. And not only grass and leaves, But also whatever else, Bark, skin, etc., Where the owners have attachment, If one takes that, One must be made to pay the price of the goods. A tree that has been felled and left, Even if half-processed, Should not be taken. But if one is cut At both the top and the root, And its branches have become rotten, And its bark has peeled off, It is permissible to take it, Thinking, "This has been abandoned by the owners." Even for one cut with a mark, When the mark is covered by bark, Then it is permissible to take it. When trees are cut For the purpose of houses, etc., And those are built and inhabited, And the timbers in the forest Are destroyed by rain and sun, Seeing such things, It is permissible to take them, Thinking, "They are abandoned." Why? Because the forest owners Are not masters of these. Those who cut them, Having given a due payment To the forest owners, They alone are the masters; And they have abandoned them, Having no attachment there. And if a bhikkhu, Having first given a due payment To the forest guards, Enters the forest And has trees taken as he wishes, It is permissible for him To go by the path he wishes, Without going to their guard post. Or if, entering without giving, He has trees taken, saying, "I will give when I leave," And then leaving, He gives what is to be given to them, It is permissible. Or if he goes having made a promise, When asked "Give!", he says "I will give!" i, when it is said, "Give," it must be given. If someone gives their own money and says, "Give it for the monk to go," it is considered received, and he may go. But if some royal person, without giving money, forbids, saying, "Do not take a share from the monks," and the forest guards say, "How can we get anything if we don't take a share from monks and ascetics? Please give, venerable sir," it must be given. But if someone, when the forest guards are sleeping, or engrossed in play, or gone somewhere, comes and calls out, "Where are the forest guards?" and not seeing them, goes away, it is a dutiable offense. And if someone reaches the guard post and, meditating on a kammaṭṭhāna or being otherwise distracted, passes by due to inattention, it is a dutiable offense. And if, upon reaching that place, a thief, or an elephant, or a wild animal, or a great rain cloud appears, and he, wishing to escape from that danger, hastily passes that place, he is protected for the moment, but it is a dutiable offense.