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you are a great lay follower, you are a senior ascetic, you are a Nigaṇṭha, you are an Ājīvaka, you are an ascetic, you are a wanderer, you are a paṇḍaka, you are a thief-dweller, you are one gone over to another sect, you are an animal, you are a matricide, you are a parricide, you are an arahant-killer, you are a schismatic, you are a shedder of blood, you are a defiler of bhikkhunīs, you are a hermaphrodite' these also constitute a head offense." And Mahāpadumatthera himself in (phrases) like "doubtful about what is seen" and so on, says: "To the extent that one is doubtful, to that extent it is not fitting for him; to the extent that it is not fitting for him, to that extent he does not remember; to the extent that he does not remember, to that extent he is confused." But Mahāsumatthera, having divided each one into two, shows a separate method for all four. How? "Doubtful about what is seen" this, first, is doubtful either about the seeing or about the person. There, "Was he seen by me, or not seen?" thus, he is doubtful about the seeing. "Was this one seen by me, or another?" thus, he is doubtful about the person. He does not approve of seeing or a person, or seeing or a person is forgotten, or seeing or a person is lost. Here, 'vematiko' means one who is perplexed. 'No kappeti' means he does not believe. 'Nassarati' means he forgets when not reminded. But when they remind him, saying, "Venerable sir, at such and such a place, at such and such a time," then he remembers. 'Pamuṭṭho' means one who, even when reminded by various means, still does not remember. By this same method, the section on the accuser should also be understood, only there the word "by me" is omitted, the rest is the same as the section on the accuser. 389. After that, to show the distinction of offenses and the distinction of non-offenses, having set forth the fourfold group beginning with "one who sees purity in impurity," each single word is explained in four ways; all of this can be known by the method of the Pāli text itself. Only the distinction of intention here should be understood. This intention is of many kinds: the intention to expel, the intention to revile, the intention to perform an act, the intention to rise up, the intention to suspend Uposatha and Pavāraṇā, the intention to investigate, the intention to preach Dhamma. Among these, for the first four intentions, one who does not make an opportunity incurs a dukkata. And even after making an opportunity, one who does not rebuke with a baseless pārājika in person incurs a saṅghādisesa. One who does not rebuke with a baseless saṅghādisesa incurs a pācittiya. One who does not rebuke for a transgression of conduct incurs a dukkata. One who speaks with the intention to revile incurs a pācittiya. But one who speaks with any of the seven classes of offenses not in person incurs a dukkata. One who performs any of the seven kinds of acts not in person incurs a dukkata. However, in the Kurundī it is said: "For one who says with the intention to rise up, 'You have committed such and such an offense, rectify it,' there is no need for the act of making an opportunity." But everywhere it is said: "For one who suspends Uposatha and Pavāraṇā, there is no act of making an opportunity." However, the field of suspension should be known. "May the Saṅgha, venerable sirs, listen to me. Today is the Uposatha, the fifteenth day. If it is agreeable to the Saṅgha..." "It is proper for the Saṅgha to perform the Uposatha." In this 're' sound, it is allowed to be established without transgressing. But after that, when the 'yya' sound is reached, it is not allowed. This is the method for Pavāraṇā. Even for the examiner, when the matter is presented, if he speaks with the intention of examining, saying "Is this yours?", there is no act of permission. Even for a Dhamma speaker, sitting on the Dhamma seat, if he speaks Dhamma without specifying, saying "Whoever does this and that, this monk is not a recluse," there is no act of permission. But if he specifies and names, saying "So-and-so and so-and-so are not recluses, not lay followers," he must descend from the Dhamma seat, confess the offense, and go. As for what is said here and there, "having caused no permission," its meaning should be understood as "without having caused permission." For there is no such thing as "no permission" by causing which one incurs an offense; rather, one incurs an offense by not having caused permission. The rest is clear. Among the origins, there are three origins: it arises from body and mind, from speech and mind, and from body, speech, and mind. It is an action, a release by perception, with intention, blameworthy by the world, a bodily action, a verbal action, with unwholesome mind, and with painful feeling. The explanation of the first training rule concerning malicious accusation is finished. 9. The explanation of the second training rule concerning malicious accusation. 391. At that time, the Buddha, the Blessed One, (established) the second training rule concerning malicious accusation. There, "Come now, friends, let us name this goat-like thing Dabba Mallaputta." It is said that those monks, unable to fulfill their desire in the first matter, having received punishment and being frustrated, wandered about seeking such a matter, saying, "Now we shall know!" Then one day, having seen it, they were pleased, looked at each other, and said, "Come now, friends, let us name this goat-like thing Dabba Mallaputta." This means, "Let us name him 'Dabba Mallaputta'." This is also the method for the nun named Mettiyā. Those monks, Metti The Bhumajaka bhikkhus questioned him, and thus they questioned: "Friend, where did you see Dabba the Mallaputta with the bhikkhuni Mettiyā?" "At the foot of Gijjhakūṭa mountain." "At what time?" "At the time of going for alms." "Friend Dabba, these people say thus: 'Where were you then?'" "I was assigning meals in Veḷuvana." "Who knows of your presence in Veḷuvana at that time?" "The Sangha of bhikkhus, venerable sirs." They asked the Sangha: "Do you know of his presence in Veḷuvana at that time?" "Yes, friend, we know. The elder has been in Veḷuvana ever since the day he received the appointment." Then they said to the Mettiyabhumajakas: "Friends, your story does not agree. Are you not speaking with a trace of falsehood?" Thus, being questioned by those bhikkhus, they said "Yes, friend," and reported the matter. "But why, friends, did you accuse the venerable Dabba the Mallaputta of an 'aññabhāgiya adhikaraṇa'?" Here, 'aññabhāgiya' means 'belonging to another part' or 'having another part'. 'Adhikaraṇa' should be understood as a basis, meaning a ground or a support. For that goat which was called "Dabba the Mallaputta" – that is, a part, a portion, a side of the venerable Dabba the Mallaputta, which is human birth and the state of a bhikkhu – is of another part, portion, or side, namely, animal birth and the state of a goat. Or, it has another part. Therefore, it receives the designation 'aññabhāgiya'. And because for those who said, "We will call this Dabba the Mallaputta," the basis, the ground, the support for that naming perception was the goat, therefore it should be understood as 'adhikaraṇa'. Referring to that, they said, "Those bhikkhus of an 'aññabhāgiya adhikaraṇa'," not one of the disputes, etc. Why? Because it is impossible. For they did not accuse anyone of an 'aññabhāgiya adhikaraṇa' among the four kinds of adhikaraṇa. They took up a mere trace of a part. And there is no such thing as a trace of the four cases. For traces of birth, etc., are said to be traces of individuals, not of disputes or cases. And this, "Dabba the Mallaputta," is a certain part, a mere trace, of a goat that was in the state of a case belonging to another category, to slander the elder with a groundless pārājika. Here, "desa" (part) means that which is seen, that which is shown, that which is called "this is his." It is a term for one of the divisions like birth, etc. "Lesa" (trace) means another thing that adheres slightly, that clings by mere usage. It is a term for one of the divisions of birth, etc. Beyond that, the meaning is clear. The same meaning applies to the rule's promulgation. But in the word analysis, that if one, taking up some part, a mere trace, of a case belonging to another category, should slander with a pārājika offense, that, since it became manifest only by way of the origin story, is to be understood as not having been analyzed. 393. But as for the four cases that arose by way of extracting the meaning from the general term "case," since their belonging to another category and their belonging to the same category are not evident and must be known by those skilled in Vinaya, therefore, relying on the case obtained from the general term, making it clear, he said, "As for a case belonging to another category: it is either an offense belonging to another category or a case belonging to another category," and so on. And as for the accusation mentioned at the end, by way of a case belonging to another category of offense, to show that too, it should be understood that this belonging to the same category and belonging to another category of all cases has been brought together. And there, since "offense belonging to another category" was mentioned first, when the exposition "And how is an offense of another category to an offense?" should have been begun, since this meaning will come up only in the discussion of a case of offense belonging to the same category, therefore, not beginning in that way, taking up only the latter word, "And how is a case of another category to a case?" the exposition has been begun. Should be explained. Therein, the section on 'other-part' is of clear meaning. Indeed, each dispute-case is of another part, another side, another division for the other three [types of cases], due to the dissimilarity of their subject matter.