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and consuming together." For morality's sake, no judgment for them should be made. But for bowls, robes, residences, and such, it should be done after obtaining a suitable witness. Now, if a conscientious one accuses a conscientious one, and their dispute is about something trivial, they should be admonished, made to confess their fault, saying: "Do not do this," and then dismissed. But if here the accused has erred inadvertently, there is no shameless one from the beginning. And he gives no confession to protect his side. Many stand up, saying: "We believe, we believe." Let him be pure once or twice by their confession. But if, from the time of the error, he does not remain in his place, A judgment should not be given. Thus, when a matter is brought before the Sangha by way of any accusation, having known the conduct of the accused and the accuser, a judgment should be understood according to the beginning, middle, and end, etc., for the purpose of knowing the success or failure of that very accusation. What is the beginning of an accusation, what is the middle, what is the end? The beginning of an accusation is the act of asking for permission, saying: "I wish to speak to you, Venerable Sir, please grant me an opportunity." The middle is the judgment, having accused and reminded with the matter that has arisen. The end is the settlement by establishing whether there is an offense or no offense. How many roots does an accusation have, how many grounds, how many bases? An accusation has two roots – with a basis or without a basis; three grounds – seen, heard, suspected; five bases – I will speak at the right time, not at the wrong time; I will speak what is factual, not what is not factual; I will speak gently, not harshly; I will speak what is beneficial, not what is unbeneficial; I will speak with a mind of loving-kindness, not with inner ill-will. And in this accusation, the accuser should be established in the fifteen qualities mentioned in the Upāli-pañcaka (Cūḷavagga 399), such as "Am I pure in bodily conduct?" The accused should be established in two qualities: in truth and in unshakeability. "Perhaps I might remove him from this holy life" – it is said that one might indeed remove that person from this supreme holy life, with the intention: "It would be good if I were to remove this person from this holy life," thus disparaging him. In the word-by-word analysis, however, to show the meaning of this very phrase "remove from the holy life," it is said, "remove from the state of a monk," and so on. Moment, etc., are synonyms for time. "He passes that moment, that time, that instant" means "he passes in that moment, in that time, in that instant." Indeed, this is a usage of the locative case. And in the explanation of being admonished, "by which matter he is disparaged." In those Pārājika cases, by which case the accuser has accused, oppressed, overwhelmed, and crushed the accused. "Being investigated in that case" means in that case spoken by the accuser, that accuser being investigated, examined, and scrutinized by the investigator with questions like: "What did you see? How did you see it?" In the explanation of "not being investigated," "not being spoken by anyone" means not by the investigator or by anyone else, or not being spoken by anyone regarding the seen and other matters. The connection of these two matrix terms with "and the bhikkhu establishes the fault" is to be understood later. For this is what is said: "Whether being investigated in this way or not being investigated, and the bhikkhu establishes the fault, acknowledges it, confesses it, it is a Saṅghādisesa." This is stated only to show the time when the groundless nature becomes evident. However, one incurs the offense at the very moment of oppression. Now, in "and that case is groundless," since the characteristic of groundlessness was stated before, to show what is new without repeating that, it begins with "Case means..." There, since a case, though one in the sense of a case, is diverse in terms of its objects, to show that diversity, it begins with "There are four cases: dispute cases..." What then is that sense of a case by which it is one? It is the need for settlement by the pacification procedures. Therefore, that which is taken up, begun, related to, and referred to by the pacification procedures should be understood as "case." However, in the Commentaries, it is said: "Some say 'case' means grasping, some say intention, some say impatience, some say litigation, some say designation." Again, it is considered thus: "If grasping is a case, one who takes up a matter for oneself, and discusses it with a fellow bhikkhu, seeing the danger in it, then abandons it, for him that case will have reached settlement. If intention is a case, 'this "I will take up the dispute" – the arisen intention ceases. If impatience is the dispute, even having taken up the dispute with impatience, later, not obtaining a decision, or being appeased, he gives it up. If a transaction is the dispute, having wandered about speaking, later he becomes silent, voiceless. Thus, that dispute of his will reach settlement. Therefore, a designation is a dispute. But this contradicts statements like: "An offense of sexual intercourse is related to an offense of sexual intercourse... and so an offense-dispute is related to an offense-dispute, and a dispute-dispute may be wholesome, may be unwholesome, may be indeterminate." For they do not desire the wholesome nature etc. of a designation, nor is the pārājika-dhamma mentioned in "by a baseless pārājika dhamma" a designation. Why? Because it is utterly unwholesome. For it is also said: "An offense-dispute may be unwholesome, may be indeterminate" (Pari. 303). And that baseless pārājika which is indicated in "by a baseless pārājika," this is a re-indication of that very thing: "and that dispute is baseless." Not of a designation. For one does not indicate one thing and then re-indicate another. But since, by the designation, by the expression, the accuser declares that person to have committed a pārājika dhamma, because the dispute, called pārājika, is baseless, that designation is also baseless. And because it occurs in a dispute, it is a dispute. Therefore, by this method, a designation might be fittingly called a "dispute." Or because what is called a baseless dispute does not exist in reality, it exists merely as a designation. Therefore, a designation might also be fittingly called a dispute. But this is only here, not everywhere. For a designation is not a dispute for controversies and so on. But for them, the meaning of "dispute" is their being disputable by the previously mentioned settlements. Thus, by this meaning of "dispute," some controversy here is both a controversy and a dispute. A dispute case. This method applies to the rest. Therein, a dispute arising based on eighteen divisive matters, such as "Here monks dispute, saying 'it is Dhamma' or 'it is not Dhamma'", is a dispute case. An accusation arising based on four lapses, such as "Here monks accuse a monk of a lapse in conduct", is an accusation case. "The five groups of offenses are an offense case, the seven groups of offenses are an offense case" – thus, an offense itself is an offense case. "Whatever is a duty for the Saṅgha, a task to be done: a declaration, a motion, a motion with a second announcement, a motion with a fourth announcement" (Cūḷava. 215) – thus, these four kinds of Saṅgha duties are to be known as duty cases. But in this context, only the offense case, reckoned as a pārājika offense, is intended. The rest are stated by way of extracting the meaning, for these are the meanings of the word 'case'. Among them, only pārājika is intended here. That case is baseless, with roots like 'seen', etc. And this monk establishes the fault, stands by it, admitting it by saying "I spoke falsely" and so on. For that monk, at the very moment of not being destroyed, it is a Saṅghādisesa. This, then, is the meaning of the training rule for its step-by-step instruction. 387. Now, those matters of accusation, such as 'seen', etc., which were stated briefly, showing how to impose the offense in detail according to them, he says "it is for one unseen" and so on. Therein, "it is for one unseen" means he is unseen by him. By this, it means he is unseen by the accuser, that person is committing a pārājika offense. This method applies to "it is for one unheard" and so on. "Seen by me" means "you were seen by me". This method applies to "heard by me" and so on. The rest in the baseless case are of clear meaning. But in the case with a basis, if he accuses him, the baselessness is to be understood by the absence of suttas and so on, stated as "heard by me". And in this entire section on the accuser, Just as in these cases here: "You have fallen into a pārājika offense, you are no recluse, you are no son of the Sakyas," by each of these words, by uttering these words, there is a saṅghādisesa offense. So too, in other cases mentioned: "You are immoral, of evil nature, of impure and defiled conduct, of hidden deeds, no recluse but claiming to be a recluse, no celibate but claiming to be a celibate, inwardly rotten, oozing, born of filth," by each of these words, by uttering these words, there is indeed a saṅghādisesa offense. "There is no Uposatha with you, or Pavāraṇā, or Saṅgha-act," these pure statements do not constitute a head offense. But "You are immoral, there is no Uposatha with you," thus, in words like "immoral" and so on, or in words like "you have fallen into a pārājika offense" and so on, when combined with any (of these), they do constitute a head offense. They become productive of a saṅghādisesa offense. But Mahāpadumatthera said: "Not only do words like 'immoral, of evil nature' and so on, which are not found in the Pāli here, constitute a head offense. 'You are a cripple, you are a great novice,