English
all of them rely on the earth, are established on the earth. Thus do these seed-plants and plant-growths come to growth, increase, and abundance. Or just as, Master Gotama, whatever strenuous tasks are performed, all of them rely on the earth, are established on the earth. Thus do these strenuous tasks they are made. Even so, good Gotama, a person, for the sake of form, established in form, generates merit or demerit; a person, for the sake of feeling, established in feeling, generates merit or demerit; a person, for the sake of perception, established in perception, generates merit or demerit; a person, for the sake of volitional formations, established in volitional formations, generates merit or demerit; a person, for the sake of consciousness, established in consciousness, generates merit or demerit.” “Do you not, Aggivessana, say this: ‘Form is my self, feeling is my self, perception is my self, volitional formations are my self, consciousness is my self’?” “Indeed, good Gotama, I say this: ‘Form is my self, feeling is my self, perception is my self, volitional formations are my self, consciousness is my self,’ and so does this great multitude.” “What will the great multitude do for you, Aggivessana? Come now, Aggivessana, explain your own doctrine.” “Indeed, good Gotama, I say this: ‘Form is my self, feeling is my self, perception is my self, volitional formations are my self, consciousness is my self’.” “Then, Aggivessana, I will question you on this point; answer as you see fit. What do you think, Aggivessana, does a king, a khattiya, anointed with the sprinkling of water, have power in his own dominion to kill whom he wishes to kill, to fine whom he wishes to fine, to banish whom he wishes to banish, just as King Pasenadi of Kosala, or King Ajātasattu, son of Videhī, of Magadha?” “Yes, good Gotama, a king, a khattiya, anointed with the sprinkling of water, has power in his own dominion to kill whom he wishes to kill, to fine whom he wishes to fine, to banish whom he wishes to banish, just as King Pasenadi of Kosala, or King Ajātasattu, son of Videhī, of Magadha.” Yes. For these assemblies, these groups, good Gotama— that is, the Vajjians, the Mallans— it is their right to rule in their own territory— to kill whom they wish to kill, to imprison whom they wish to imprison, to banish whom they wish to banish. How much more so for a consecrated Khattiya king, such as King Pasenadi of Kosala, or King Ajātasattu, son of Vedehī, of Magadha? It is their right, good Gotama, and they are worthy to exercise it. "What do you think, Aggivessana, when you say, 'Form is my self,' do you have control over that form— 'Let my form be thus, let my form not be thus'?" When this was said, Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha's son remained silent. A second time the Blessed One said to Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha's son, "What do you think, Aggivessana, when you say, 'Form is my self,' do you have control over that form— 'Let my form be thus, let my form not be thus'?" A second time Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha's son remained silent. Then the Blessed One said to Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha's son, "Now answer, Aggivessana, this is not the time for your silence. Whoever, Aggivessana, being asked a righteous question by the Tathāgata up to the third time, does not answer, right there his head will split into seven pieces." Now at that time, the yakkha Vajirapāṇi, holding an iron vajira, blazing, flaming, glowing, was standing in the air above Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha's son, thinking: 'If this Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha's son, being asked a righteous question by the Blessed One up to the third time, does not answer, right there I will split his head into seven pieces.' The Blessed One saw that yakkha Vajirapāṇi, and Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha's son also saw him. Then Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha's son, frightened, agitated, his hair standing on end, sought the Blessed One as his protector, sought the Blessed One as his shelter, sought the Blessed One as his refuge. The seeker said this to the Blessed One: "Let Master Gotama question me, I will answer." 358. "What do you think, Aggivessana, when you say this – 'Form is my self'?" "Do you have control over that form – 'Let my form be thus, let my form not be thus'?" "No, indeed, Master Gotama." "Pay attention, Aggivessana; having paid attention, Aggivessana, answer. Indeed, your earlier statement does not agree with your later, nor your later with your earlier. What do you think, Aggivessana, when you say this – 'Feeling is my self'?" "Do you have control over that feeling – 'Let my feeling be thus, let my feeling not be thus'?" "No, indeed, Master Gotama." "Pay attention, Aggivessana; having paid attention, Aggivessana, answer. Indeed, your earlier statement does not agree with your later, nor your later with your earlier. What do you think, Aggivessana, when you say this – 'Perception is my self'?" "Do you have control over that perception – 'Let my perception be thus, let my perception not be thus'?" "No, indeed, Master Gotama." "Pay attention, Aggivessana; having paid attention, Aggivessana, answer. Indeed, your earlier statement does not agree with your later, nor your later with your earlier. What do you think, Aggivessana, when you say this – 'Volitional formations are my self'?" "Do you have control over those volitional formations – 'Let my volitional formations be thus, let my volitional formations not be thus'?" "No, indeed, Master Gotama." "Pay attention, Aggivessana; having paid attention, Aggivessana, answer. Indeed, your earlier statement does not agree with your later, nor your later with your earlier. What do you think, Aggivessana, when you say this – 'Consciousness is my self'?" "Do you have control over that consciousness – 'Let my consciousness be thus, let my consciousness not be thus'?" "No, indeed, Master Gotama." Pay attention, Aggivessana; pay attention, Aggivessana, and then speak. Indeed, your earlier statement does not agree with your later, nor your later with your earlier. What do you think, Aggivessana, is form permanent or impermanent? Impermanent, good Gotama. But what is impermanent, is it suffering or happiness? Suffering, good Gotama. But what is impermanent, suffering, subject to change, is it proper to regard it thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’? No indeed, good Gotama. What do you think, Aggivessana, is feeling… perception… volitional formations… what do you think, Aggivessana, is consciousness permanent or impermanent? Impermanent, good Gotama. But what is impermanent, is it suffering or happiness? Suffering, good Gotama. But what is impermanent, suffering, subject to change, is it proper to regard it thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’? No indeed, good Gotama. What do you think, Aggivessana, if one is attached to suffering, has come to suffering, is settled in suffering, and regards suffering thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’, would he himself fully understand suffering, or live having brought suffering to an end? How could that be, good Gotama? No indeed, good Gotama. What do you think, Aggivessana, is it not true that you, being thus, are attached to suffering, have come to suffering, are settled in suffering, and regard suffering thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’? How could it not be, good Gotama? So it is, good Gotama. Just as, Aggivessana, a man in search of heartwood, seeking heartwood, wandering in search of heartwood, might take a sharp axe and enter a forest. There he might see a great plantain trunk, straight, fresh, without a core. He would then… He should cut at the root, having cut at the root, he should cut at the top, having cut at the top, he should tear off the leaf-sheath. As he tears off the leaf-sheath there, he would not find even pith, much less heartwood! Just so, Aggivessana, when questioned by me about your own doctrine, when cross-examined, when spoken to, you are empty, hollow, and defeated. But this speech was spoken by you, Aggivessana, in the assembly at Vesālī: ‘I do not see that ascetic or brahmin, a leader of a community, a teacher of a group, or even one who claims to be an Arahant, a Fully Self-Awakened One, who, when engaged in debate with me, would not tremble, would not shake, would not quake, and from whose armpits sweat would not pour forth. If I were to engage in debate with an inanimate pillar, even it, when engaged in debate with me, would tremble, would shake, would quake. What then of a human being?’ But as for you, Aggivessana, some drops of sweat have burst from your forehead, pierced your outer robe, and fallen to the ground. But as for me, Aggivessana, there is no sweat on my body now.’ Thus the Blessed One in that assembly revealed his golden-hued body. When this was said, Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son became silent, abashed, with shoulders drooping, downcast, brooding, and speechless, he sat down. Then Dummukha the Licchavi’s son, seeing Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son silent, abashed, with drooping shoulders, downcast, brooding, and speechless, said to the Blessed One: ‘‘An analogy occurs to me, Blessed One.’’ ‘‘Let it occur to you, Dummukha,’’ the Blessed One said. ‘‘Just as, venerable sir, not far from a village or town, there is a pond. In it there would be a crab. Then, venerable sir, many boys or girls having come out from that village or town, would go to that pond; having gone... having entered that pond, having pulled that crab out of the water, they would place it on dry land. And whatever leg, venerable sir, that crab would extend, that very leg those boys or girls would cut off, would break, would smash with a stick or a potsherd. Thus, venerable sir, with all its legs cut off, broken, and smashed, that crab would be unable to enter that pond again, just as before. Even so, venerable sir, whatever writhings, contortions, and struggles Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha's son had, all of them have been cut off, broken, and smashed by the Blessed One. And now, venerable sir,