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45.Title of the Treatise.g2.0f

English

It is like the emission of semen. In India, the prana practitioners of the outsiders regard women as something to be abandoned. The prana practitioners who have wives, and rely on the blessings of kabbalas, conch shells, and bracelets, they are not happy, this needs to be understood. Therefore, the claim that the terminology of the six unions exists completely and without omission in the external scriptures, binding the sun and moon, the path of magical powers, immeasurable meditations, formless absorptions, etc., is entirely false, unless it is said that others have said it to them. Moreover, the saying that only immeasurable thought and immeasurable form are common with the outsiders is a rumor that has spread in Tibet, which is a plagiarism of Bon. Its meaning is that many non-Buddhists practitioners meditated in the past, so they obtained these achievements. In any non-Buddhist doctrine, there is no classification of immeasurable thought and immeasurable form, etc., and even the names do not exist. So, what does this mean? It is because they know the faults of desire and hatred, know that there is no happiness in the objects of desire and hatred, and meditate with one-pointed mind without separating from discernment, so they can obtain the first dhyana. Even if it has all nine mental abidings and seven attentions, they do not need to know these explanations, and even if they explain, there are other ways of explaining. Their samadhi is the final result of the union, although it has the meaning of the five limbs, it is not necessary to have the name of the union and the classification of the five limbs. Even if it is necessary to explain to others, it can be understood in other ways. Therefore, in practicing calm abiding, if one practices the nine mental abidings, the five faults, the eight applications, etc., and the superior insight of thought and form, then the seven attentions, and the limbs of meditation in the main practice, the classification of the formless realms, the detailed classification of the four immeasurables, the eight liberations in benefits or qualities, the ten perfections, the eight victories, etc., all appear only in the Buddha's scriptures. In the Compendium of the Perfection of Wisdom by the teacher Hero, it is also said: "The meditation of the second dhyana, spoken by the supreme upright one who is without duality." etc. can be taken as examples. The attainment of meditation by non-Buddhist practitioners may have occurred more than three hundred years after the Buddha's nirvana. After that, outsiders did not attain meditation, nor did they achieve ascetic sages. The insiders obtained the four fruits.

Chinese

我没有来过。兽中之王(狮子)也已绝迹,五浊极其兴盛啊!这是印度所有人都知道的。因此,僧人萨迦的拉也不是阿罗汉。班钦释迦师利(Paṇḍita Śākyaśrī)时代,据说在僧伽罗(Siṃhala,今斯里兰卡)有阿罗汉,也只是夸大其词而已。对于六见外道,获得有色禅定的道路且不说,连名相也不可能出现,而且只有见解和行为相违背,如数论派(Sāṃkhya)和瑜伽派(Patañjali),他们认为依靠世间欲乐就能解脱。理智者、胜论派有三种终极的理智,他们认为有作者。那么,他们怎么可能有无色禅定的道路呢?因此,这些人的想法是,如果认为有色禅定是内外道共有的,那么外道也会有像《俱舍论》第八品那样的有色禅定的名相,这是一种混淆。现在,任何外道都别说获得有色禅定,连它的诀窍也没有,经典也没有,也没有自诩为等持传承持有者的人。以前有获得等持的人的时代,也是各自认为自己获得的等持就是解脱,因此不认为还有更高的境界。比如,愚笨的人虽然知道射箭、农业、商业、性爱和战斗等行为,却不知道这些行为的名相、解释和论著。还有,说从《阿玛拉》(Amarakośa)中出现,力量和神通是从《阿玛拉 कोश》(Amarakośa)中说的。四谛和四法印在那里没有出现的理由。如果那个人是班智达,那么在因明学的解释中,作为前置的观点,对佛教的宗义稍作解释是有的。还有,你们是说无我的,问是遮遣世俗谛还是遮遣胜义谛,如果这是真的,那就是愚蠢的问题。既然认为无我,如果遮遣其他宗派的“我”,那对遮遣实有还有什么怀疑?遮遣了实有,除非有必须区分的必要,否则也只能遮遣名言。在各自的宗派中,除了旧的应成派,还有什么比论证无我的意义更重要的呢?这种说法就像在用一异离的方式遮遣法我时,当三种方式各自成立时,无自性的意义已经成立,所以在立宗时,说会变成成立名言一样。

English

I have not come. The king of beasts (lion) has also become extinct, and the five degenerations are extremely rampant! This is known to all in India. Therefore, the monk Saga's Lha is not an Arhat either. In the time of Paṇḍita Śākyaśrī, it was said that there were Arhats in Simhala (present-day Sri Lanka), but it was just an exaggeration. For the six heretics, let alone obtaining the path of form meditation, even the nomenclature is impossible to appear, and only views and behaviors contradict each other, such as the Sāṃkhya and Patañjali, who believe that liberation can be achieved by relying on worldly pleasures. The intelligent, the Vaiśeṣika have three ultimate intelligences, and they believe in a creator. Then, how can they have the path of formless meditation? Therefore, these people think that if form meditation is considered common to both internal and external paths, then the externalists will also have the nomenclature of form meditation like the eighth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa, which is a confusion. Now, let alone any heretics obtaining form meditation, they don't even have its key instructions, nor scriptures, nor any lineage holders who claim to be in meditative absorption. In the past, when there were people who had attained meditative absorption, they also considered the samādhi they had attained as liberation, so they did not think there was a higher state. For example, foolish people know how to shoot arrows, farm, trade, have sexual intercourse, and fight, but they do not know the nomenclature, explanations, and treatises of these behaviors. Also, saying that it comes from the Amarakośa, power and clairvoyance are spoken of in the Amarakośa. The Four Noble Truths and the Four Seals have no reason to appear there. If that person is a Paṇḍita, then in the explanation of logic, as a preliminary view, there is a brief explanation of the tenets of Buddhism. Also, you are those who speak of no-self, asking whether to negate conventional truth or ultimate truth, if this is true, then it is a foolish question. Since you believe in no-self, if you negate the "self" of other schools, then what doubt is there about negating the real? Once the real is negated, unless there is a need to distinguish, it can only negate the conventional. In their respective schools, what is more important than proving the meaning of no-self, except for the old Prāsaṅgikas? This saying is like when negating the self of phenomena by way of one and many, when the three modes are established separately, the meaning of no-inherent-existence is already established, so when establishing the thesis, it is said that it will become establishing the conventional.

Chinese

那裡有作為取得的細節的來源。關係非常小。還有,這裡有些人認為,說有我的(བདག་,梵文:ātman,羅馬轉寫:ātman,字面意思:我)是外道,說沒有的是佛教徒,這樣想,但寫道,那樣的眾生中,如果勢均力敵,那麼勢力更大。其他那樣的沒有嗎?還有,如果承認我的(བདག་,梵文:ātman,羅馬轉寫:ātman,字面意思:我)這個詞就變成外道,那麼導師也變成那樣了。僅僅因為不承認這個詞就變成佛教徒,那麼鳥和野獸也變成那樣了,說這些也是無關緊要的。總之,這個沒有前提的推論有什麼用?然而,在這裡研究,不承認我的(བདག་,梵文:ātman,羅馬轉寫:ātman,字面意思:我)這個詞的宗派,誰也沒有。因為承認的意思是承認宗派。即使遠離了壞聚見,也是佛陀的。如怎樣示現我(ང་,梵文:aham,羅馬轉寫:aham,字面意思:我)和我所(ང་ཡི,梵文:mama,羅馬轉寫:mama,字面意思:我的)一樣。同樣,事物雖然沒有自性,但說有,是如實的教導。僅僅這樣說,導師也不會承認我的(བདག་,梵文:ātman,羅馬轉寫:ātman,字面意思:我)這個詞。總之,引入的詞也不合理。因為說事物存在的經典,不是字面意思的如實教導。因為佛陀的我的(ང་,梵文:aham,羅馬轉寫:aham,字面意思:我)那時的行為,和說我的(ངའི,梵文:mama,羅馬轉寫:mama,字面意思:我的)聲聞一樣,說要這樣,但實際上,佛陀那樣說,是字面意思,因為不需要另外引導和改變。內道的人不僅僅是我的(བདག་,梵文:ātman,羅馬轉寫:ātman,字面意思:我)這個詞,連意義也全都承認。有些人認為是假立在蘊上的假立有,有些人認為是假立在意識上的假立有,有些人認為是假立在阿賴耶識上。我(ང་,梵文:aham,羅馬轉寫:aham,字面意思:我)和我的(བདག་,梵文:ātman,羅馬轉寫:ātman,字面意思:我)不是完全沒有。因為認為是假立有,所以只是存在的種類。對那些也沒有太大的不合理。內道的聲聞部派五部認為我(བདག་,梵文:ātman,羅馬轉寫:ātman,字面意思:我)是實有的那些是不合理的。對於所知來說,根本不可能存在的我(བདག་,梵文:ātman,羅馬轉寫:ātman,字面意思:我),是指常一自在的。說這完全是遍計所執,大部分是不合理的。俱生也認為只有這個。因此,外道的宗派所安立的遍計所執,也是以俱生為理由而安立的。如俱生我執所執持的那樣,所知是不可能存在的。這些術語太雜亂了。

English

There is the source that is the basis for the details of what was taken. The connection is very small. Also, here some people think that saying 'I exist' (བདག་, Sanskrit: ātman, Romanization: ātman, literal meaning: self) is a non-Buddhist, and saying 'I do not exist' is a Buddhist, but it is written that among such sentient beings, if the forces are equal, then the force is greater. Are there no others like that? Also, if one accepts the term 'I' (བདག་, Sanskrit: ātman, Romanization: ātman, literal meaning: self), then the teacher also becomes like that. If one becomes a Buddhist simply by not accepting the term, then birds and wild animals also become like that, which is irrelevant. In short, what is the use of this inference without a prior position? However, let us examine this here. There is no one who speaks of a philosophical system that does not accept the term 'I' (བདག་, Sanskrit: ātman, Romanization: ātman, literal meaning: self). Because 'accepting' means accepting a philosophical system. Even if one is free from the view of the aggregates, one is still a Buddha. Just as how 'I' (ང་, Sanskrit: aham, Romanization: aham, literal meaning: I) and 'mine' (ང་ཡི, Sanskrit: mama, Romanization: mama, literal meaning: mine) are shown. Similarly, although things do not have inherent existence, saying that they exist is the true teaching. Just by saying that, the teacher does not accept the term 'I' (བདག་, Sanskrit: ātman, Romanization: ātman, literal meaning: self). In short, the introductory words are also unreasonable. Because the sutras that say that things exist are not literal teachings. Because the Buddha's 'I' (ང་, Sanskrit: aham, Romanization: aham, literal meaning: I) at that time, and saying 'my' (ངའི, Sanskrit: mama, Romanization: mama, literal meaning: my) disciples are the same, but in reality, the Buddha said that in a literal sense, because there is no need to guide and change it otherwise. Not only the term 'I' (བདག་, Sanskrit: ātman, Romanization: ātman, literal meaning: self), but also the meaning is accepted by all inner schools. Some consider it to be a nominal existence imputed on the aggregates, some consider it to be a nominal existence imputed on the mind-consciousness, and some consider it to be imputed on the alaya-consciousness. 'I' (ང་, Sanskrit: aham, Romanization: aham, literal meaning: I) and 'self' (བདག་, Sanskrit: ātman, Romanization: ātman, literal meaning: self) are not completely non-existent. Because it is considered to be a nominal existence, it is only a category of existence. There is not much unreasonableness in those. The five Hinayana schools of Buddhism are unreasonable in that they believe that 'I' (བདག་, Sanskrit: ātman, Romanization: ātman, literal meaning: self) is substantially existent. The 'I' (བདག་, Sanskrit: ātman, Romanization: ātman, literal meaning: self) that is completely impossible for knowable objects refers to the permanent, single, and independent one. Saying that this is completely imputed is mostly unreasonable. The innate also considers only this. Therefore, the imputations established by the non-Buddhist schools are also established based on the innate as a reason. The knowable object is impossible as held by the innate self-grasping. These religious terms are too messy.