Chinese
只是相似而已，因为在那里安立，所以是安立。如果以前没有获得，就不会有后来的失去，因此依赖于获得而安立失去，依赖于失去而安立获得。同样，自性、能表、所依等也不是实有，虽然安立说肚子胀、脚萎缩、脖子细是瓶子的自性，但瓶子上并没有这样实有，所以是心识安立。能表也依赖于自性而在那里安立，所以不是实有。名、词、字母等也只是心中显现声音的总相，因为在那里安立。同样，粗大的事物如山和房屋等，以及时间的安排，积累众多刹那而用心识安立为日、月、年和劫等。所依和能依也是互相依赖而安立的，例如，相对于房屋，山之类的东西被安立为所依，房屋被安立为能依。但在某些情况下，房屋是所依，住在那里的人的行动也是能依，因此互相依赖，在那里安立。根和枝也是安立的，例如，相对于树干，它的树枝被安立为枝，但相对于叶子、花、果实，树枝本身又变成了有枝，所以仅仅是安立而已。同样，枝和有枝也是心识安立，例如，相对于整个身体，手之类的东西是枝，但相对于手指，手之类的东西又变成了有枝，所以都是安立。词和义也是互相安立而成立的，例如，依赖于词而有义，依赖于义而有名词，因此词义二者的关系也是心识完全安立的缘故。此外，不承认多种关系的差别，也都是心识完全安立的，例如，有为法和无常二者被称为以一个本体的关系相联系，但二者的关系并不是实有<即真实的实有>，因为凡是有为法就是无常，凡是无常就是有为法，所以关系的定义并不完整，因此一个本体的关系也是心识安立的。彼生关系也不是实有，并且
English
It is merely similar, and it is established because it is designated there. If one has not obtained it before, then there will be no subsequent loss. Therefore, loss is designated in dependence on obtaining, and obtaining is designated in dependence on loss. Similarly, characteristics, indicators, substrates, and so on are not substantially established. Although it is stated that a swollen belly, shrunken feet, and a thin neck are the characteristics of a vase, these are not substantially established as such in the vase, so they are mentally designated. The indicator is also designated there in dependence on the characteristic, so it is not substantially existent. Names, words, letters, and so on are also designated because only a general sound appears in the mind. Similarly, coarse objects such as mountains and houses, and the arrangement of time, accumulating many moments, are mentally designated as days, months, years, and kalpas. Support and supported are also established in dependence on each other. For example, in relation to a house, something like a mountain is designated as the support, and the house is designated as the supported. However, in some cases, the house is the support, and the actions of the people living there are the supported. Therefore, they are designated there in dependence on each other. Roots and branches are also designated. For example, in relation to a tree trunk, its branches are designated as branches, but in relation to leaves, flowers, and fruits, the branches themselves become the branch-possessing, so it is merely a designation. Similarly, branch and branch-possessing are also mentally designated. For example, in relation to the whole body, something like a hand is a branch, but in relation to fingers, something like a hand becomes the branch-possessing, so all are designated. Word and meaning are also established in dependence on each other. For example, meaning depends on the word, and the word depends on the meaning. Therefore, the relationship between word and meaning is also entirely mentally designated. Furthermore, those who do not accept the difference of various relations are also entirely mentally designated. For example, it is said that conditioned phenomena and impermanence are related by a single entity, but the relationship between the two is not substantially existent <i.e., truly substantially existent>, because whatever is conditioned is impermanent, and whatever is impermanent is conditioned. Therefore, the definition of relationship is not complete, so the relationship of a single entity is also mentally designated. The relationship of arising from that is also not substantially established, and
Chinese
都只是假立而已。财物和所有者的二者，也不是实有的，例如黄金、白银等财物，以及支配它们的某人被立为所有者，但那人也被国王等役使。先前的所有者，如财物和国王等，也会变成所有者，因此，这二者也不是实有的。同样，因和果二者也是假立的，例如，制造瓶子者是因，果是瓶子，二者都是由分别念假立的。同样，一起相伴的事物也都是假立的。所谓的主要和眷属，低劣和殊胜，明显和不明显，以及能益和所益，能损和所损，所诠、体性和基的关联等，也都是假立的。所说和能说二者也是由分别念假立的，例如，相对于所说如应学处等，十二部经被立为能说，但相对于阐明十二部经意义的论典，十二部经也有变成所说的时候。境和有境的关联也是由分别念假立的，例如，相对于境色法，眼识变成有境，但相对于有境意识等，眼识也有变成境的时候。例如，任何如“如瓶子一般”的比喻，也都是由分别念假立的，因为瓶子本身有时也会变成意义。理由和所立之法二者也不是实有的，例如，如“声音是法，是无常的，因为是所作”这样的理由，当把那个所立之法作为“由因缘所生”来安立时，先前的理由也会变成后者的所立之法。同样，作者和所作以及作等关联也不是实有的。美和不美以及中间等，高和低以及中间等，感受苦乐者，了知境者，见境者，作者，有情，补特伽罗，士夫等，也因为是由分别念假立的，所以不是实有的。
English
are merely imputed. Wealth and the owner are not truly existent either. For example, gold, silver, and other wealth, and someone who controls them is designated as the owner, but that person is also employed by the king and others. The previous owner, such as wealth and the king, can also become the owner, so these two are not truly existent either. Similarly, cause and effect are also imputed. For example, the maker of a vase is the cause, and the vase is the effect, both of which are imputed by conceptual thought. Likewise, things that accompany each other are also all imputed. The so-called main and retinue, inferior and superior, clear and unclear, as well as the relationship between benefactor and beneficiary, harmer and harmed, signifier, characteristic, and basis, are all imputed. The expressed and the expresser are also imputed by conceptual thought. For example, relative to what is to be expressed, such as the objects of training, the twelve branches of scripture are designated as the expresser, but relative to the treatises that clarify the meaning of the twelve branches of scripture, there are times when the twelve branches of scripture become the expressed. The relationship between object and subject is also imputed by conceptual thought. For example, relative to the object of form, eye consciousness becomes the subject, but relative to the subject of mental consciousness, eye consciousness can also become the object. For example, any analogy such as "like a vase" is also imputed by conceptual thought, because the vase itself can sometimes become the meaning. The reason and the property to be proven are not truly existent either. For example, like the reason in "sound is the subject, it is impermanent because it is produced," when that property to be proven is established as "born from causes and conditions," the previous reason also becomes the latter's property to be proven. Similarly, the relationship between the agent, the object, and the action is also not truly existent. Beautiful and ugly and intermediate, high and low and intermediate, the experiencer of pleasure and pain, the knower of objects, the seer of objects, the agent, sentient beings, persons, and individuals are also not truly existent because they are imputed by conceptual thought.
Chinese
并且，天和地狱等处所的构造，以及脚和手、眼睛等身体的构造，还有山和森林、房屋等外器的构造，以及光明和黑暗等受用的构造，这些粗大的构造，如果以假立的角度来观察，就会发现它们并不存在。但从相对的角度来看，它们是不同的，所以要分别看待。同样，年、月、日、劫等也并非实有，只是由心识假立而已。前一刹那和后一刹那，虽然似乎是由心识连接起来的，但实际上并没有连接，因此不是实有。两个色法的物体，虽然似乎是由心识连接起来的，但实际上并没有连接，因此不是实有。虚空的色法，如装饰的虚空、孔隙的虚空等，这些在视觉中显现的，也只是由心识假立，并非实有。在心中显现的色、声、香、味、触等，例如，反复在心中忆念瓶子的形状，就会像亲眼看到一样出现清晰的显现，这些都是心中显现的色法，而这些也只是假立而已。饥饿和口渴，也是依赖于内在产生的界的变化而产生，只是对此进行假立，并非实有。同样，饮食、受用、行动等，也都是由心识假立，实际上并不存在。此外，婴儿、青年、老人等各种不同的阶段，也只是对此进行假立，因此不是实有。一和二等数字，以及东方西方等方位，过去未来等时间等，也都是假立的。两个事物相互矛盾，这也是由心识假立，因为矛盾的事物并非实有。同样，否定和肯定，也是由心识假立，并非实有。因为在事物的实相中存在的，即使否定也无法否定；在实相中不存在的，即使肯定也无法肯定；而在实相中存在的，则无需肯定。因此，要确定假立是无自性的。
English
And, the arrangements for going to places like gods and hells, and the arrangements of the body such as feet, hands, and eyes, and the arrangements of the outer world such as mountains, forests, houses, and the arrangements for use such as light and darkness. These coarse arrangements, if examined as imputations, will be found to be non-existent. But from a relative point of view, they are different, so they should be regarded separately. Similarly, years, months, days, kalpas, etc., are not truly existent, but are merely imputed by the mind. The previous moment and the subsequent moment, although seemingly connected by the mind, are not actually connected, therefore they are not truly existent. Two material objects, although seemingly connected by the mind, are not actually connected, therefore they are not truly existent. The appearance of space, such as decorated space, the space of a hole, etc., which appear to the eye, are also merely imputed by the mind and are not truly existent. Forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations, etc., that appear in the mind, for example, repeatedly thinking of the shape of a vase in the mind, so that a clear appearance arises as if actually seen, these are forms that appear in the mind, and these are also merely imputations. Hunger and thirst also arise depending on the changes of the elements that occur internally, and are imputed to them, but are not truly existent. Similarly, eating, enjoying, moving, etc., are also imputed by the mind, but are not truly existent. Furthermore, the various different stages such as infancy, youth, and old age are merely imputed to them, therefore they are not truly existent. Numbers such as one and two, directions such as east and west, and times such as past and future are also imputations. The statement that two things contradict each other is also imputed by the mind, because contradictory things are not truly existent. Similarly, negation and affirmation are also imputed by the mind and are not truly existent. Because what exists in the reality of things cannot be negated even if negated, and what does not exist in reality cannot be affirmed even if affirmed, and what exists in reality does not need to be affirmed. Therefore, it should be determined that imputations are without inherent existence.
Chinese
无法完全控制他者，因为无法做到这一点，所以无法证悟圆成实性。因此，认识假有之法非常重要。考虑到仅一个例子无法涵盖所有知识，所以在此说了百余种直接开示。凡是遍计所执，都不会包含在其中。因此，所有这些遍计所执的名相，都不是从各自的体性上作为实有存在的，而仅仅是心识分别假立的。如果从安立的基础来区分，则有三种：即处所和时间等安立的基础不确定；面前的瓶子的生起等依赖于一个基础；以及多种因和多种果等依赖于多个基础。如果从安立的基础来区分，则有这三种。第三种非实有是虚空，以及各别自性空和非各别自性空两种，以及任何未生之法等。以前存在的事物后来消失，即变为其他事物的非实有；瓶子的总相和柱子的总相等等事物的总相，是依赖于瓶子和柱子等事物的非实有；不存在的瓶子的总相，以及不存在的柱子的总相等等，非实有的分类有这三种。所有这些都是心识分别假立的，因此，有些非实有是依赖于实有的非实有，有些是依赖于事物关系的非实有，有些是依赖于事物的不相符方面而由心识安立的，因此，是虚构的非实有。非实有的后两种分类，都包含在事物转变的非实有之中。如此，蕴、界、处三者，色蕴中也有生界、器世间和有情众生三种。意处也有心、意和识三种。法界也有名言之法、自性之法和非实有之法三种。名言中也有受蕴、想蕴和行蕴三种。自性中也有对境。