Chinese
这六者应当说成是刹那性的。水在夏季的时候，刹那刹那地干涸，在雨季的时候，河水逐渐上涨，这是显而易见的。所以水是刹那性的，如果不是刹那刹那地增减，最终就会干涸，或者完全上涨，这是不可能的。风的自性是流动的，所以是刹那性的，因为不可能静止，它的自性就是流动和运动。还有，风是刹那性的，因为可以明显地看到它从小变大，从大变小。火也是刹那性的，因为根据燃料的多少，火焰的大小也各不相同。地也是刹那性的，因为它与已经变成刹那性的水、火、风三者相关联。既然它所关联的对象是刹那性的，那么它所关联的法也必然是刹那性的。这可以类推到其他事物，例如，火是刹那性的，因为它与另外三个元素相关联，等等。色是刹那性的，因为可以看到它被四种变化所改变。四种变化中，业的变化就像有情众生的善恶业力导致器世间变好变坏一样。损害的变化就像人们挖掘土地，导致土地变得低洼，或者添加其他物质导致土地变得高耸一样。元素的变化就像水流的力量导致土地变得低洼一样。时间的变化就像时间长了，人的身体会衰老一样。同样，颜色、形状、气味、味道和触觉也都是刹那性的，因为原因与上述的推理相同。声音也是刹那性的，例如，当用鼓槌敲击鼓时，最初的声音从小变大，然后从大变小，这是显而易见的。
English
These six should be stated as momentary. Water dries up moment by moment in the summer, and rivers gradually rise in the rainy season, which is obvious. Therefore, water is momentary, because if it did not increase or decrease moment by moment, it would eventually dry up or completely rise, which is impossible. Wind is inherently moving, so it is momentary, because it is impossible to be still, its nature is to move and go. Also, wind is momentary, because it can be clearly seen that it increases from small to large and decreases from large to small. Fire is also momentary, because the size of the flame varies depending on the amount of fuel. Earth is also momentary, because it is related to the three elements of water, fire, and wind, which have become momentary. Since the object it is related to is momentary, then the dharma it is related to must also be momentary. This can be analogized to other things, for example, fire is momentary because it is related to the other three elements, and so on. Form is momentary, because it can be seen that it is changed by four kinds of changes. Among the four kinds of changes, the change of karma is like the good and bad karma of sentient beings causing the container world to become good or bad. The change of harm is like people digging the earth, causing the land to become low-lying, or adding other substances causing the land to become towering. The change of elements is like the power of water flow causing the land to become low-lying. The change of time is like the human body aging after a long period of time. Similarly, color, shape, smell, taste, and touch are all momentary, because the reasons are the same as the above reasoning. Sound is also momentary, for example, when a drum is struck with a drumstick, the initial sound goes from small to large, and then from large to small, which is obvious.
Chinese
法处所摄之色，成立为刹那性，因为随顺显现者之心的缘故。其中，法处所摄之色，对于获得心自在的瑜伽士们来说，乃是以明现的方式显现的色、声、香、味、触等各种显现；即使没有获得明现，对于普通众生来说，在意识中显现的色等显现部分，也是如此。所谓“为了提问”是指，如果有人提问：灯火是刹那性的吗？以灯火刹那刹那耗尽灯油为理由，如果回答说不是刹那性的，那么一切有为法也与之相同，因此成立为刹那性。又如，如果有人提问：骑手不走，坐骑也不走，这种情况可能存在吗？如果回答说不存在，那么诸根的对境也成立为刹那性，因为识是刹那性的所依。如此一来，论证无常的理路已经结束，接下来解释其剩余意义，其中有五个要点。第一，论证无实事无常：一般来说，虚空等这些，很多人都承许为常法和无为法，但在此宣讲大乘经部了义时，必须宣讲其为有为法和无常。也就是说，对于任何法，在任何处所、任何时间都不存在的无实事，说是常法是不合理的，这是立宗。如果有人认为，那么法称论师和陈那论师等所说的虚空和总相等等，不是常法吗？虽然他们那样说过，但那仅仅是从无常中反过来，才说是常法，因此只是安立了常法的名言而已。而且，那些仅仅是毫无所有的无实事，为了区分是变化的实有，所以才说是常法。并且，世间普遍认为这些是常法，所以顺应世俗的说法，才说是常法。总相是在与外道辩论时，才对他们安立常法的名言，但总的来说，他们并不认为那些是常法的自性。虚空和类。
English
The form included in the dharma-sphere is established as momentary, because it follows the mind of the person who perceives it. Among these, the form included in the dharma-sphere, for yogis who have attained mastery over their minds, are the various appearances of form, sound, smell, taste, and touch that appear in the manner of clear appearances. Even if one has not attained clear appearances, the appearances of form and so on that appear in the minds of ordinary beings are also the same. The phrase "for the sake of questioning" means that if someone asks, "Is a flame momentary or not?" and answers that it is not momentary, giving the reason that the flame consumes oil moment by moment, then all conditioned dharmas are the same, and therefore it is established as momentary. Also, if someone asks, "Is it possible for a rider not to move and the horse not to move?" and answers that it is not possible, then the objects of the senses are also established as momentary, because consciousness is the basis of the momentary. Thus, the reasoning for proving impermanence has ended, and now the remaining meaning is explained, which has five points. First, proving the impermanence of non-entities: Generally, many people accept that these, such as space, are permanent and unconditioned, but here, when explaining the definitive meaning of the Mahayana sutras, it is necessary to explain that they are conditioned and impermanent. That is to say, it is unreasonable to say that a non-entity that does not exist in any place or time is permanent; this is the proposition. If someone thinks, "Then aren't space and universals, etc., as explained by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, permanent?" Although they said so, it is only in contrast to impermanence that they are called permanent, so it is only a designation of permanence. Moreover, since those are merely non-entities without anything, they are called permanent in order to distinguish them from changing entities. Furthermore, because it is universally accepted in the world that these are permanent, they are called permanent in accordance with popular belief. Universals are only given the designation of permanence when arguing with non-Buddhists, but in general, they do not consider them to be the nature of permanence. Space and class.
Chinese
因为地共相等等这些非实有仅仅是假立的缘故。仅仅是分别假立而已，实际上成立的实物一个也没有。如果认为，这些东西因为任何时候都不会改变，为什么不是常法呢？因此，对于这些非实有，因为差别基没有成立，所以即使没有改变，也不是不变。如果任何法的自性成立为差别基，不改变且恒常，那就是不变。但是，这些不是因为自己存在才没有改变，而是因为自己的体性不存在，所以没有改变的缘故。因此，对于任何差别基都没有的，差别法的生灭等等，存在与不存在都不合理。例如，石女没有儿子，所以没有出生和死亡等等，但并不是无生。第二点，显示以否定不存在为特征的空性不是胜义谛实有：又有些人说，法界空性仅仅是远离戏论，什么也不是，那才是实相的胜义谛。对于这样认为的空性或者无生的意义，也不是胜义谛真谛实有，因为与刚才所说的无生相同。因此，石女的儿子即使在假立的层面上也不存在，是不可能存在的法的基础，完全不存在。对于它，即使没有差别法的出生，也不是无生。虚空、类共相等等非实有，因为仅仅是由分别念假立的假立之法。在世俗假立的层面上存在，所以不是不可能存在的法本身，但并不是实有。因此，对于差别基不是实有的，即使没有差别法的实有出生，也不能安立为无生。同样，对于以否定不存在的<仅仅是空>为特征的法界，因为什么也没有，而且不存在。对于它，即使没有生灭，对于什么也没有的，因为没有出生的因和坏灭的因，所以说是无生，但并不是无生的意义。因此，对于任何存在且成立的法没有出生，才能说是无生。本来<自生>成立的，没有因缘的显现出生。因为没有它，所以最初不是产生，中间不是住留，最后也不是坏灭。要点
English
Because those non-existents such as earth generality are merely imputed. It is only conceptually imputed, and there is not a single thing that is actually established. If you think, since these things never change, why are they not permanent? Therefore, for these non-existents, even though there is no change because the basis of difference is not established, it is not unchanging. If any dharma whose own nature is established as the basis of difference does not change and is constant, then it is unchanging. However, these are not unchanging because they exist themselves, but because their own nature does not exist, so there is no reason to change. Therefore, for anything that has no basis of difference, it is not reasonable for the existence or non-existence of the characteristics of arising and ceasing, etc. For example, if a barren woman has no son, then there is no birth or death, etc., but it is not unborn. The second point is to show that emptiness, which is characterized by negating non-existence, is not the ultimate reality: Some say that the emptiness of the dharmadhatu is merely free from elaboration and is nothing, and that is the ultimate truth of reality. The meaning of emptiness or non-birth that is believed in this way is also not the ultimate truth, because it is the same as the non-birth just mentioned. Therefore, since the son of a barren woman does not exist even in name, it is an impossible basis for dharma and does not exist at all. For it, even if there is no birth of characteristics, it is not unborn. Non-existents such as space and class generality are merely imputations imputed by conceptualization. Because it exists only as an imputation in conventional imputation, it is not an impossible dharma itself, but it is not real. Therefore, for that which has no substantial basis of difference, even if there is no substantial birth of characteristics, it cannot be established as unborn. Similarly, for the dharmadhatu characterized by negating non-existence, because there is nothing and it does not exist. For it, even though there is no arising or ceasing, for that which has nothing, it is said to be unborn because there is no cause for arising and no cause for ceasing, but it is not the meaning of unborn. Therefore, if there is no birth for any dharma that exists and is established, then it should be called unborn. That which is originally established is not manifestly born by causes and conditions. Because it does not exist, it is not produced in the beginning, it does not remain in the middle, and it does not cease in the end. Key point
Chinese
第三，考察生灭之义：一般而言，生灭之事物被认为是实有和假有二者。其中，例如瓶子之类的东西是实有的生灭之物，而瓶子的产生和毁灭等，是附加于其状态的假立之法，因此不是实有。第二种情况，则有实有、假有和胜义三种。然而，任何法最初产生之后如果持续存在，则被称作存在，但对于从一开始就自性成立的存在，由于<离戏之要点>，不存在“存在”的说法。个别观察之灭和非个别观察之灭二者，也是由因缘显现而成为有为法，因为这些是新产生的法。例如，在十五日的正午时分，获得圣道之智慧，当证得见道苦法智时，就获得了完全断除苦谛所断的个别观察之灭。这在上午之前是没有的，而是从正午开始新产生的。非个别观察之灭也是凭借因缘不具足的力量而新产生的。这样一来，最初产生的事物最终没有不灭的，因此，它被确立为生灭之物，而一旦确立了这一点，也就确立了它是有为法。这两种灭最初产生的理由，并非仅仅是从后推断出最终会灭亡，而是因为最终灭亡的理由，从个别观察之灭的第一个刹那和第二个刹那开始，直到经历劫等等的时间都有。如上所述，十五日正午时分获得的断除苦谛所断的个别观察之灭，从刹那、小时、日、年月等依次经历，甚至延续到劫，也是因为该灭与获得者的相续相关联。因此，由于时间的推移，最终该灭在意识中完全转变并灭亡。又或者认为，该灭虽然是先前没有而新出现的，但并非产生。如果这样认为，那么色等...
English
Thirdly, examining the meaning of arising and ceasing: Generally, things that arise and cease are considered to be of two types: substantially existent and imputedly existent. Among these, for example, something like a vase is a substantially existent thing that arises and ceases, while the arising and ceasing of the vase, etc., are imputations attached to its state, and therefore are not substantially existent. In the second case, there are three aspects: substantially existent, imputedly existent, and ultimately existent. However, if any dharma persists after its initial arising, it is said to exist, but for that which exists as self-established from the beginning, there is no term for "existence" because of the <point of being free from elaboration>. Both cessation through individual examination and cessation not through individual examination also become manifestly conditioned by causes and conditions, because these are newly arisen dharmas. For example, at about noon on the fifteenth day, having attained the wisdom of the noble path, when the wisdom of the Dharma-acceptance of suffering in the path of seeing arises in one's mind-stream, one obtains the cessation through individual examination that completely abandons what is to be abandoned by the suffering of the path of seeing. This did not exist before noon, but arose newly from noon onwards. Cessation not through individual examination also arises newly through the power of incomplete conditions. In this way, since there is nothing that arises initially that does not ultimately cease, it is established as something that arises and ceases, and once that is established, it is also established as being conditioned. The reason why these two cessations arise initially is not merely that we infer from later on that they will ultimately cease, but because the reason for ultimate cessation exists from the first and second moments of cessation through individual examination onwards, until eons and so on have passed. As mentioned above, the cessation through individual examination that completely abandons what is to be abandoned by the suffering of the path of seeing, which is obtained at noon on the fifteenth day, gradually progresses through moments, hours, days, months, and years, and even continues until an eon, because that cessation is connected to the mind-stream of the one who obtained it. Therefore, due to the passage of time, that cessation ultimately transforms completely in the mind and ceases. Alternatively, one might think that although that cessation is newly arisen where it did not exist before, it is not an arising. If one thinks in this way, then form, etc...