Chinese
执著和邪见完全确定是遍计所执的烦恼，而贪欲、嗔恨等其他烦恼，则兼具遍计所执和俱生烦恼两者的成分。然而，由于这两者没有实体上的差别，因此个体的智慧无法区分这两者。或者，如果对那个理由进行区分，可以分为证悟与未证悟、清晰与不清晰的区分，以及有相与无相的两种理由。证悟是指了知自己的对境，例如眼识了知近处的清晰的色法。第二种情况是，眼识不了知远处的色法。清晰是指色法等显现清晰，而不清晰是指虚空等显现不清晰的区分。证悟和清晰两者被称为有相的理由，而未证悟和不清晰两者被称为无相的理由。此外，理由还有五种分类方式，即五种理由：理由的理由，例如执著于认为“这是瓶子”的执著方式的对境的总相，即执著方式所执持的对境的总相。名称的理由，例如“瓶子”这个声音的总相，即执著于声音的总相的执著方式所执持的显现在心中的总相。分别念的理由，例如心和心所的总相。如是的理由，是指证悟到分别念的如是性的假立之处。正确的智慧的理由，是指执著于道路的执著方式的总相。名称的分类，虽然总共有四十种左右，但这里归纳为六种：事物的名称，例如显现“瓶子”这个声音的总相。同样，关联的名称，例如显现“这个瓶子大”、“这个瓶子小”等声音的总相。集合的名称，例如“金瓶、银瓶、铜瓶这些都是瓶子”，这样将多个事物显现为一个事物的声音的总相。不同的名称，例如“金瓶、银瓶、铜瓶这些名称是不同的”，这样将各个事物显现为不同的声音的总相。
English
Attachment and wrong views are definitely only afflictions of imputation, while other afflictions such as desire and hatred have aspects of both afflictions of imputation and innate afflictions. However, since these two do not have substantial differences, individual beings' wisdom cannot distinguish between them. Alternatively, if we differentiate that reason, we can divide it into the distinction between realization and non-realization, clarity and non-clarity, and the two reasons of with-characteristics and without-characteristics. Realization refers to the knowing of one's own object, such as the eye consciousness knowing the clear form that is nearby. The second case is that the eye consciousness does not know the form that is far away. Clarity is the distinction between forms and so on appearing clearly, and the appearance of the sky and so on being unclear. Realization and clarity are both called reasons with characteristics, while non-realization and non-clarity are both called reasons without characteristics. Furthermore, there are five types of reasons, namely five types of reasons: the reason for the reason, such as the general characteristic of the object of the grasping that grasps as "this is a vase," that is, the general characteristic of the object grasped by the grasping. The reason for the name is the general sound of "vase," which is the general characteristic that appears in the mind, grasped by the grasping that grasps the general sound. The reason for conceptual thought is like the general characteristic of mind and mental factors. The reason for suchness is the imputation that is realized as the suchness of conceptual thought. The reason for correct wisdom is the general characteristic of the grasping that grasps as the path. The classification of names, although there are about forty in total, is summarized here into six: the name of the object, such as the appearance of the general sound of "vase." Similarly, the name of relation is like the appearance of the general sound of "this vase is big," "this vase is small." The name of aggregation is like the general sound of "these gold vases, silver vases, and copper vases are all vases," which appears as many things as one. The different names are like the general sound of "the names of these gold vases, silver vases, and copper vases are different," which appears as each thing separately.
Chinese
是儿子啊！名声在外的名称和名声不显的名称，是指在某个地方某个时间出名和不出名。例如，“哈斯地”这个声音是“有手”，指大象出名。虽然有手，但牛身上却没有这个名称。分别念的差别是无边无际的。也就是有相的分别念和无相的分别念两种。主要指欲界的意和意所生的分别念，以及从初禅开始的那些。第二种是从二禅到有顶之间，以及昏厥和熟睡状态下的意和意所生。对于那些来说，完全没有相也不是，而是对低劣的加上否定的词语。或者说，烦恼的分别念和非烦恼的分别念两种。第一种是欲界的不善分别念。第二种是善的有漏和无记，以及无漏所包含的分别念。或者说，进入境的分别念，寻求者的分别念，和各自分别的分别念三种。第一种是，五根识及其眷属，因为能进入各自的境。第二种是，烦恼意和意识、作意等。第三种是，无论是意识还是意所生，都是能区分各个境的分别念。第三个有无的差别是，分别念和正确的知识两种是实有的，只是名称和假立存在。虽然大多数理由是假立存在，但理由中属于执持的部分是实有产生的。真如既不是实有，也不是假立存在，而是胜义存在。后者真如和正确的知识两种，真如是胜义谛的真实，而正确的知识只是安立为随顺的胜义。其他名称、理由、分别念三种，成立为世俗存在。第四个一和异的差别是，名称和理由两者既不是一也不是异，因此，那本身是不可说为其他的。同样，真如和这四法也是不可说为真如和其他的。
English
Is a son! Famous names and unknown names refer to being famous or not famous in a certain place at a certain time. For example, the sound "Hasti" means "having hands," which is famous for elephants. Although it has hands, this name is not known for cows. The difference in conceptualization is limitless. That is, there are two types of conceptualization: with characteristics and without characteristics. The main ones are the conceptualizations of mind and mental events that arise from the desire realm, and those from the first dhyana onwards. The second type is from the second dhyana to the peak of existence, and the mind and mental events in states of fainting and deep sleep. It is not that those do not have characteristics at all, but rather that a negative term is added to the inferior. Alternatively, there are two types of conceptualization: afflicted conceptualization and non-afflicted conceptualization. The first is the non-virtuous conceptualization of the desire realm. The second is the conceptualization included in the virtuous contaminated and unspecified, and the uncontaminated. Alternatively, there are three types of conceptualization: conceptualization that enters objects, conceptualization of the seeker, and conceptualization that distinguishes individually. The first is that the five sense consciousnesses and their retinues enter their respective objects. The second is afflicted mind and consciousness, volition, etc. The third is that whether it is consciousness or mental events, they are conceptualizations that distinguish each object. The third difference between existence and non-existence is that conceptualization and correct knowledge are both substantially existent, only names and imputed existence. Although most reasons are imputed existence, the parts of the reason that are grasped are substantially existent. Suchness is neither substantially existent nor imputed existence, but ultimately existent. The latter two, suchness and correct knowledge, suchness is the reality of ultimate truth, and correct knowledge is only established as conforming to the ultimate. The other three, name, reason, and conceptualization, are established as conventionally existent. The fourth difference between one and different is that name and reason are neither one nor different, therefore, that itself cannot be expressed as other. Similarly, suchness and these four dharmas cannot be expressed as suchness and other.
Chinese
是的，那样的道理将在真假二谛的时候讲述。分别念的行境的体性是因，因为因是分别念的境，分别念是行境的行者。名是词语表达产生的所依或处所的体性。以因作为境的体性是分别念。后者，如是性是正确的知识二者境与有境的体性，因为正确知识的行境是如是性，以如是性作为境的有境是正确知识的体性。此处所说的体性，也不是现在普遍流传的不遍、遍太过和不可能这三种过失所断除的自性，只是在那个差别事上具有那个差别法而已，就安立为体性。这五法以三种体性如何归纳的道理是，不包括执著分的多数因和名是周遍假立，分别和正确的知识二者是他起的体性，如是性是不变的圆成实。对于四谛的观察是，总的来说，四谛有分别安立的四谛和不分别安立的四谛两种。前者是，一切乘都共称的，那是由于声音和分别念可以安立名言，所以那样说，后者是声音分别念的名言不能安立的，胜义法性四谛的显现。因此，因具有分别安立的四谛的一切分，名唯独由苦谛所摄，所以是名就周遍是苦谛，但是是苦谛就不周遍是名。除了灭谛之外的其他三谛的一切执著分存在于分别念中，所以那也周遍以分别念来遍及其他那三谛的本体，但是总的来说，分别念不周遍三谛，因为那三谛的所取分不是分别念。不分别安立的四谛，显现为法性四谛的灭谛是由如是性所摄。分别安立与不分别安立的一切四谛都以正确的知识
English
Yes, that kind of reasoning will be explained in the context of the two truths. The characteristic of the object of conceptualization is the reason, because the reason is the object of conceptualization, and conceptualization is the agent that acts on that object. A name is characterized as the basis or place where verbal expression arises. The characteristic of taking reason as an object is conceptualization. The latter, suchness, is characterized by the object and subject of valid cognition, because the object of valid cognition is suchness, and the subject that takes suchness as an object is the characteristic of valid cognition. The characteristic mentioned here is not the nature that is currently popularly known to be free from the three faults of non-pervasion, over-pervasion, and impossibility, but merely the possession of that distinguishing feature on that distinguishing basis is what is established as the characteristic. The way these five dharmas are summarized by the three characteristics is that most reasons, excluding the grasping aspect, and names are completely imputed, conceptualization and valid cognition are characterized by other-dependence, and suchness is the unchanging thoroughly established. The examination of the four truths is that, in general, the four truths are divided into the four truths that are conceptually established and the four truths that are not conceptually established. The former is known to all vehicles, and it is so called because terms can be conceptually established by sound and conceptualization, while the latter is the appearance of the ultimate reality, the four truths of dharmata, which cannot be established by the terms of sound and conceptualization. Therefore, the reason has all the parts of the four truths that are conceptually established, and the name is only included in the truth of suffering, so if it is a name, it is pervasive that it is the truth of suffering, but if it is the truth of suffering, it is not pervasive that it is a name. All the grasping aspects of the other three truths except the truth of cessation exist in conceptualization, so it is also pervasive that conceptualization pervades the essence of those other three truths, but in general, conceptualization does not pervade the three truths, because the apprehended aspects of those three are not conceptualization. The four truths that are not conceptually established, the truth of cessation that appears as the four truths of dharmata, are included in suchness. All the four truths that are conceptually established and not conceptually established are with valid cognition.
Chinese
是所缘，即以法性真谛之相作为所思和所得之所缘。四种安立的谛，即无常、痛苦、空和无我，是苦谛的四种相；因、集、缘、生是集谛的相；灭、寂、妙、离是灭谛的四种相；道、行、理、出是道谛的四种相，即缘彼十六种。第五，观察二谛：五法中，取名和义二者，以及取分别和真实之识二者。如是，真如是胜义谛。初二者唯是世俗，第三分别是在世俗谛中存在，后者真如和真实之识二者，次第是胜义谛的实体和名言的胜义谛。第六，解释此处所涉之法：此处之法，是指能使人理解意义之法的所依。同样，也可称为五事，即仅是事物之义。二者，体相和所依中，所依之法和能依所依二者中，能依的一切所知皆包含于此五者中，故五法之名是胜者所立。第二，解释三种体相，分三：略说、广说、义摄。第一，总的来说，任何一个所依之法，如瓶子，皆可安立遍计所执的瓶子、依他起的瓶子和圆成实的瓶子这三种体相。即使在内摄瓶子的遍计所执中，也可能存在三种体相，但不应作无限延伸的安立。如在《圣百颂》等中，有遍计所执之色、分别之色和法性之色等对色的分类的说法，但并非如此，而仅是指色上可安立三种体相之义。其中，遍计所执的自性是，由意的言说、由分别念所安立的安立分是遍计所执。此处，由正确的言说所安立的安立分也是遍计所执，