Chinese
對於以其他次數因感受轉變之業而生於四禪者而言，此在阿賴耶上安立習氣之次第是必須的，如云：「心明一淨生何果，如梵天等即如是。」所說的是，母子二人被水沖走時，母親對兒子懷有強烈的慈愛之心，兒子也同樣對母親懷有慈愛之心，這二人去世時，如同生於梵天世界一樣，這是因為他們二人在前世獲得了禪定的等持，後來退失了，所以在阿賴耶上禪定的習氣變得極其濃厚，不必依靠止觀的等持修習，僅僅是慈愛之心，就能使先前的種子完全成熟，從而生於梵天。世間和出世間道的道理也是如此，在其他世中，以空性所聽聞等無漏的智慧生起的種子在阿賴耶上存在，以加行道殊勝法位修道等，積累殊勝善根的因緣，使種子完全成熟，從而在相續中生起出世間的智慧，不是從世間的眾生中實際生起出世間的智慧，如果沒有阿賴耶，那它的生起方式也是不合理的。從這些道理中引申出的含義是，避免了阿賴耶與外道的自在天等相同，以及避免了如果具備一切種子，那果也應當同時顯現的過失這兩種情況。第一種情況是，熱達瓦等一些人說，如同阿賴耶識以習氣產生一切顯現一樣，一些外道也認為梵天化現了一切世界，因此阿賴耶識與梵天相同，或者與數論派所認為的自性等相同。這也是因為阿賴耶與他們在某些方面相似，自在天和造作者等都是依賴於這個阿賴耶而假立的，因為《楞伽經》中這樣說過：蘊的相續。
English
For those who are born in the four dhyanas due to the karma of experiencing transformation in other instances, this sequence of establishing imprints on the Alaya is necessary. As it is said, "What fruit is born from a single clear mind? It is like Brahma and others." What is said is that when a mother and son were swept away by water, the mother had a strong feeling of love for her son, and the son also had a feeling of love for his mother. When these two died, it was like being born in the world of Brahma. This is because they had attained the samadhi of meditation in a previous life, but later lost it, so the imprint of meditation on the Alaya became extremely thick. Without relying on the practice of samadhi of calm abiding and insight, just the feeling of love alone can cause the previous seeds to fully ripen, and thus be born in Brahma. The principle of the mundane and supramundane paths is also the same. In other lives, the seeds of uncontaminated wisdom, such as hearing about emptiness, exist on the Alaya. Through the practice of the path of the great supreme dharma of the path of application, etc., and the accumulation of the causes and conditions of special virtues, the seeds fully ripen, and thus supramundane wisdom arises in the mindstream. It is impossible for supramundane wisdom to actually arise from mundane beings. If there is no Alaya, then its arising is also unreasonable. The implications derived from these reasons are to avoid the fault of equating the Alaya with the Ishvara of the Tirthikas, and to avoid the fault of all fruits appearing simultaneously if all seeds are present. The first case is that some, such as Redawa, say that just as the Alaya-vijnana produces all appearances from imprints, some Tirthikas also believe that Brahma emanates all worlds, so the Alaya-vijnana is the same as Brahma, or the same as the Pradhana, etc., believed by the Samkhyas. This is because the Alaya and they are similar in some respects. Ishvara and the agent, etc., are based on this Alaya, as it is said in the Lankavatara Sutra: the continuum of the skandhas.
Chinese
以及补特伽罗，如是因和痛苦，以及主宰自在作者等，我已说是唯心。如是说之故。阿赖耶与彼等完全相同也不是，数论派所许的主要是物质性的事物常恒，而此是识非恒常，以及作者自在所许的，身心二者聚合之士夫是常恒，而此处不是物质和觉性二者聚合，是觉性无常之自性，以及作者说以自己的意愿化现这些世间。<此处是>从阿赖耶的习气力而显现各种各样，不是阿赖耶自己以意愿化现，因为阿赖耶没有意愿之故。如是阿赖耶与彼等有极大的不同差别。第二是，论师月称说：一切之种子名为阿赖耶，从自己的能力生起唯识。等等首先安立前述的宗派，具有一切种子的阿赖耶被诸多理证遮破，对此，果六类之显现等等，应成同时全部显现，因为因阿赖耶是具有一切种子之故，如是进行遮破。所谓具有一切种子，<自续中>安立为仅仅是具足同类种子，否则，应成天授的相续中也有供施生于地狱的习气种子。因此，所谓同类种子具足一切，也仅仅是具足本体的种子即可，不需要具足<一切各自的>自性种子，譬如，从阿赖耶中有瓶子的种子之力，显现瓶子的显现<仅此而已>，而且，那也是最终坏灭和生起，以及大小等等的自性之法，是<瓶子显现所出>因的次第而生起，不需要从彼等之外有习气和种子，因为瓶子的显现生起之后，彼等的<生灭等等>会变成有力之故。如果阿赖耶识中有因习气一切，但是果显现一切
English
and persons, likewise causes and suffering, and lords, the powerful doers, I have explained as mind-only. Because it is said thus. The ālaya is not entirely the same as those either, for the pradhāna that the Sāṃkhyas assert is a material entity that they assert as permanent, while this is a consciousness that is impermanent, and those who assert the doer Īśvara assert that a person who is an aggregate of body and mind is permanent, while here it is not an aggregate of matter and awareness, but is awareness with the characteristic of impermanence, and the doer says that he emanates these worlds by his own will. <Here> it appears in various ways from the power of the ālaya's impressions, but the ālaya itself does not emanate by its own will, because the ālaya has no will. Thus, the ālaya and those have a very great difference. The second is: Ācārya Candrakīrti says: From the seed of all, called the ālaya, from its own power, only consciousness arises. etc. First, he establishes the former tenet, and the ālaya that possesses all seeds is refuted by many reasonings, and to that, the appearance of the six kinds of fruits, etc., should all appear simultaneously, because the cause, the ālaya, is the possessor of all seeds, thus he refutes. The term "possessor of all seeds" is <in svatantra> posited as merely possessing similar kinds of seeds, otherwise, it would follow that the continuum of Devadatta would also have the seeds of impressions that would cause him to be born in hell. Therefore, the term "possessor of all similar kinds of seeds" is also sufficient with merely possessing the basis of the characteristics, but it is not necessary to possess <all the individual> characteristics of the seeds, for example, from the power of the ālaya having the seed of a pot, the appearance of the pot arises <that much only>, and that also eventually decays and arises, and the characteristics of the qualities of size, etc., arise from the sequence of <the pot's appearing> causes, and there is no need for impressions and seeds to be separate from those, because after the appearance of the pot has arisen, their <arising, ceasing, etc.> become powerful. If the ālaya-vijñāna has all the causal impressions, but all the fruit appearances
Chinese
不可能同时显现，仅仅是具有所有种子，并不能产生显现，因为凭借因缘次第显现。其中有些因缘必须恒常存在，因为那是从习气的力量中产生的，因为习气是所有形态的。如果认为从习气的力量中可以产生因缘，但并非所有的因缘都必然<恒常存在于自身>。对于那个因缘来说，也有其他的因缘，即第二个<先前的作意>，但是仅仅有因的种子，果的显现也不会变得清晰，而是由自身所生的<想要观看的>先前的作意使其变得清晰。虽然因缘等因是从习气的自性，阿赖耶识自身产生的，但是因缘并非恒常存在于自身，例如，虽然所有内外之法都是从心的力量中产生的，但是这些法和心二者并非一体，因为心的体性是光明和觉知等，而变成物质的法类则不具备这些。心和内外之法也不是他异的，因为这些内外之法并非存在于心之外。因此，它们既不能说是同一，也不能说是他异。如果以理智分析这些，是以胜义谛的观察方式进行分析，那么我们也会为了确立阿赖耶识及其眷属为无实有而进行驳斥。如果以世俗谛中仅为因缘的方式进行理智分析并驳斥它们，那么就仅仅是看似夸张的责难。例如，在第一道曙光出现的时候，虽然也有显现所有景象的种子，但是由于对境曙光产生了想要观看的作意，作为因缘，眼识以曙光的形象显现，由于它的显现，其他景象显现的习气无法被唤醒。在那之后，当专注于声音的对境时，先前景象清晰显现的能力减弱，之后声音景象显现的习气被唤醒，从而显现出声音的景象。你的理智<这个所有种子>的周遍性也成立，例如外在的
English
It is impossible for everything to appear simultaneously. Merely having all the seeds does not generate appearance, because appearances arise sequentially through conditions. Some of those conditions must always be present, because they arise from the power of habit, since habit is of all kinds. If one thinks that conditions can arise from the power of habit, it is not certain that all conditions <are always present in themselves>. For that condition, there is also another condition, the second <previous attention>, but merely having the seed as the cause, the appearance of the result will not become clear, but it is made clear by the previous attention <of wanting to see> that arises from itself. Although the cause, such as conditions, arises from the nature of habit, the alaya consciousness itself, the condition is not always present in itself. For example, although all external and internal phenomena arise from the power of mind, those phenomena and mind are not the same, because the nature of mind is clear and cognitive, etc., which the phenomena that have become material do not possess. Mind and external and internal phenomena are also not different, because these external and internal phenomena do not exist apart from mind. Therefore, they cannot be said to be either the same or different. If these are analyzed with reasoning, if they are analyzed from the perspective of the reasoning that investigates ultimate truth, then we will also refute them in order to establish that the alaya consciousness and its retinue are unreal. If, in conventional truth, one analyzes with reasoning based on the mere nature of cause and condition and refutes them, then it is merely an apparent exaggeration of refutation. For example, at the time when the first rays of dawn appear, although there are seeds for all appearances to arise, because the attention of wanting to see arises towards the object of dawn, as a condition, eye consciousness arises in the form of the appearance of dawn, and because of its arising, the habit of other appearances arising cannot be awakened. After that, when attention is directed towards the object of sound, the ability of the previous appearance of form to appear clearly diminishes, and the habit of the appearance of the later sound arises, and the appearance of that arises. Your reasoning <this all seeds> this pervasion is also valid, for example, external
Chinese
如果将许多不同的事物放入一个容器中，那么产生一个事物时，就会导致所有事物都产生。因为许多不同的事物都依赖于一个容器而存在。也就是说，如果一个词消失，就会导致所有词都消失，原因也是如此。那些以排除其他边的方式存在的阿赖耶识，如果显示没有损害者，就成立为有阿赖耶识。因此，证明有阿赖耶识，即有阿赖耶识，因为对于贪等烦恼，如果缺少了不同于根、境和识三者的，不产生的原因，那么聚集在一起的任何东西，都不会超出阿赖耶识。例如，从眼睛的根和境的色产生贪等，这是显而易见的，但在某些时候，即使境、根、识三者聚集，也不会产生贪等烦恼，因此仅仅依靠这三者是不够的，所以成立为有一个原因，而这原因不是阿赖耶识之外的其他。有时，看到这三者聚集而产生烦恼，因此也成立为阿赖耶识与这三者一起运作。对此，前派说：贪等烦恼的产生仅仅是境的力量所致。如果是这样，那么对于一个人生起嗔恨的境，即敌人，无论什么样的人看到，都会导致仅仅生起嗔恨，因为仅仅是境的力量。这样一来，阿罗汉的相续中也会导致生起嗔恨，因为可能会出现用武器伤害他的敌人等，仅仅是境的力量而生起嗔恨。因此，阿罗汉的相续中根本不可能生起烦恼，因为已经断除了所有烦恼的种子。即使不是仅仅依靠境的力量而生起，但会因为作意的差别而生起，如果这样认为。那么，如果一个人以嗔恨的心，将损害自己的敌人作为境来作意，那么从那一生起一次嗔恨，就会导致总是对他生起嗔恨。因为习气已经成熟。例如，在太阳稍微偏离一点的时间里，<逐渐地>将少量听闻一次又一次地作意并背诵，持续大约一个月<长时间>。
English
If many different things are put into one container, then when one thing arises, it follows that all things arise. Because many different things exist relying on one container. That is to say, if one word disappears, it follows that all words disappear, and the reason is the same. Those Alaya-vijñāna that exist in a way that excludes other extremes, if it is shown that there is no harm, then it is established that there is Alaya-vijñāna. Therefore, proving that there is Alaya-vijñāna, that is, there is Alaya-vijñāna, because for afflictions such as attachment, if there is a cause that is different from the three of root, object, and consciousness, and that without which it does not arise, then anything that gathers together will not go beyond Alaya-vijñāna. For example, the arising of attachment etc. from the eye's root and the object of form is obvious, but sometimes, even if the three of object, root, and consciousness gather, attachment etc. afflictions do not arise, so relying solely on these three is not enough, so it is established that there is a cause, and this cause is not other than Alaya-vijñāna. Sometimes, seeing that afflictions arise when these three gather, therefore it is also established that Alaya-vijñāna also operates together with these three. To this, the former party says: The arising of afflictions such as attachment is solely due to the power of the object. If that is the case, then for a person who has an object that gives rise to hatred, that is, an enemy, no matter what kind of person sees it, it will follow that only hatred arises, because it is solely the power of the object. In this way, it would also follow that hatred arises in the continuum of an Arhat, because there may appear an enemy who harms him with weapons, etc., and hatred arises solely from the power of the object. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible for afflictions to arise in the continuum of an Arhat, because all the seeds of afflictions have been abandoned. Even if it does not arise solely from the power of the object, but it will arise due to the difference in attention, if you think so. Then, if a person attends to an enemy who harms him as an object with a hateful mind, then from that, if hatred arises once, it will follow that hatred always arises towards him. Because the habit has matured. For example, in the time when the sun deviates slightly, <gradually> attending to and reciting a small amount of hearing one time after another, continuing for about a month <for a long time>.