Chinese
大正藏第 85 册 No. 2783 大乘稻[〹/干]经随听疏决 No. 2783 [cf. No. 2782] 大乘稻芉经随听疏决 稽首恭敬正遍知 及以妙法僧伽众 所有稻芉未决义 今当次第略解释 十六论中第一言因中有果论者。谓如有一若沙门若婆罗门。起如是见立论。常常时恒恒时。于诸因中具有果性。谓雨众外道作如是计。何因缘故。起如是计。立如是论。显示因中具有果性。由教及理故。教者谓彼先师所造教藏。随门传授。传至于今。显示因中先有果性。理者谓即彼沙门若婆罗门为性。寻□□□□察住即思地住自辩地住异生地住。随思惟观察行地。彼作是思。若从彼性此住得生。一切世间共知共立。彼为此因非余。又求果者惟所此因非余。又即于彼加功营构诸所求事非余。又若彼果即从彼生不从余生。是故彼果因中已有。若不尔者。应立一切是一切因。为求一果应所一切应于一切。加功营构。应从一切一切果生。如是由施设故。求所故。所作决定故。生故。彼见因中常有果性。应审问彼。汝何所欲。何者因相。何者果相。因果两相为异不异。若无异相。便无因果二种。决定因果二种无差别故。因中有果不应道理。若有异相。汝意云何。因中果相为 现代汉语译本 《大乘稻秆经随听疏决》 稽首恭敬于正遍知（正等觉者，即佛陀），以及妙法僧伽众（僧团）。 对于《稻秆经》中尚未决定的意义，现在应当依次略作解释。 十六论中，第一种是‘因中有果论’。意思是说，如果有一个沙门（出家修道者）或婆罗门（古印度教祭司），生起这样的见解并立论：在任何时候，任何情况下，各种因中都具有果的性质。这是雨众外道（指持常见的外道）所作的计较。因为什么缘故，他们生起这样的计较，立下这样的理论，来显示因中具有果的性质呢？ 这是由于教和理的缘故。教是指他们的先师所造的教藏，按照一定的门径传授，一直传到今天，显示因中先有果的性质。理是指那些沙门或婆罗门以自性寻思、观察，安住于思地住、自辩地住、异生地住。随着思惟观察的进行，他们这样思考：如果从那个自性，这个住处得以产生，那么一切世间都会共同知道、共同承认，那个自性是产生这个住处的因，而不是其他的因。而且，寻求果的人，只会从这个因中寻求，而不是从其他的因中寻求。而且，就在那个因上，人们会加以功力，营造所求的事情，而不是在其他的因上。而且，如果那个果是从那个因产生的，而不是从其他的因产生的，所以那个果在因中已经存在了。如果不是这样，就应该认为一切都是一切的因，为了求一个果，就应该在一切事物上，对一切事物，加以功力，应该从一切事物中产生一切果。因为这样的施设，因为寻求的缘故，因为所作的决定，因为产生的缘故，他们认为因中常有果的性质。应该审问他们：你想要什么？什么是因的相状？什么是果的相状？因和果的两种相状是相同还是不同？如果没有不同的相状，就没有因果两种。因为因果两种没有差别，所以因中有果是不应道理的。如果有不同的相状，你认为怎么样？因中的果相是
English
English version The Commentary and Elucidation on the Mahayana Rice Seedling Sutra I bow with reverence to the Perfectly Enlightened One (Sammasambuddha), and to the wonderful Dharma and the Sangha (community). Regarding the meanings in the Rice Seedling Sutra that have not yet been resolved, I shall now briefly explain them in order. Among the sixteen theses, the first is the 'theory of the effect existing in the cause'. It means that if there is a Shramana (wandering ascetic) or a Brahmin (ancient Indian priest), who arises with such a view and establishes a theory: at all times and in all circumstances, various causes possess the nature of the effect. This is the calculation made by the Rain Sect heretics (referring to externalists who hold the view of permanence). For what reason do they arise with such a calculation, establish such a theory, to show that the cause possesses the nature of the effect? This is due to the reason of teaching and principle. Teaching refers to the teachings created by their former teachers, transmitted through certain paths, and passed down to this day, showing that the nature of the effect exists in the cause first. Principle refers to those Shramanas or Brahmins who contemplate and observe with their own nature, dwelling in the dwelling of thought, the dwelling of self-argument, and the dwelling of the different birth. As the contemplation and observation proceed, they think like this: if from that nature, this dwelling can be produced, then all the world will commonly know and commonly acknowledge that that nature is the cause of producing this dwelling, and not other causes. Moreover, those who seek the effect will only seek it from this cause, and not from other causes. Moreover, on that cause, people will apply effort and construct the things they seek, and not on other causes. Moreover, if that effect is produced from that cause, and not from other causes, then that effect already exists in the cause. If it is not like this, it should be considered that everything is the cause of everything, and in order to seek one effect, effort should be applied to everything, to everything, and all effects should be produced from everything. Because of such establishment, because of the reason of seeking, because of the determination of what is done, because of the reason of production, they believe that the nature of the effect always exists in the cause. They should be questioned: what do you want? What is the characteristic of the cause? What is the characteristic of the effect? Are the two characteristics of cause and effect the same or different? If there are no different characteristics, there are no two kinds of cause and effect. Because the two kinds of cause and effect have no difference, it is unreasonable to say that the effect exists in the cause. If there are different characteristics, what do you think? Is the characteristic of the effect in the cause --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
未生相。为已生相。若未生相。便于因中果犹未生而说。是有不应道理。若已生相即果。已生复从因生。不应道理。是故因中非先有果。然要有因待缘果生。又有相法。于有相法中。由五种相故。方可了知。于一处所可得。如瓶中水。二于所依可得。如眼中眼识。三即自相可得。如因自体不由比度。四即由自作业可得。五由因变异故成变异。或由缘变异故果成变异。是故彼说常常时恒恒时因中有果。不应道理。由此因缘故。所立论非如理说。如是不异相故。异相故。未生相故。已生相故。不应道理 二言从缘显了。论者。即如有一若沙门若婆罗门。起如是见。立如是论。一切诸法本性是有。从众缘显。不从缘生。谓即因中有果论者。及声相论者。作如是计。何因缘故。因中有果。论者。见诸因中。先有果性。从缘显耶。由教及理故。教如前说。理者谓如有一为性。即思为性观察广说如前。彼如是思。果先是有。复从因生。不应道理。然非不用功为成于果。彼复何缘而作功用。岂非唯为显了果耶彼作如是妄分别已。立显了论。应审问彼。汝何所欲为无障缘而为障碍为有障缘耶。若无障缘者。无障碍缘而为障碍。不应道理。若有障缘者。属果之因。何故不障。同是有故。不应道理。譬如黑闇障盆中水。亦能障盆。若言障因 现代汉语译本 未生之相，是已生之相吗？如果说是未生之相，那么在因中，果实尚未产生就被谈论，这是不应有的道理。如果说是已生之相，那么果实已经产生，又从因中产生，这也不合道理。因此，因中并非预先存在果实。然而，必须要有因，等待缘分的聚合，果实才能产生。又有相之法，在有相之法中，通过五种相，才能被了解。一是在一处所可以获得，比如瓶中的水。二是在所依赖之处可以获得，比如眼中的眼识。三是直接从自身之相可以获得，比如因的自体，不需要通过比较推度。四是直接通过自身的作业可以获得。五是由于因的变化而产生变化，或者由于缘的变化而果实产生变化。因此，那些说果实常常时、恒恒时存在于因中的说法，是不合道理的。由于这些因缘，所建立的论点并非如理如实。像这样，因为不异之相，因为异相，因为未生之相，因为已生之相，这些说法都是不合道理的。 二、关于‘从缘显了’的论者。就像有些沙门（Śrāmaṇa，指佛教出家修行者）或婆罗门（Brāhmaṇa，指古印度教的祭司），产生这样的见解，立下这样的论点：一切诸法的本性是存在的，只是从众缘显现出来，而不是从缘而生。这就是所谓的‘因中有果’论者，以及‘声相’论者，他们这样认为。因为什么缘故，‘因中有果’论者认为在诸因中，果的性质预先存在，只是从缘显现出来呢？是因为教义和道理的缘故。教义如前面所说。道理是指，比如有一个‘为性’，即以思考为性质，观察并广泛论述，如前所述。他们这样认为，果实预先存在，又从因中产生，这不合道理。然而，并非不用功就能成就果实。他们又因为什么缘故而作功用呢？难道不是仅仅为了显现果实吗？他们作出这样的虚妄分别之后，立下‘显了’论。应该审问他们，你们想要做什么？是为了消除障碍的缘，还是为了制造障碍？如果说是为了消除障碍的缘，那么没有障碍的缘却要消除障碍，这不合道理。如果说是有障碍的缘，那么属于果的因，为什么不阻碍它呢？因为它们同样是存在的，这不合道理。譬如黑暗能够阻碍盆中的水，也能阻碍盆。如果说阻碍因...
English
English version Is the unarisen characteristic the same as the arisen characteristic? If it is said to be the unarisen characteristic, then to speak of the fruit as not yet arisen within the cause is unreasonable. If it is said to be the arisen characteristic, then the fruit, having already arisen, arises again from the cause, which is also unreasonable. Therefore, the fruit does not pre-exist within the cause. However, there must be a cause, awaiting the convergence of conditions (緣, *pratyaya*), for the fruit to arise. Furthermore, there are characteristics of phenomena (相法, *lakṣaṇa-dharma*). Within the characteristics of phenomena, it is only through five kinds of characteristics that it can be understood. First, it can be obtained in one place, like water in a bottle. Second, it can be obtained in what it relies on, like eye-consciousness in the eye. Third, it can be obtained directly from its own characteristic, like the self-nature of a cause, without relying on comparison or inference. Fourth, it can be obtained directly through its own activity. Fifth, it changes because of the change in the cause, or the fruit changes because of the change in the conditions. Therefore, those who say that the fruit always exists in the cause at all times are speaking unreasonably. Because of these causes and conditions, the established argument is not in accordance with reason. Thus, because of the non-different characteristic, because of the different characteristic, because of the unarisen characteristic, because of the arisen characteristic, these statements are unreasonable. Second, regarding the proponents of 'manifestation from conditions'. It is like some Śrāmaṇas (沙門, *Śrāmaṇa*, Buddhist renunciates) or Brāhmaṇas (婆羅門, *Brāhmaṇa*, priests in ancient India) who give rise to such views and establish such arguments: the inherent nature of all phenomena exists, but it is manifested from the aggregation of conditions, not born from conditions. This is what the proponents of 'fruit exists in the cause' and the proponents of 'sound-characteristic' believe. For what reason do the proponents of 'fruit exists in the cause' believe that the nature of the fruit pre-exists in all causes, and is merely manifested from conditions? It is because of doctrine and reason. The doctrine is as previously stated. The reason is that, for example, there is a 'nature' (為性), which is characterized by thinking, observing, and extensively discussing, as mentioned before. They think that the fruit pre-exists and then arises from the cause, which is unreasonable. However, it is not that no effort is needed to achieve the fruit. For what reason do they make effort? Is it not solely to manifest the fruit? After making such false distinctions, they establish the 'manifestation' argument. They should be questioned: what do you want to do? Is it to remove obstructing conditions or to create obstacles? If it is to remove obstructing conditions, then removing obstacles when there are no obstacles is unreasonable. If there are obstructing conditions, then why doesn't the cause belonging to the fruit obstruct it? Because they both exist, which is unreasonable. For example, darkness can obstruct the water in a pot, and it can also obstruct the pot. If it is said that it obstructs the cause... --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
缘。亦能障者。亦应显因。俱被障故。而言但显因中光有果生不显因者。不应道理。复应问彼。为有性是障缘为异耶。若有性是障缘者。是即有性应常不显了。不应道理。因亦是有。何不为障。若言果性。是障缘者。是则一法亦因亦果。如芽是种子。果是茎等。因是即一法亦显不显。不应道理。又今问汝。随汝意答。本法与显为异不异。若不异者。法应常显。一已复显。不应道理。若言异者。彼显为无因耶。为有因耶。若言无因。无因而显。不应道理。若有因者。果性可显。非是因性。以不显因能显于果。不应道理。如是无障缘故。有障缘故。有相故。果相故。显不异故。显异故。不应道理 三言去来实有论者。谓如有一若沙门若婆罗门。若在此法者。由不正思惟故。起如是见立如是论。有过去有未来其相成就。犹如见在实有非假。何因缘故起如见立如是论。由教及理。教如前说。又在此法者。于如来经。不如理分别故。谓如经言。一切有者。即十二处。此二十处实相是有。又薄伽梵说。有过去业。又说。有过去色。有未来色。广说乃至识亦如是。理者谓如有一为性寻思为性观察。广说如前。彼如是思。若法自相安住此法。真实是有。此若未来无者。尔时应未受相。此若过去无者。尔时应失自相。若如是者。法法自相 现代汉语译本 缘。如果说缘也能成为障碍，那么也应该显现出因。因为因和缘都被障碍了。如果只说在显现因中，光有果产生，而不显现因，这是不应道理的。还应该问他们，‘有性’是障碍缘，还是‘异’是障碍缘？如果‘有性’是障碍缘，那么这个‘有性’就应该永远不显现，这是不应道理的。因也是‘有’，为什么不能成为障碍？如果说果的‘性’是障碍缘，那么这就变成一个法既是因又是果，比如芽是种子的果，是茎的因等等。一个法既显现又不显现，这是不应道理的。再问你，随便你回答，本法和显现是‘异’还是‘不异’？如果不‘异’，那么法应该永远显现，已经显现了又再次显现，这是不应道理的。如果说是‘异’，那么这个显现是没有因的呢？还是有因的呢？如果说没有因，没有因而显现，这是不应道理的。如果有因，那么是果的‘性’可以显现，而不是因的‘性’。因为不显现的因能够显现果，这是不应道理的。像这样，因为没有障碍缘的缘故，因为有障碍缘的缘故，因为有相的缘故，因为果相的缘故，因为显现不‘异’的缘故，因为显现‘异’的缘故，这些都是不应道理的。 三言去来实有论者。就是说，如果有一个沙门（Śrāmaṇa，出家修道者）或者婆罗门（Brahmana，古印度僧侣阶层），如果在这个法中，由于不正思惟的缘故，产生这样的见解，立下这样的论断：过去和未来是真实存在的，它们的相是成就的，就像现在真实存在一样，不是虚假的。因为什么因缘而产生这样的见解，立下这样的论断呢？因为教和理。教就像前面所说的。又在这个法中的人，对于如来的经典，不如理分别的缘故，认为如经文所说：‘一切有’，就是十二处（Dvādaśa āyatana，内六处和外六处的总称）。这十二处实相是有。而且薄伽梵（Bhagavan，世尊）说过，有过去的业，又说，有过去的色（Rūpa，物质、颜色），有未来的色，广泛地说，乃至识（Vijñāna，意识）也是这样。理就是说，如果有一个人以寻思为‘性’，以观察为‘性’，广泛地说就像前面所说的。他这样思惟，如果法自身安住的相，这个法就是真实存在的。如果未来没有，那么那时应该没有接受相。如果过去没有，那么那时应该失去自身相。如果像这样，法法自身相