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t44n1843 awakening of faith in the mahayana meaning commentary.g2.0f

English

English version There are not six minds (referring to six different consciousnesses). In response to this wrong attachment, we say that the mind is not singular. Vijnana (consciousness) has no separate entity; its meaning lies in perceiving and cognizing. The minds of the six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness) rely on different roots (sense organs) and perceive different objects. How can it be said to be one? If it is determined to be one and is constant, then it should always only cognize one sensory object and should not change. Moreover, mental phenomena (dharma) do not have the nature of moving back and forth. Wherever it arises cognition, it arises there. It cannot be said that it is one and can move back and forth in all places. Furthermore, the example of the monkey they cite to prove that the mind is one is incorrect. Ordinary foolish people think that the monkey is fixed as one, appearing in six windows, but in reality, the monkey's thoughts arise and cease moment by moment. The monkey appearing in this window will not go to that window. Consciousness is also like this. Eye-consciousness arising from the eye-root will not go to other roots. Everything is like this. The second wrong view is the attachment to the absolute difference of consciousness. Some people proclaim that the nature of the six consciousnesses is absolutely different. In response to this wrong attachment, we say that the mind is not completely different. In the boundaries of affairs, they are continuously unified, not completely separate entities. One monkey moves between six windows, not six monkeys. If it is said that the six consciousnesses each have independent entities, then the independent entities will not interfere with each other. Eye-consciousness should always arise from eye-consciousness, and even mind-consciousness should always arise from mind-consciousness, and they should not arise from each other. But now we see that the five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, and body-consciousness) arise from mind-consciousness, and mind-consciousness arises from the five consciousnesses, so they are not completely different entities. Furthermore, if the six consciousnesses each have independent entities, then the independent entities will not hinder each other. Because they do not hinder each other, the minds of the six consciousnesses should always exist simultaneously and should always function simultaneously. But they do not always exist simultaneously, so this shows that they do not have independent entities. The third wrong view is the attachment to the constancy of consciousness. Some people hear that karma-phala (karmic consequences) will not be cut off in the three times (past, present, and future), and they think that the mind is constant, going back and forth in samsara (cycle of rebirth), and it is always one consciousness that is functioning. Even if there are rises and falls, the essence of the mind will not change. In response to this wrong attachment, we say that consciousness is impermanent. The mind in humans and the mind in devas (gods) are different. The minds of the six realms (hell, hungry ghosts, animals, asuras, humans, and devas) are different from each other. How can it be said to be constant? Moreover, as it is said in the sutras, the mind corresponding to suffering is different, the mind corresponding to happiness is different, and the mind corresponding to neither suffering nor happiness is different. Like this, everything is different. How can it be said to be constant? It is only because ordinary people do not know the true nature of the mind that they falsely think it is constant, just like a child seeing a rotating fire wheel and thinking that it is not interrupted. If the mind is constant, then good should always be good, and evil should always be evil, without any change. Precisely because there is change, it can be determined that the mind is impermanent. The fourth wrong view is the attachment to the annihilation of consciousness. Some people hear that consciousness is impermanent. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chinese

便谓定断。对治此执说心不断。现世造业。后必得果。云何定断。譬如乳酪转变虽异置毒乳中。酪则害人。心亦如是。此身造恶。必未受苦果报。明非是断。五者执定有。如毗昙说。十八界等各住已性。是有不空。谓言空者但空阴上横计我人。不空法体。法不空故心识定有。对此邪执说识是空。空相云何。识者正以别知为义。如一念识即具四相。初生次住终异后灭。于四中何者是知。为初相知为中为后。若初相知者余应不知。余若不知则不名识。若余相知初应不知。初若不知初不名识。若言四相各别是知便是四念各别。知法何关。一念具足四相。答言。四相别非是知。和合之中方知者非知共合。云何有知。如百盲聚。岂有所见。又复四相都无合理。云何无合者。生相现时余相未有。余谁共合。乃至第四灭相现时余相已谢。复与谁合。进退推求都无合义。云何说言和合有知。知义既无。焉有定识。是故经说。色乃至受想行识一切皆空也。六者执定无。有人闻说五阴空寂。便谓世谛因缘亦无。对治此执说识非无。若无心识云何而得见闻觉知。现见六识各有作用。明知。不无。又若无识则无善恶。若无善恶亦无苦乐。则入邪见断善根中不宜受之。经言空者就真为论。于世谛中不无心识。七者执心识独立。无数如来实说。对治 此执说有同时心心数法。故涅槃云。我诸弟子不解我意。唱言。佛说定无心数。又涅槃说十大地中心数之定。明非无数。又龙树云。譬如池水珠在则清象入便浊。水喻心王。珠象喻数。于彼喻中可说言。水珠象一心法如是。宁无别数。八者执心外定有数。如毗昙说。对治此执明非定别。故涅槃云。我诸弟子不解我意。唱言。佛说定有心数。若使心外定有别数。无预心事无心之时何不别起。又若心外定有别数。识从意生。诸数亦应别有所依。若别有依是义不然。云何不然。于彼宗中说三性心相应各异。如欲界地善心起时二十二数相应共生。不善起时二十一数相应共生。无记起时有十二数相应共生。从无记心起善恶时十二同数可有所依。自余别数意何所依。若无依生是则心法无次第缘。经说不许。若无别依依意生者与识同依。明非心外。道理云何。即彼心体同时具有。受想行等诸义差别。不同成实前后建立。就一心体随义别分不同毗昙异体建立。两义兼通故非诤论。次就妄识。对治邪执。邪执有六。一者执定无。有人闻说但有六识无第七情便言一向无第七识。对治此执说有七识。如楞伽中说八识义。胜鬘亦云。七法不住。若无妄识说何为八说何为七。经中所言无七情者。事相之中无。第七情非无妄识。二执定有。有人闻说 现代汉语译本 此执认为同时存在心和心所法(citta-caitta)。所以《涅槃经》(Nirvana Sutra)说:‘我的弟子们不理解我的意思,宣称佛说绝对没有心所。’又《涅槃经》说十大地(ten grounds)中心所的确定性,表明并非没有心所。又龙树(Nagarjuna)说:‘譬如池水,珠子在则清澈,大象进入就浑浊。’水比喻心王(citta-raja),珠子和大象比喻心所。在那比喻中可以说,水、珠子、大象和一心法(eka-citta-dharma)就是这样。难道没有分别的心所吗? 第八种执着认为心外有确定的心所。如毗昙宗(Abhidharma)所说。为了对治这种执着,说明心所并非与心截然不同。所以《涅槃经》说:‘我的弟子们不理解我的意思,宣称佛说确定有心所。’如果心外有确定的心所,在没有涉及心的事情、没有心的时候,为什么不单独生起?又如果心外有确定的心所,识(vijnana)是从意(manas)产生的,那么诸心所也应该有各自的所依。如果另有依靠,这种说法是不对的。为什么不对呢?在他们的宗派中说,三性(tri-svabhava)的心相应各不相同。如欲界地(kama-dhatu)善心生起时,二十二个心所相应共同生起;不善心生起时,二十一个心所相应共同生起;无记心(avyakrta-citta)生起时,有十二个心所相应共同生起。从无记心生起善恶心时,十二个相同的心所可以有所依,其余不同的心所依靠什么呢?如果没有所依而生,那么心法就没有次第缘(krama-pratyaya),经典上说是不允许的。如果没有别的所依,依靠意而生,那么就和识的所依相同,表明并非在心外。 道理是什么呢?就是那个心体(citta-kaya)同时具有受(vedana)、想(samjna)、行(samskara)等诸义的差别,不同于成实宗(Satyasiddhi)前后建立的观点。就一心体(eka-citta-kaya)随着意义的不同而分别,不同于毗昙宗异体建立的观点。两种意义兼顾,所以不是争论。 其次就妄识(bhranta-vijnana)而言,对治邪执。邪执有六种。第一种执着认为绝对没有。有人听说只有六识(sad-vijnana),没有第七末那识(manas-vijnana),便说一概没有第七识。为了对治这种执着,说有七识。如《楞伽经》(Lankavatara Sutra)中说八识义(asta-vijnana),《胜鬘经》(Srimala Sutra)也说:‘七法不住。’如果没有妄识,说什么为八识,说什么为七识?经中所说的没有七情(sapta-vedana),是指在事相(vastu-lakshana)中没有第七情,并非没有妄识。 第二种执着认为绝对有。有人听说

English

English version This adherence asserts that co-existent with the mind are mental functions (citta-caitta). Therefore, the Nirvana Sutra states: 'My disciples do not understand my meaning and proclaim that the Buddha said there are absolutely no mental functions.' Furthermore, the Nirvana Sutra speaks of the definiteness of mental functions within the ten grounds (ten grounds), indicating that they are not non-existent. Nagarjuna (Nagarjuna) also said: 'For example, a pond of water, clear when a pearl is present, becomes turbid when an elephant enters.' The water is likened to the mind-king (citta-raja), while the pearl and elephant are likened to mental functions. In that analogy, it can be said that the water, pearl, elephant, and single mind-dharma (eka-citta-dharma) are thus. Are there not distinct mental functions? The eighth adherence asserts that mental functions exist definitively outside the mind, as stated in the Abhidharma. To counter this adherence, it is clarified that mental functions are not entirely separate from the mind. Therefore, the Nirvana Sutra states: 'My disciples do not understand my meaning and proclaim that the Buddha said there are definitively mental functions.' If mental functions exist definitively outside the mind, why do they not arise independently when there is no involvement of the mind or when the mind is absent? Furthermore, if mental functions exist definitively outside the mind, and consciousness (vijnana) arises from the intellect (manas), then the mental functions should also have their respective bases. If they have separate bases, this assertion is incorrect. Why is it incorrect? In their school, it is said that the mental concomitants of the three natures (tri-svabhava) differ. For example, in the desire realm (kama-dhatu), when a wholesome mind arises, twenty-two mental functions arise in conjunction; when an unwholesome mind arises, twenty-one mental functions arise in conjunction; when a neutral mind (avyakrta-citta) arises, twelve mental functions arise in conjunction. When wholesome or unwholesome minds arise from a neutral mind, the twelve common mental functions can have a basis, but what do the remaining distinct mental functions rely on? If they arise without a basis, then the mind-dharma lacks sequential causation (krama-pratyaya), which is not permitted according to the scriptures. If they do not have a separate basis and arise relying on the intellect, then they share the same basis as consciousness, indicating that they are not outside the mind. What is the reasoning? It is that the mind-body (citta-kaya) simultaneously possesses the distinctions of feeling (vedana), perception (samjna), volition (samskara), and other meanings, differing from the Satyasiddhi school's view of sequential establishment. The single mind-body (eka-citta-kaya) is distinguished according to the difference in meaning, differing from the Abhidharma school's view of establishing separate entities. Both meanings are accommodated, so it is not a dispute. Next, regarding deluded consciousness (bhranta-vijnana), to counter wrong adherences. There are six types of wrong adherences. The first adherence asserts that it absolutely does not exist. Some, hearing that there are only six consciousnesses (sad-vijnana) and not the seventh, manas-consciousness (manas-vijnana), claim that there is absolutely no seventh consciousness. To counter this adherence, it is said that there are seven consciousnesses. As the Lankavatara Sutra explains the meaning of the eight consciousnesses (asta-vijnana), and the Srimala Sutra also states: 'The seven dharmas are impermanent.' If there were no deluded consciousness, what would be referred to as the eight consciousnesses, and what would be referred to as the seven? The scriptures' statement that there are no seven feelings (sapta-vedana) refers to the absence of the seventh feeling in phenomena (vastu-lakshana), not the absence of deluded consciousness. The second adherence asserts that it absolutely exists. Some, hearing that --------------------------------------------------------------------------------