Chinese
大正藏第 31 册 No. 1624 观所缘缘论 No. 1624 [cf. No. 1625] 观所缘缘论 陈那菩萨造 三藏法师玄奘奉 诏译 诸有欲令眼等五识。以外色作所缘缘者。或执极微许有实体。能生识故或执和合。以识生时带彼相故。二俱非理。所以者何。 极微于五识 设缘非所缘 彼相识无故 犹如眼根等 所缘缘者。谓能缘识带彼相起及有实体。令能缘识托彼而生色等极微。设有实体能生五识容有缘义。然非所缘。如眼根等于眼等识无彼相故。如是极微于眼等识。无所缘义。 和合于五识 设所缘非缘 彼体实无故 犹如第二月 色等和合于眼识等有彼相故。设作所缘然无缘义。如眼错乱见第二月。彼无实体不能生故。如是和合于眼等识无有缘义故。外二事于所缘缘互阙一支。俱不应理。有执色等各有多相。于中一分是现量境故。诸极微相资各有一和集相。此相实有各能发生。似己相识故与五识作所缘缘。此亦非理。所以者何。 和集如坚等 设于眼等识 是缘非所缘 许极微相故 如坚等相虽是实有。于眼等识容有缘义。而非所缘。眼等识上无彼相故。色等极微诸和集相。理亦应尔。彼 现代汉语译本 大正藏第 31 册 No. 1624 观所缘缘论 No. 1624 [cf. No. 1625] 观所缘缘论 陈那菩萨造 三藏法师玄奘奉 诏译 那些想要让眼等五识以外色作为所缘缘（ālambana-pratyaya，产生认知的客观条件）的人，或者执着于极微（paramāṇu，物质的最小单位），认为它有实体，能够产生意识；或者执着于和合（saṃghāta，组合），认为意识产生时带有极微的相状。这两种观点都不合理。为什么呢？ 极微对于五识 假设是缘而非所缘 彼相识中无 犹如眼根等 所谓所缘缘，是指能缘识（vijñāna，意识）带有它的相状而生起，并且具有实体，使能缘识依靠它而产生。色等极微，即使有实体，能够产生五识，容许它具有缘的作用，但不是所缘。就像眼根（cakṣurindriya，视觉器官）对于眼识（cakṣurvijñāna，视觉意识）一样，没有它的相状。因此，极微对于眼等识，没有所缘的意义。 和合对于五识 假设是所缘而非缘 彼体实无故 犹如第二月 色等的和合，对于眼识等，有它的相状，假设它可以作为所缘，但没有缘的作用。就像眼睛错乱时看到第二个月亮一样，它没有实体，不能产生意识。因此，和合对于眼等识，没有缘的作用。所以，外在的两种事物，在所缘缘中都缺少一个要素，都不合理。有人执着于色等各自具有多种相状，其中一部分是现量境（pratyakṣa-viṣaya，直接感知的对象），因此，诸极微相互资助，各自具有一种和集相（samudāya-lakṣaṇa，集合的相状）。这种相状是真实存在的，各自能够发生类似于自己相状的意识，因此可以作为五识的所缘缘。这种观点也不合理。为什么呢？ 和集如坚等 假设对于眼等识 是缘而非所缘 许极微相故 就像坚硬等相，虽然是真实存在的，对于眼等识，容许它具有缘的作用，但不是所缘。因为眼等识上没有它的相状。色等极微的各种和集相，道理也应该如此。它们
English
English version T 31, No. 1624 *Treatise on the Object Conditioned* (*Guan Suo Yuan Yuan Lun*) No. 1624 [cf. No. 1625] *Treatise on the Object Conditioned* By Bodhisattva Dignāga (Chenna Pusa) Translated under imperial order by Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang Those who wish to assert that the five consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, take external colors as their object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya), either clinging to the idea of ultimate particles (paramāṇu) as having substantial reality and being able to generate consciousness, or clinging to the idea of aggregates (saṃghāta) because consciousness arises with their appearance, are both unreasonable. Why? Ultimate particles, in relation to the five consciousnesses, If considered a condition, are not the object-condition. Because their appearance is not in consciousness, Like the eye-organ, etc. The object-condition is that which the consciousness that cognizes arises with its appearance and has substantial reality, causing the cognizing consciousness to arise relying on it. Ultimate particles of color, etc., even if they have substantial reality and can generate the five consciousnesses, may have the meaning of a condition, but are not the object-condition. Just like the eye-organ (cakṣurindriya) in relation to eye-consciousness (cakṣurvijñāna), it does not have its appearance. Thus, ultimate particles do not have the meaning of an object-condition in relation to eye-consciousness, etc. Aggregates, in relation to the five consciousnesses, If considered the object-condition, are not a condition. Because their substance is not real, Like a second moon. The aggregates of color, etc., have their appearance in relation to eye-consciousness, etc. If they are considered as the object-condition, they do not have the meaning of a condition. Just like seeing a second moon due to eye delusion, it has no substance and cannot generate consciousness. Thus, aggregates do not have the meaning of a condition in relation to eye-consciousness, etc. Therefore, these two external things both lack one element in the object-condition and are both unreasonable. Some cling to the idea that colors, etc., each have multiple appearances, a portion of which is the object of direct perception (pratyakṣa-viṣaya). Therefore, the ultimate particles mutually support each other, each having an aggregate appearance (samudāya-lakṣaṇa). This appearance is real and can each generate consciousness similar to its own appearance, thus serving as the object-condition for the five consciousnesses. This view is also unreasonable. Why? Aggregates, like hardness, etc., If considered in relation to eye-consciousness, etc., Are a condition but not the object-condition, Because ultimate particles are posited. Just like the appearance of hardness, etc., although it is real, it may have the meaning of a condition in relation to eye-consciousness, etc., but it is not the object-condition. Because eye-consciousness, etc., does not have its appearance. The various aggregate appearances of the ultimate particles of color, etc., should also be the same in principle. They --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
俱执为极微相故。执眼等识能缘极微。诸和集相复有别失。 瓶瓯等觉相 彼执应无别 非形别故别 形别非实故 瓶瓯等物大小等者。能成极微多少同故。缘彼觉相应无差别。若谓彼物形相别故觉相别者。理亦不然。顶等别形唯在瓶等假法上有。非极微故彼不应执。极微亦有差别形相所以者何。 极微量等故 形别惟在假 析彼至极微 彼觉定舍故 非瓶瓯等能成极微有形量别。舍微圆相故。知别形在假非实。又形别物析至极微。彼觉定舍非青等物。析至极微彼觉可舍。由此形别唯世俗有。非如青等亦在实物。是故五识所缘缘体非外色等其理极成。彼所缘缘岂全不有。非全不有。若尔云何。 内色如外现 为识所缘缘 许彼相在识 及能生识故 外境虽无。而有内色似外境现。为所缘缘。许眼等识带彼相起及从彼生。具二义故。此内境相既不离识。如何俱起。能作识缘。 决定相随故 俱时亦作缘 或前为后缘 引彼功能故 境相与识定相随故。虽俱时起亦作识缘。因明者说。若此与彼有无相随。虽俱时生而亦得有因果相故。或前识相为后识缘。引本识中生似自果功能令起不违理故。若五识生唯缘内色。如何亦说眼等为缘。 识上色功能 现代汉语译本 因为他们坚持认为一切事物都是由极微（paramāṇu）组成的。他们认为眼识等能够认知极微。但是，如果将这些极微组合起来，又会出现其他问题。 如果瓶子（bhiṅga）和碗（oṇa）的感知没有区别， 按照他们的观点，这二者应该没有区别。 如果说因为形状不同而有区别， 但形状的差别并非真实存在。 瓶子、碗等物体，如果大小相同，那么构成它们的极微的数量也应该相同。因此，对它们的感知也应该没有差别。如果说因为这些物体的形状不同，所以感知也不同，这个理由也是不成立的。顶等不同的形状只存在于瓶子等假法（prajñapti-dharma）之上，而不是存在于极微之上，所以他们不应该坚持认为极微也有差别。为什么呢？ 因为极微的量是相等的， 形状的差别只存在于假法之中。 将这些物体分解到极微， 对它们的感知一定会消失。 如果构成瓶子、碗等的极微有形状和大小的差别，那么就会舍弃极微的圆形状态。因此，可以知道形状的差别存在于假法之中，而不是真实存在的。此外，将形状不同的物体分解到极微，对它们的感知一定会消失，就像对青色等物体的感知一样。将青色等物体分解到极微，对它们的感知是可以舍弃的。由此可见，形状的差别只存在于世俗层面，不像青色等颜色也存在于真实物体之中。因此，五识所缘的缘体不是外在的色等，这个道理非常明确。那么，五识所缘的缘体难道完全不存在吗？并非完全不存在。如果不是完全不存在，那又是什么呢？ 内在的色法（antar-rūpa）像外境一样显现， 作为识所缘的缘。 允许这些相存在于识中， 并且能够产生识。 虽然外境不存在，但是有内在的色法像外境一样显现，作为所缘缘。允许眼识等带着这些相而生起，并且从这些相中产生，具备这两种含义。这种内在的境相既然不离识，如何能够同时生起，作为识的缘呢？ 因为决定的相随关系， 即使同时生起也能作为缘。 或者前一识作为后一识的缘， 引发本识（mūla-vijñāna）中产生类似自身果的功能。 境相与识之间存在决定的相随关系，所以即使同时生起，也能作为识的缘。因明（hetu-vidyā）学者说，如果此与彼之间存在有无相随的关系，即使同时产生，也可能存在因果关系。或者，前一识的相作为后一识的缘，引发本识中产生类似自身果的功能，这并不违背道理。如果五识的产生仅仅缘于内在的色法，那么为什么又说眼等也是缘呢？ 识上的色法功能，
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English version Because they insist that everything is composed of ultimate particles (paramāṇu). They hold that eye-consciousness, etc., can cognize these ultimate particles. However, if these aggregates are combined, other problems arise. If the perception of a pot (bhiṅga) and a bowl (oṇa) are not distinct, According to their view, there should be no difference between the two. If they say that the difference lies in their different shapes, But the difference in shape is not real. If objects like pots and bowls are the same size, then the number of ultimate particles that constitute them should also be the same. Therefore, the perception of them should be no different. If they say that the perception is different because these objects have different shapes, this reason is also untenable. The different shapes, such as the rim, etc., exist only on conventional entities (prajñapti-dharma) like pots, and not on ultimate particles, so they should not insist that ultimate particles also have differences. Why is that? Because the quantity of ultimate particles is equal, The difference in shape exists only in conventional entities. When these objects are analyzed down to ultimate particles, The perception of them will definitely disappear. If the ultimate particles that constitute pots, bowls, etc., have differences in shape and size, then the roundness of the ultimate particles would be abandoned. Therefore, it can be known that the difference in shape exists in conventional entities, and is not real. Furthermore, when objects with different shapes are analyzed down to ultimate particles, the perception of them will definitely disappear, just like the perception of blue objects. When blue objects are analyzed down to ultimate particles, the perception of them can be abandoned. From this, it can be seen that the difference in shape exists only on the conventional level, unlike colors like blue, which also exist in real objects. Therefore, the object of the five consciousnesses is not external form, etc.; this principle is very clear. Then, does the object of the five consciousnesses not exist at all? It is not that it does not exist at all. If it does not not exist, then what is it? Internal form (antar-rūpa) appears like an external object, As the object-condition of consciousness. It is accepted that these appearances exist in consciousness, And are able to produce consciousness. Although external objects do not exist, there is internal form that appears like an external object, serving as the object-condition. It is accepted that eye-consciousness, etc., arise with these appearances, and arise from these appearances, possessing both meanings. Since this internal object-appearance is not separate from consciousness, how can it arise simultaneously and serve as a condition for consciousness? Because of the determined co-occurrence, Even if they arise simultaneously, they can still serve as a condition. Or the preceding consciousness serves as a condition for the subsequent consciousness, Evoking the potential in the fundamental consciousness (mūla-vijñāna) to produce a result similar to itself. There is a determined co-occurrence between the object-appearance and consciousness, so even if they arise simultaneously, they can still serve as a condition for consciousness. Scholars of logic (hetu-vidyā) say that if there is a relationship of co-occurrence between this and that, even if they arise simultaneously, there may still be a cause-and-effect relationship. Alternatively, the appearance of the preceding consciousness serves as a condition for the subsequent consciousness, evoking the potential in the fundamental consciousness to produce a result similar to itself, which is not contrary to reason. If the arising of the five consciousnesses is only conditioned by internal form, then why is it also said that the eye, etc., are conditions? The potential of form on consciousness, -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 名五根应理 功能与境色 无始互为因