English
English version: The Adana-vijnana (receptacle consciousness). Because it stores all the seeds of all dharmas, it is also called the Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness). Because it is the Vipaka (result) of karma led by previous lives, it is also called the Vipaka-result consciousness. If this Vipaka consciousness is not admitted, then what consciousness can hold the body? No other consciousness can universally hold the body, not even abandoning it until the end of life. Also, in what Skandha (aggregate), when the antidote to Klesha-anusaya (affliction latent) arises, can it be called capable of cutting off afflictions? If it is said that the Skandha is in the mind that can counteract it, this is not reasonable. How can latent afflictions be followed, yet become objects that can be counteracted? Also, when sentient beings are born in the Arūpadhātu (formless realm), and defiled, virtuous, and non-outflow thoughts are arising, what Gati (realm of rebirth) contains the Vipaka-dharma? Or it should be allowed that Gati communicates with non-Vipaka and non-bound dharmas, which contradicts reason. Also, when an Anagamin (non-returner) is born in Bhavagra (peak of existence), in order to exhaust the remaining outflows, they cultivate the antidote path. When non-outflow mind arises in Akincanyayatana (sphere of nothingness), what different thing is there in Bhavagra? The self still exists, but it is not called death, nor is it Nikayasabhaga (community of beings). Or, the Jivitindriya (life force) is a separate real thing apart from form, mind, etc. Both of these statements are only hypothetically established on similar Bhaga (aspects) in the Vipaka Skandhas. Similar Bhaga has no separate entity, just like the similar Bhaga of rice and weeds. Therefore, it must be admitted that there is a seed-holding consciousness body as described above, apart from the six Vijnana-kayas (consciousness bodies). It is based on this consciousness that the Theravada school establishes the name Bhavanga-citta (life-continuum consciousness) in their scriptures. The Mahasanghika school calls it Mula-vijnana (root consciousness) in their scriptures. The Mahisasaka school speaks of it as the aggregate that exhausts life and death. What is the aspect of this consciousness in perceiving objects? This aspect of perceiving objects is unknowable. Why is it called consciousness, yet it is like this? Just like when grasping Nirodha-samapatti (cessation attainment) and other states, there is still remaining consciousness, and its aspect of perceiving objects is difficult to know, this consciousness should also be like this. In which Upadanakkhandha (aggregate of clinging) is this consciousness contained? In principle, it should be said that it is contained in the Vijnana Upadanakkhandha. If so, how should the sutra verses be explained? For example, the sutra says: 'What is called Vijnana Upadanakkhandha? It is the six Vijnana-kayas.' And it also says: 'What is called consciousness that conditions Nama-rupa (name and form)? It is the six consciousnesses.' It should be known that this sutra has a different hidden meaning. Just like the Sutra says: 'What is called Samskarakkhandha (aggregate of mental formations)? It is the six bodies of thought.' It is not that there are no other dharmas in the Samskarakkhandha, it is the same here. What is the hidden meaning of saying the six consciousnesses and not other dharmas? For example, the World Honored One said in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra: 'I do not expound to foolish ordinary people, for fear that they will discriminate and cling to it as self.' Why do foolish people --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
夫执此为我。此无始来穷生死际。行相微细无改变故。又以六识所依所缘行相品类粗易了故。与诸烦恼及对治道有相应故。建立杂染清净品故。体是果识由此比知有种识故。诸契经中随所宣说不说因识。与上所说皆相违故。是名说六非余密意。由此已释。余部经中唯说六识身为有分识等。随其所应皆无违害。又于今时一一部内无量契经皆已隐没。如释轨论广辩应知。故不应计阿赖耶识定非经说。理必有故。若尔一身应有二识俱时而转。谓异熟识及余转识。如是何过。若一身中二识俱转。应俱时立二有情身。如余身中二识俱转。此无有失。因果二识展转为依不相离故。又异熟识是余转识所熏习故。非异身中二识俱转。有如是事故无此失。颇有现见种与种果相续异耶。现见世间青莲花等。根与茎等相续各异而为种果。此亦应然。又纵世间见与不见。若不许有阿赖耶识。便有如前所说过难。故应定许阿赖耶识离六识身其体实有。 何缘不许我体实有与六识身为所依止。汝所执我其相云何。而说能为六识依止。若许我如阿赖耶识生灭相续随缘转变。与识何殊。而执为我。若执我体是一是常毕竟无变。如何可说受识等熏为所依止。夫熏习者。令彼所熏相续变成功能差别。如紫矿汁熏拘橼花。令彼相续功能转变。若无熏习则 现代汉语译本：如果执着于‘这个’是‘我’，那么从无始以来直到生死轮回的尽头，它的行相非常微细，不会改变。而且，因为六识所依赖和缘取的行相品类粗显易懂，与各种烦恼以及对治之道相应，建立杂染和清净的品类，它的本体是果识。由此可以推知有种子识的存在。如果各种契经中随处宣说而不说因识，就与上面所说的相违背。这叫做说六识而非其他识的密意。由此已经解释了，其他部经中只说六识的身为有分识等，都随其所应没有违背。而且在现在，一部部经中的无量契经都已经隐没，如《释轨论》中广泛辩论所应知的那样。所以不应该认为阿赖耶识一定不是经中所说，因为从道理上来说必然存在。如果这样，那么一身应该有两个识同时运转，即异熟识和其余的转识。这样有什么过失呢？如果一身中有两个识同时运转，应该同时成立两个有情身，就像其余身中有两个识同时运转一样。这没有过失，因为因果二识辗转为依，不会相离。而且异熟识是其余转识所熏习的，不是异身中有两个识同时运转。有这样的原因，所以没有这个过失。难道有现见的种子和种子果相续不同的吗？现见世间青莲花等的根和茎等相续各异，而作为种子果。这也应该如此。而且即使世间见到与见不到，如果不允许有阿赖耶识，就会有如前面所说的过难。所以应该一定允许阿赖耶识离开六识身，它的本体是真实存在的。 为什么不允许‘我’的本体真实存在，并且作为六识身所依赖的处所呢？你所执着的‘我’的相状是什么样的，而说能作为六识的依止？如果允许‘我’像阿赖耶识一样生灭相续，随缘转变，那么和识有什么区别呢？而执着为‘我’。如果执着‘我’的本体是同一的、常恒的、毕竟不变的，那么如何可以说接受识等的熏习，作为所依赖的处所呢？所谓的熏习，是使被熏习的事物相续变成功能差别，就像用紫矿汁熏拘橼花，使它的相续功能转变。如果没有熏习，那么...
English
English version: If one clings to 'this' as 'I,' then from beginningless time until the end of the cycle of birth and death, its characteristics are very subtle and unchanging. Moreover, because the characteristics of the six consciousnesses (six vijnanas) (the six types of consciousness: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental) on which they rely and which they apprehend are coarse and easily understood, corresponding to various afflictions (kleshas) and antidotal paths, and establishing the categories of defilement and purity, its essence is resultant consciousness (vipaka-vijnana). From this, it can be inferred that there is seed consciousness (bija-vijnana). If the sutras (scriptures) everywhere proclaim without mentioning causal consciousness, it contradicts what was said above. This is called the hidden meaning of speaking of the six consciousnesses and not others. From this, it has been explained that in other scriptures, only the body of the six consciousnesses is spoken of as the life-continuum consciousness (bhavaṅga-citta), etc., and all are without contradiction as appropriate. Moreover, at present, countless sutras in each section have already disappeared, as should be known from the extensive debate in the Commentary on the Compendium of Principles (释轨论). Therefore, it should not be thought that the alaya consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) (storehouse consciousness) is definitely not spoken of in the scriptures, because it necessarily exists according to reason. If so, then one body should have two consciousnesses operating simultaneously, namely, the resultant consciousness and the remaining active consciousnesses. What fault is there in this? If two consciousnesses operate simultaneously in one body, then two sentient beings should be established simultaneously, just as two consciousnesses operate simultaneously in other bodies. There is no fault in this, because the cause and effect consciousnesses rely on each other and are not separate. Moreover, the resultant consciousness is conditioned by the remaining active consciousnesses, not that two consciousnesses operate simultaneously in different bodies. Because there is such a reason, there is no such fault. Is there any visible difference between the continuity of seed and seed-fruit? In the world, the roots and stems of blue lotuses, etc., are seen to be different in continuity, but they serve as seed-fruit. This should also be the case. Moreover, even if the world sees or does not see, if the alaya consciousness is not allowed, there will be the difficulties mentioned earlier. Therefore, it should definitely be allowed that the alaya consciousness is separate from the body of the six consciousnesses, and its essence is truly existent. Why is it not allowed that the essence of 'I' is truly existent and serves as the place on which the body of the six consciousnesses relies? What is the nature of the 'I' that you cling to, and say that it can serve as the basis for the six consciousnesses? If it is allowed that 'I,' like the alaya consciousness, arises and ceases in succession, changing according to conditions, then what is the difference between it and consciousness? And why cling to it as 'I'? If one clings to the essence of 'I' as being one, constant, and ultimately unchanging, then how can it be said to receive the conditioning of consciousness, etc., and serve as the place of reliance? The so-called conditioning is to cause the conditioned thing to continuously transform into functional differences, just as using purple mineral juice to condition citron flowers causes its continuous function to transform. If there is no conditioning, then... --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
无转变差别功能。如何先时领智贪等数习异故。后经久时念智贪等生起差别。又无心位与彼后时我体无别。今既无识。后意识等从何而生。又于识等我有何能。而执我为识等依止。若言识等因我故生。我体恒时既无差别。如何识等渐次而生。非于一时一切顿起。若谓更待余因缘助方能生者。离余因缘。如何知有我能生用。若言识等依我而转。诸法才生无间即灭。既无住义何容有转。故不应执我体实有与六识身为所依止。又执有我。违阿笈摩说一切法皆无有我故。汝所执一常实我都无正理。但率妄情。 由此证成。但思差别熏习同时阿赖耶识令其相续转变差别。能引当来爱非爱果。非如彼说身语业相。 若不许有身语二业。岂能遗谤三业契经。不能遗谤。然能如理解释此经令无过失。如何无失解释此经。应除执毒当为广说。何为契经说有三业。何者是身何者是业。何义名身何义名业。复以何义名为身业语业意业。问亦如是。复以何缘契经唯说身等三业。非眼等耶。何为契经说三业者。为显三业摄十业道。劝励怖多所作者故。如略说三学授佛栗氏子。有执诸业唯身所造非语非意。为显彼二亦有所造故说三业。身谓诸根大造和合差别为体。业即是思差别为性。积集所成。是为身义。大造极微积集成故。有说种种 现代汉语译本：没有转变和差别的功能。如果因为先前领悟、智慧、贪婪等习性的不同，导致后来经过长时间，念头、智慧、贪婪等生起时有差别。又在没有心识的状态下，与之后我（ātman）的本体没有区别。现在既然没有意识，之后的意识等从何而生？又对于意识等，我有什么能力，而执着于我作为意识等的依靠？如果说意识等因为我而生，我的本体恒常没有差别，为何意识等渐次产生，而不是一时全部产生？如果说还要等待其他因缘的帮助才能产生，离开其他因缘，如何知道我有产生的作用？如果说意识等依靠我而运转，诸法才产生无间就灭亡，既然没有停留的意义，怎么能有运转？所以不应该执着于我的本体真实存在，作为六识身的依靠。又执着于有我，违背了《阿笈摩经》（Āgama）所说的一切法都没有我的教义。你所执着的一个常存的、真实的我都毫无道理，只是随从虚妄的情感。 由此证明，只有思惟差别熏习同时的阿赖耶识（Ālaya-vijñāna），使其相续转变差别，才能引来将来的可爱或不可爱的果报。而不是像他们所说的身语业相。 如果不承认有身语二业，怎么能避免诽谤三业的契经？不能避免诽谤。但是能够如理地解释这部经，使它没有过失。如何没有过失地解释这部经？应该去除执着毒害，当为你广泛解说。什么是契经所说的三业？什么是身？什么是业？什么意义称为身？什么意义称为业？又以什么意义称为身业、语业、意业？问题也是这样。又以什么因缘契经只说身等三业，而不是眼等呢？契经说三业是为了显示三业包含十业道，劝勉和恐吓多数造作者。例如简略地说三学来教导佛栗氏子（Buddha ṛṣi-putra）。有人执着于诸业只有身体所造，不是语言和意念所造。为了显示语言和意念也有所造，所以说三业。身是指诸根、大种、造色和合的差别为体。业就是思惟的差别为性质，积集所成，这是身的意义。大种由极微积集成，所以有种种。