English
English version Although objects may just come into contact with conditions for ripening changes such as fire, light, or vinegar, there will be differences in the appearances of those ripening changes, but we cannot know the specific manifestations of those differences. However, these before and after states are not without differences. This should also be understood in this way. Just like long firewood and grass, their various parts look similar, but the flames produced by each burning are different. Although we cannot know the specific manifestations of these differences, these parts are not without differences. This should also be understood in this way. If the appearances of ripening changes do not immediately arise when objects undergoing ripening changes just come into contact with conditions, then they should not arise at a later time either, because the conditions have not changed. If long firewood and grass, their various parts look similar, but not each part separately produces flames, then the production of flames has no basis, because they are different parts. The shape, size, illumination, and heat of the flames are different. Therefore, one should not think that this object has moved to another place simply because one cannot know the specific manifestations of these differences. One should carefully understand the specific manifestations of these differences. If one thinks that because the cause of extinction cannot be found, one knows that this dharma has moved to another place, this is also unreasonable. For example, what cause of extinction leads to the momentary arising and ceasing of mind (citta), mental factors (cittas), sound, lamp flames, etc.? Others should also be like this. Extinction does not need a cause. If one says that mind etc. also have a cause of extinction, that is their respective impermanent nature (anitya). If that is the case, why are others not allowed to be like that? Since others are not like that, then how can this be like that? Therefore, one knows that the extinction of mind etc. does not need a cause. Since mind etc. are like this, others should also be like this. If the extinction of other dharmas does not need a cause, then the color etc. properties of firewood etc. should not be perceptible before they are combined with fire etc. Just like the state after combination, the later state should also be perceptible like the previous state. Why? Before the wind and hand touch or hold the lamp bell, the lamp flame is clearly perceptible. It is not in the later state that the extinguishing of the flame and sound does not need wind and hand. Firewood etc. are also like this, one should not make it difficult. Furthermore, if the color etc. properties of firewood etc. cannot be perceived because they are extinguished by fire etc., then they should not be perceptible when they just come into contact. Because they have differences when they just come into contact. Moreover, their external conditions have no difference. When the appearances of ripening changes of ripening-changed objects, inferior, medium, and superior, arise with differences, because these differences serve as causes, the later phenomena arise and the earlier phenomena are destroyed, then who is the cause? It should not be that this dharma arises because of that dharma, and then is destroyed because of that dharma. The two states contradict each other and cannot share one cause. The truth of the world is established in this way, so conditioned dharmas (samskrta) do not need a cause of extinction, but naturally extinguish themselves, just as mentioned before. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
可取。不可取者。应知相续随转灭坏差别之相。有微增故。又若灭法亦有因者。是则应无无因灭法。心心所等如待因生。灭亦应尔。非离心等别有无常世共成立。又因异故灭应差别。如火光雪酢等异故熟变差别。又已灭法应更可灭许有因故。犹如色等。是故灭法决定无因。灭无因故才生即灭。故知无有转至余方。若谓生因不可得故。知即此法转至余方。此亦非理有生因故。谓前与后而作生因。如前念心与后念心。前念熟变与后熟变。乳与其酪。葡萄汁与酒。酒复与酢等故。无少法转至余方。转相既无何有行动。又若有住则无行动。既无行动彼应常住。法若无住亦无行动。才生即灭无动义故。若尔现见行动者何。余方所见非即本物何缘知彼非本物耶。由彼彼方新新生故。如草火焰及如影行。非此方影余方可见形质不动。日等光明远近回转便见彼影或长或短或移转故。又障光明少分生故。有反诘言。何缘徴难。至余方义且如何知。余方所见非即本物。此亦应引前理为证。谓若有住则无动等。又外火等缘无差别。而于后时差别可取。由此证知念念各别。又若以证异因无故。谓余所见还是本物。既无有因证即本物。何缘不谓非本物耶。由此二义应俱不定。故至余方义不成立。 日出论者作如是言。诸行实无至余方义。有 现代汉语译本：可以接受的观点和不可接受的观点，应该了解相续、随转、灭坏的差别之相，因为有细微的增减变化。此外，如果灭法也有原因，那么就应该不存在无因的灭法。心和心所等法依赖于因缘而生，灭也应该如此。不存在离开心等之外，另外有一个被世俗共同认可的无常。而且，因为原因不同，灭也应该有差别，就像火光、雪、醋等不同，导致成熟和变化也不同。此外，已经灭掉的法应该可以再次被灭，因为它被认为是存在原因的，就像色法等。因此，灭法一定是无因的。因为灭是无因的，所以才产生就立即灭亡。因此，可以知道没有东西会转移到其他地方。如果认为因为找不到生因，所以知道就是这个法转移到了其他地方，这也是不合理的，因为存在生因。所谓生因，就是指前和后之间可以作为生因，比如前念心和后念心，前念的成熟变化和后念的成熟变化，乳和酪，葡萄汁和酒，酒和醋等等。所以，没有丝毫的法会转移到其他地方。既然没有转移的现象，又怎么会有行动呢？而且，如果有住留，就没有行动。既然没有行动，它就应该是常住的。法如果没有住留，也没有行动，因为才产生就立即灭亡，没有行动的意义。如果这样，现在看到的行动又是什么呢？在其他地方看到的，不是原来的东西。凭什么知道它不是原来的东西呢？因为在那个地方，有新的东西产生。就像草、火焰，以及像影子的移动。不是说这边的影子，在其他地方也能看到，形体本质并没有动。太阳等的光明远近回转，就看到那个影子或长或短，或移动。又因为阻碍光明的少部分产生。有人反驳说：凭什么要质疑转移到其他地方的说法？又凭什么知道在其他地方看到的不是原来的东西？这也应该引用前面的道理来证明，就是如果有住留就没有行动等等。而且，外在的火等因缘没有差别，但是在之后的时间，差别是可以观察到的。由此可以证明念念各别。而且，如果用证明异因不存在的理由，认为在其他地方看到的还是原来的东西，既然没有原因可以证明是原来的东西，凭什么不认为它不是原来的东西呢？由此两种说法都应该是不确定的。所以，转移到其他地方的说法是不成立的。 日出论者这样说：诸行实际上没有转移到其他地方的意义，有
English
English version: Acceptable and unacceptable views: one should understand the characteristics of continuity (samtati), transformation (anuvrtti), cessation (nirodha), and destruction (bhanga), because of subtle increases and decreases. Furthermore, if cessation also has a cause, then there should be no causeless cessation. Mental states (citta) and mental factors (caittas), like things that arise dependent on causes, should also cease in the same way. There is no impermanence established by common consent apart from mind etc. Moreover, cessation should differ because of different causes, just as ripening and change differ because of differences in firelight, snow, vinegar, etc. Furthermore, a phenomenon that has already ceased should be able to cease again, since it is admitted to have a cause, like form etc. Therefore, cessation definitely has no cause. Because cessation is causeless, it ceases immediately upon arising. Therefore, it is known that nothing moves to another place. If it is argued that because the cause of arising cannot be found, it is known that this very phenomenon moves to another place, this is also unreasonable, because there is a cause of arising. The so-called cause of arising refers to the relationship between what is before and what is after, which can serve as a cause of arising, such as the preceding moment of mind and the subsequent moment of mind, the preceding moment of ripening and change and the subsequent ripening and change, milk and curds, grape juice and wine, wine and vinegar, and so on. Therefore, no phenomenon whatsoever moves to another place. Since there is no phenomenon of moving, how can there be action? Moreover, if there is abiding, there is no action. Since there is no action, it should be permanent. If a phenomenon has no abiding, it also has no action, because it ceases immediately upon arising, and there is no meaning of action. If so, what is the action that is seen now? What is seen in another place is not the original thing. How is it known that it is not the original thing? Because in that place, new things arise. Like grass, flames, and the movement of shadows. It is not that the shadow on this side can be seen on the other side; the essence of the form does not move. The light of the sun, etc., revolves from far and near, and then the shadow is seen to be either long or short, or moving. Also, because a small part of the light is obstructed and arises. Someone retorts: Why question the meaning of moving to another place? And how is it known that what is seen in another place is not the original thing? This should also cite the previous reasoning as proof, that is, if there is abiding, there is no action, etc. Moreover, the external causes and conditions such as fire are no different, but differences can be observed at a later time. From this, it can be proven that each moment is separate. Moreover, if one uses the reason that there is no different cause to prove that what is seen in another place is still the original thing, since there is no cause to prove that it is the original thing, why not consider it not the original thing? Therefore, both of these statements should be uncertain. Therefore, the statement of moving to another place is not established. The 'Rising Sun' theorists say: In reality, phenomena do not have the meaning of moving to another place, there is --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
为法性念念灭故。然别有法心差别为因。依手足等起此法。能作手足等物。异方生因是名行动。亦名身表。此摄在何处。谓色处所摄。若尔何缘不许眼见如诸显色。既非所见不表示他。如何名表。复云何知此法实有。云何此法能令自身转趣余方别异而起。若言由心差别。所生风界即应如是。风界其性是动。足能为彼异方生因。何乃离风执有动法。又草叶等离外风界无别动法。云何移转。然诸风界摇触等生其性能动。即应许彼能令手等转余方生何劳别执。若体若用俱不极成能动法生。 若不尔者即心差别。所生风界能为手等异方生因应是身表。如是风界无所表示。云何名表。又许触处是善不善便非释子。 若不尔者即心差别。能令自身余方生起。即身生起应是身表。是则身表应假非实。自身多法合为体故。又无表示云何名表。香等不能表示他故。又许香等是善不善便非释子。若不尔者即心差别。所生显色应是身表。显色非心差别所起。自种子风差别生故。又许显色是善不善便非释子。若此显色体非身表。此余方生应是身表。天爱任汝于此表业尽力所能勤加转计。然此非用功力能成。何乃于中徒生劳倦。谁能成立生别有体。此所执生非如色等。是所现见非如眼等。是能现见何缘知有。又不可见云何名表。前说 现代汉语译本：因为法性念念生灭的缘故，另外有一种法，以心的差别作为原因，依靠手足等产生这种法。这种法能够使手足等移动。在不同的方向产生原因，这叫做行动，也叫做身表（kaya-vijnapti，身体的表达）。这包含在哪里呢？包含在色处所摄（rupa-ayatana，色界）。如果这样，为什么不允许眼睛看到它，像看到各种显色一样呢？既然不是所见之物，就不能向他人表达什么，怎么能叫做‘表’呢？又怎么知道这种法是真实存在的呢？这种法如何能使自身转移到其他方向，产生不同的变化呢？如果说是由于心的差别所产生的风界（vayu-dhatu，风元素），就应该是这样。风界的性质是运动的，足能够成为它在不同方向产生的原因。为什么离开风界，另外执着于有‘动’这种法呢？而且草叶等离开外面的风界，没有其他的‘动’法，怎么能移动呢？然而各种风界，摇动、接触等产生，它的性能是运动的，就应该允许它能使手等转移到其他方向，产生变化，何必另外执着于‘动’这种法呢？无论是体性还是作用，都不能充分证明‘动’这种法的存在。 如果不是这样，那么由心的差别所产生的风界，能够成为手等在不同方向产生的原因，就应该是身表。像这样，风界没有什么可以表达的，怎么能叫做‘表’呢？又允许触处（sprsa-ayatana，触觉）是善或不善的，那就不是释迦牟尼佛的弟子了。 如果不是这样，那么由心的差别，能够使自身在其他方向产生，自身生起就应该是身表。这样的话，身表应该是假有的，而不是真实的，因为自身是多种法合在一起形成的。而且没有什么可以表达的，怎么能叫做‘表’呢？香等不能表达什么，又允许香等是善或不善的，那就不是释迦牟尼佛的弟子了。如果不是这样，那么由心的差别所产生的显色（varna，颜色），就应该是身表。显色不是由心的差别所产生的，而是由自身的种子和风的差别所产生的。又允许显色是善或不善的，那就不是释迦牟尼佛的弟子了。如果这种显色的体性不是身表，那么这种在其他方向的产生就应该是身表。天爱（devanampriya，对僧侣的尊称），任凭你对这种‘表’的业用，尽你所能，努力地进行推论。然而这不是用功力能够完成的，为什么要在其中白白地浪费精力呢？谁能够成立‘生’是另外一种实体呢？这种你所执着的‘生’，不像色等，是能够被直接看到的；也不像眼等，是能够进行观察的。它既不能被观察到，又怎么知道它的存在呢？而且不可见，怎么能叫做‘表’呢？前面已经说过了。