English
English version: Or the external object should be one. Like the Vaisheshikas (an Indian philosophical school that argues the universe is constituted by atoms) who hold that there are divisible colors. Or the external object should be multiple. Like they hold that truly existent numerous paramāṇus (the smallest unit of matter, indivisible) each are an object. Or it should be the samāgama (gathering) and samuccaya (combination) of multiple paramāṇus. Like they hold that truly existent numerous paramāṇus all together gather and combine as an object. Moreover, that external object should not be one. Because divisible colors are different from the colors of each part, therefore it is not acceptable. It is also not logically multiple. Because each paramāṇu is not acceptable. Also, it is not logically a samāgama or samuccaya as an object. Because a real paramāṇu cannot be established logically. Why cannot it be established? The verse says: ‘If a paramāṇu combines with six, it should become six parts; if it is in the same place as six, the aggregate should be like a paramāṇu.’ The treatise says: If one paramāṇu combines with one paramāṇu in each of the six directions, it should become six parts. Because one place has no space to accommodate other places. If there are six paramāṇus in the place of one paramāṇu, then all aggregate colors (polymers) should be as small as a paramāṇu. Because looking at each other in turn does not exceed the amount of a paramāṇu. Then, the aggregate color should also be invisible. The Vaibhāṣika (Sarvāstivāda school master) of Kashmir said: Not all paramāṇus have the meaning of combining with each other. Because there is no direction, it is like the previous fault. But all aggregate colors have the reason to combine with each other, because there is direction. This statement is also incorrect. The verse says: ‘Since paramāṇus have no combination, who has the combination in the aggregate? Or the combination is not established, not because there is no direction.’ The treatise says: Now we should question the reasoning they said. Since different paramāṇus have no other aggregate color, and paramāṇus have no combination, then who is aggregating? If they turn to argue that the aggregate color has no meaning of combination in turn. Then it should not be said that paramāṇus have no combination because there is no direction. Aggregate colors have direction and do not allow combination. Paramāṇus have no combination not because there is no direction. Therefore, a real paramāṇu cannot be established. Also, allowing paramāṇus to combine and not allowing paramāṇus to combine, the fault is like this. If you allow paramāṇus to have division or no division, it is a big fault. Why? ‘If a paramāṇu has direction, it should not become one; if there is no shadow or obstruction, the aggregate is not different and not two.’ The treatise says: Because the division of the six directions of one paramāṇu is different, taking multiple divisions as the body. How can it become one? If one paramāṇu has no different directional divisions, when the sun rises and the light touches, how can it... --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
余边得有影现。以无余分光所不及。又执极微无方分者。云何此彼展轮相障。以无余分他所不行。可说此彼展转相碍。既不相碍。应诸极微展转处同。则诸色聚同一极微量。过如前说。云何不许影障属聚不属极微。岂异极微许有聚色发影为障。不尔。若尔聚应无二。谓若聚色不异极微。影障应成不属聚色。安布差别立为极微。或立为聚俱非一实。何用思择极微聚为。犹未能遮外色等相。此复何相。谓眼等境亦是青等实色等性。应共审思。此眼等境青等实性。为一为多。设尔何失。二俱有过。多过如前。一亦非理。颂曰。 一应无次行 俱时至未至 及多有间事 并难见细物 论曰。若无隔别所有青等。眼所行境执为一物。应无渐次行大地理。若下一足至一切故。又应俱时于此于彼无至未至。一物一时。理不应有得未得故。又一方处。应不得有多象马等有间隙事。若处有一亦即有余。云何此彼可辩差别。或二如何可于一处有至不至中间见空。又亦应无小水虫等难见细物。彼与粗物同一处所量应等故。若谓由相此彼差别即成别物不由余义。则定应许此差别物。展转分析成多极微。已辩极微非一实物。是则离识眼等色等。若根若境皆不得成。由此善成唯有识义。诸法由量刊定有无。一切量中现量为胜。若无 现代汉语译本： 如果边缘有阴影出现，那是因为还有光线无法完全照射到的地方。如果有人坚持认为极微（paramāṇu，最小的物质单位）没有方向和部分，那么如何解释它们彼此阻挡光线呢？如果极微没有剩余的部分，其他东西就无法穿过，那么可以说它们彼此阻碍。既然它们不互相阻碍，那么所有的极微应该在同一个地方。这样，所有的色聚（rupa-skandha，色蕴）就只有一个极微的大小，这和之前说的过失一样。为什么不允许阴影的阻碍属于色聚而不属于极微呢？难道你认为色聚不同于极微，并且色聚可以产生阴影作为阻碍吗？如果不是这样，那么色聚应该没有差异。如果色聚不异于极微，那么阴影的阻碍就不应该属于色聚。将不同的排列方式视为极微，或者视为色聚，都不是真实的。为什么要思考极微和色聚呢？这仍然不能阻止外在的颜色等现象。这是什么现象呢？也就是说，眼等（cakṣu，眼睛）的对境也是青色等真实的颜色等性质。应该一起思考，这眼等的对境，青色等真实性质，是一还是多？如果这样问，会有什么问题？两种情况都有问题。多的过失如前所述。一也不合理。偈颂说： ‘一应无次行，俱时至未至，及多有间事，并难见细物。’ 论曰：如果没有间隔，所有的青色等，眼睛所看到的对境被认为是一个东西，那么应该没有渐次行走广阔的土地。如果下一步就到达所有的地方。又应该同时在此处和彼处，没有到达和未到达。一个东西在一个时间，不应该有得到和未得到。又在一个地方，不应该有多头大象和马等有间隔的事物。如果一个地方有一个，那么其他地方也有，怎么能区分彼此的差别呢？或者两个东西怎么能在同一个地方有到达和未到达，中间看到空隙呢？又应该没有小水虫等难以看到的小东西。它们和粗大的东西在同一个地方，大小应该相等。如果说通过现象来区分彼此的差别，那就变成了不同的东西，而不是因为其他原因。那么就应该承认这些不同的东西，逐渐分析成多个极微。已经辩论过极微不是真实的东西。这样，离开意识，眼睛等色等，无论是根还是境，都不能成立。因此，很好地证明了唯有识的道理。诸法的存在与否由量来决定，一切量中，现量（pratyakṣa，现量）最为殊胜。如果没有现量，
English
English version: If there is a shadow appearing at the edge, it is because there are places where the light cannot fully reach. If someone insists that the paramāṇu (ultimate particle, smallest unit of matter) has no direction or parts, then how can they obstruct each other's light? If the paramāṇu has no remaining parts, other things cannot pass through it, then it can be said that they obstruct each other. Since they do not obstruct each other, all paramāṇus should be in the same place. In this way, all rupa-skandhas (aggregates of form) would be the size of one paramāṇu, which is the same fault as mentioned before. Why not allow the obstruction of shadows to belong to the rupa-skandha and not to the paramāṇu? Do you think that the rupa-skandha is different from the paramāṇu, and that the rupa-skandha can produce shadows as an obstruction? If not, then the rupa-skandha should have no differences. If the rupa-skandha is not different from the paramāṇu, then the obstruction of shadows should not belong to the rupa-skandha. Considering different arrangements as paramāṇus, or as rupa-skandhas, neither is real. Why think about paramāṇus and rupa-skandhas? This still cannot prevent external phenomena such as colors. What is this phenomenon? That is, the objects of the eyes (cakṣu) are also real properties such as blue colors. It should be considered together, whether the objects of these eyes, the real properties such as blue colors, are one or many? If you ask this, what problems will there be? Both situations have problems. The faults of many are as mentioned before. One is also unreasonable. The verse says: 'If one, there should be no successive movement, simultaneous arrival and non-arrival, and many things with intervals, and difficult-to-see small objects.' The treatise says: If there is no separation, and all the blue colors, etc., the objects seen by the eyes are considered as one thing, then there should be no gradual walking across the vast land. If the next step reaches all places. Also, there should be simultaneous arrival and non-arrival here and there. One thing at one time should not have both attainment and non-attainment. Also, in one place, there should not be many elephants and horses, etc., with intervals. If there is one in one place, then there are others in other places, how can the differences between them be distinguished? Or how can two things have arrival and non-arrival in the same place, seeing gaps in between? Also, there should be no small, difficult-to-see objects such as small aquatic insects. They are in the same place as large objects, and their sizes should be equal. If it is said that the differences between them are distinguished by phenomena, then they become different things, not because of other reasons. Then it should be admitted that these different things are gradually analyzed into multiple paramāṇus. It has already been argued that paramāṇus are not real things. In this way, apart from consciousness, the eyes, etc., and colors, etc., neither the sense organs nor the objects can be established. Therefore, the principle that only consciousness exists is well proven. The existence or non-existence of dharmas is determined by measurement, and among all measurements, direct perception (pratyakṣa) is the most excellent. Without direct perception, --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
外境宁有此觉。我今现证如是境耶。此证不成。颂曰。 现觉如梦等 已起现觉时 见及境已无 宁许有现量 论曰。如梦等时虽无外境。而亦得有如是现觉。余时现觉应知亦尔。故彼引此为证不成。又若尔时有此现觉。我今现证如是色等。尔时于境能见已无。要在意识能分别故。时眼等识必已谢故。刹那论者有此觉时。色等现境亦皆已灭。如何此时许有现量。要曾现受意识能忆。是故决定有曾受境。见此境者许为现量。由斯外境实有义成。如是要由先受后忆。证有外境理亦不成。何以故。颂曰。 如说似境识 从此生忆念 论曰。如前所说虽无外境。而眼识等似外境现。从此后位与念相应。分别意识似前境现。即说此为忆曾所受。故以后忆。证先所见实有外境。其理不成。若如梦中虽无实境。而识得起觉时亦然。如世自知梦境非有。觉时既尔何不自知。既不自知觉境非有。宁如梦识实境皆无。此亦非证。颂曰。 未觉不能知 梦所见非有 论曰。如未觉位。不知梦境非外实有。觉时乃知。如是世间虚妄分别串习惛熟如在梦中。诸有所见皆非实有。未得真觉不能自知。若时得彼出世对治无分别智。乃名真觉。此后所得世间净智现在前位。如实了知彼境非实。其义平等。若诸 现代汉语译本： 问：外在的境界难道会有这样的感觉吗？我现在亲身验证了这样的境界吗？ 答：这个验证是不成立的。颂词说： ‘现在的感觉就像梦境等一样，当已经生起现在的感觉时，能见和所见的境界都已经消失了，怎么能允许有现量（直接的认知）呢？’ 论述：就像在梦境等时候，即使没有外在的境界，也仍然可以有这样的现在的感觉。其他时候的现在的感觉也应该知道是这样的。所以，用这个来作为证据是不成立的。而且，如果那个时候有这样的现在的感觉，我现在亲身验证了这样的色等。那个时候对于境界的能见已经没有了，因为一定要有意识才能分别。当时眼识等必然已经消逝了。刹那论者认为，有这种感觉的时候，色等现在的境界也全都已经灭尽了。怎么能在这个时候允许有现量呢？一定要曾经亲身感受过，意识才能回忆。所以，可以确定有曾经感受过的境界。允许见到这个境界的是现量。因此，外在境界真实存在的意思成立。像这样要通过先感受后回忆，来证明有外在境界的道理也是不成立的。为什么呢？颂词说： ‘就像所说的相似于境界的识，从此产生回忆。’ 论述：就像前面所说的，即使没有外在的境界，而眼识等也呈现出相似于外在境界的样子。从此以后的阶段，与念头相应，分别意识呈现出相似于先前境界的样子。就说这是回忆曾经感受过的。所以，用以后的回忆，来证明先前所见真实存在外在境界，这个道理是不成立的。如果像在梦中一样，即使没有真实的境界，而识也可以生起，那么在清醒的时候也是这样。就像世人自己知道梦中的境界不是真实的。清醒的时候既然是这样，为什么不能自己知道呢？既然不能自己知道清醒时的境界不是真实的，怎么能像梦中的识一样，认为真实的境界都不存在呢？这个也不能作为证据。颂词说： ‘没有觉悟的时候不能知道，梦中所见不是真实的。’ 论述：就像没有觉悟的时候，不知道梦中的境界不是外在真实存在的。觉悟的时候才知道。像这样，世间的虚妄分别串习纯熟，就像在梦中一样。所有见到的都不是真实存在的。没有得到真正的觉悟就不能自己知道。如果得到那出世的对治无分别智，才叫做真正的觉悟。此后所得到的世间清净智慧现在面前的时候，如实地了知那个境界不是真实的。这个意义是相同的。如果各种