Chinese
有相事中相不相。何以故？若法先有相，更何用相为？复次，若有相事中相得相者，则有二相过：一者先有相，二者相来相是相。是故有相事中相无所相。无相事中相亦无所相。何法名无相而以有相相？如象有双牙，垂一鼻，头有三隆，耳如箕，脊如弯弓，腹大而垂，尾端有毛，四脚粗圆，是为象相。若离是相，更无有象可以相相。如马竖耳、垂𩭤，四脚同蹄，尾通有毛，若离是相，更无有马可以相相。如是有相中相无所相，无相中相亦无所相；离有相、无相，更无第三法可以相相，是故相无所相。相无所相故，可相法亦不成。何以故？以相故知是事名可相。以是因缘故，相、可相俱空。相、可相空故，万物亦空。何以故？离相、可相，更无有物。物无故，非物亦无；以物灭故名无物，若无物者，何所灭故名为无物？物、无物空故，一切有为法皆空；有为法空故，无为法亦空；有为、无为空故，我亦空。 观一异门第六 复次，一切法空。何以故？ 相及与可相， 一、异不可得； 若无有一、异， 是二云何成？ 是相、可相，若一不可得，异亦不可得；若一、异不可得，是二则不成，是故相、可相皆空。 现代汉语译本 有相之相与无相之相，都不能执著于‘相’； 离开有相和无相，那么‘相’又以什么为‘相’呢？ 在有相的事物中，‘相’实际上是无法成立的。为什么呢？如果一个法一开始就具有‘相’，又何必再用‘相’去识别它呢？进一步说，如果在有相的事物中，‘相’能够成立，那么就会出现两种‘相’的过失：一是事物本身先已存在‘相’，二是‘相’的出现又给事物增加了一个‘相’。因此，在有相的事物中，‘相’是无所‘相’的。在无相的事物中，‘相’也是无所‘相’的。什么样的法可以被称为无相，却又用有相的‘相’去识别它呢？比如，大象有双牙，垂着长长的鼻子，头上有三个隆起，耳朵像簸箕，脊背像弯弓，肚子大而下垂，尾巴末端有毛，四条腿粗壮而圆，这就是大象的‘相’。如果离开了这些‘相’，就没有其他可以用来识别大象的‘相’了。比如，马竖着耳朵，垂着鬃毛，四条腿都是蹄子，尾巴通体有毛，如果离开了这些‘相’，就没有其他可以用来识别马的‘相’了。就像这样，在有相的事物中，‘相’是无所‘相’的，在无相的事物中，‘相’也是无所‘相’的；离开了有相和无相，就没有第三种法可以用来‘相’，所以‘相’是无所‘相’的。因为‘相’无所‘相’，所以可以被‘相’的法也不能成立。为什么呢？因为有了‘相’，才能知道这个事物是可以被‘相’的。因为这个缘故，‘相’和‘可相’都是空性的。因为‘相’和‘可相’是空性的，所以万物也是空性的。为什么呢？离开了‘相’和‘可相’，就没有其他事物存在。事物不存在，非事物也不存在；因为事物灭尽了，所以称为无物，如果没有事物，又是什么灭尽了才称为无物呢？事物和无物都是空性的，所以一切有为法（Samskrta，指由因缘和合而成的法）都是空性的；有为法是空性的，所以无为法（Asamskrta，指不生不灭、无造作的法）也是空性的；有为法和无为法都是空性的，所以‘我’也是空性的。 观一异门第六 进一步说，一切法都是空性的。为什么呢？ ‘相’和‘可相’，既不能说是一，也不能说是异； 如果没有一和异，那么‘相’和‘可相’这二者又如何成立呢？ ‘相’和‘可相’，如果不能说是一，也不能说是异；如果不能说是一和异，那么这二者就不能成立，所以‘相’和‘可相’都是空性的。
English
English version The characteristic of 'having characteristics' and the characteristic of 'not having characteristics' should not be clung to; Apart from 'having characteristics' and 'not having characteristics', what does 'characteristic' characterize? In things that have characteristics, 'characteristic' cannot actually be established. Why? If a dharma (法, law/phenomenon) initially possesses a characteristic, why would one need to use a characteristic to identify it? Furthermore, if 'characteristic' can be established in things that have characteristics, then there would be two faults of 'characteristic': first, the thing itself already has a characteristic; second, the appearance of 'characteristic' adds another characteristic to the thing. Therefore, in things that have characteristics, 'characteristic' has nothing to characterize. In things that do not have characteristics, 'characteristic' also has nothing to characterize. What kind of dharma can be called 'without characteristics', yet be identified using a 'characteristic' that has characteristics? For example, an elephant has tusks, a long trunk, three humps on its head, ears like winnowing fans, a back like a drawn bow, a large and drooping belly, hair at the end of its tail, and thick, round legs; these are the characteristics of an elephant. If these characteristics are absent, there are no other characteristics to identify an elephant. For example, a horse has erect ears, a flowing mane, hooves on all four legs, and hair all along its tail; if these characteristics are absent, there are no other characteristics to identify a horse. Just like this, in things that have characteristics, 'characteristic' has nothing to characterize; in things that do not have characteristics, 'characteristic' also has nothing to characterize; apart from 'having characteristics' and 'not having characteristics', there is no third dharma that can be used to characterize, so 'characteristic' has nothing to characterize. Because 'characteristic' has nothing to characterize, the dharma that can be characterized cannot be established either. Why? Because with 'characteristic', one can know that this thing can be characterized. Because of this reason, both 'characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized' are empty. Because 'characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized' are empty, all things are also empty. Why? Apart from 'characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized', there are no other things that exist. If things do not exist, non-things also do not exist; because things are extinguished, it is called 'no-thing'. If there are no things, what is extinguished that is called 'no-thing'? Things and non-things are empty, so all conditioned dharmas (Samskrta, conditioned phenomena) are empty; conditioned dharmas are empty, so unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta, unconditioned phenomena) are also empty; conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, so 'I' is also empty. Contemplation on the Gate of One and Different, Chapter Six Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? 'Characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized' cannot be said to be one, nor can they be said to be different; If there is no one and no different, then how can these two be established? 'Characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized', if they cannot be said to be one, nor can they be said to be different; if they cannot be said to be one and different, then these two cannot be established, so both 'characteristic' and 'that which can be characterized' are empty. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 相、可相空故，一切法皆空。
Chinese
问曰：“相、可相常成，何故不成？汝说相、可相，一、异不可得，今当说：凡物，或相即是可相，或相异可相，或少分是相余是可相。如识相是识，离所用识更无识；如受相是受，离所用受更无受，如是等相即是可相。如佛说灭爱名涅槃，爱是有为有漏法，灭是无为无漏法；如信者有三相，乐亲近善人、乐欲听法、乐行布施，是三事身、口业故色阴所摄，信是心数法故行阴所摄，是名相与可相异。如正见是道相，于道是少分；又生、住、灭是有为相，于有为法是少分，如是于可相中少分名相。是故，或相即可相，或相异可相，或可相少分为相；汝言一、异不成，故相、可相不成者，是事不然。” 答曰：“汝说或相是可相，如识等。是事不然。何以故？以相故可知，名可相，所用者名为相。凡物不能自知，如指不能自触，如眼不能自见，是故汝说识即是相、可相，是事不然。 “复次，若相即是可相者，不应分别是相、是可相；若分别是相、是可相者，不应言相即是可相。 “复次，若相即是可相者，因果则一。何以故？相是因，可相是果，是二则一；而实不一，是故相即是可相，是事不然。 “汝说相异可相者，是亦不然。汝说灭爱是涅槃相，不说 现代汉语译本 相（lakṣaṇa，事物所具有的性质或特征），因为可相（lakṣaṇīya，可以被认识或观察的性质或特征）是空性的缘故，所以一切法（dharma，宇宙间的一切事物和现象）都是空性的。 问：‘相和可相应该是恒常成立的，为什么说它们不成立呢？你说相和可相，既不能说它们是‘一’（同一），也不能说它们是‘异’（不同）。现在我来说明：任何事物，或者相就是可相，或者相异于可相，或者少部分是相，剩余部分是可相。比如，识相（vijñāna-lakṣaṇa，识别的性质）就是识（vijñāna，识别作用），离开了所作用的识，就没有其他的识；比如，受相（vedanā-lakṣaṇa，感受的性质）就是受（vedanā，感受作用），离开了所作用的受，就没有其他的受，像这些情况，相就是可相。比如，佛（Buddha）说灭除爱欲（tṛṣṇā）叫做涅槃（nirvāṇa），爱欲是有为（saṃskṛta，由因缘和合而成的）有漏（sāsrava，有烦恼的）法，灭除是无为（asaṃskṛta，不依赖因缘的）无漏（anāsrava，没有烦恼的）法；比如，有信心的人有三种表现，喜欢亲近善人、喜欢听闻佛法、喜欢施行布施，这三件事是身、口的行为，所以属于色阴（rūpa-skandha，物质的集合），信心是心所法（caitasika，心理活动），所以属于行阴（saṃskāra-skandha，意志行为的集合），这叫做相与可相不同。比如，正见（samyag-dṛṣṭi，正确的见解）是道（mārga，通往解脱的道路）的相，对于道来说只是少部分；又比如，生、住、灭是有为的相，对于有为法来说只是少部分，像这样，在可相中少部分叫做相。所以，或者相就是可相，或者相异于可相，或者可相的少部分是相；你说一和异都不能成立，所以相和可相不成立，这种说法是不对的。’ 答：‘你说或者相就是可相，比如识等等。这种说法是不对的。为什么呢？因为通过相才能被认知，所以叫做可相，被作用的叫做相。任何事物都不能自己认知自己，比如手指不能自己触摸自己，比如眼睛不能自己看见自己，所以你说识就是相和可相，这种说法是不对的。 ‘再者，如果相就是可相，就不应该分别什么是相，什么是可相；如果能分别什么是相，什么是可相，就不应该说相就是可相。 ‘再者，如果相就是可相，那么因和果就是同一个。为什么呢？相是因，可相是果，这二者就是同一个；但实际上它们不是同一个，所以相就是可相，这种说法是不对的。 ‘你说相异于可相，这种说法也是不对的。你说灭除爱欲是涅槃的相，但并没有说。
English
English version Because the lakṣaṇa (characteristic, attribute) and the lakṣaṇīya (that which can be characterized, observable attribute) are empty, all dharmas (phenomena, things) are empty. Question: 'Lakṣaṇa and lakṣaṇīya should be constantly established, why are they not established? You say that lakṣaṇa and lakṣaṇīya are neither 'one' (identical) nor 'different' (distinct). Now I will explain: In any object, either the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, or the lakṣaṇa is different from the lakṣaṇīya, or a small part is the lakṣaṇa and the remainder is the lakṣaṇīya. For example, the vijñāna-lakṣaṇa (characteristic of consciousness) is vijñāna (consciousness), and there is no other consciousness apart from the consciousness being used; for example, the vedanā-lakṣaṇa (characteristic of feeling) is vedanā (feeling), and there is no other feeling apart from the feeling being used. In these cases, the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya. For example, the Buddha says that the extinction of tṛṣṇā (craving) is called nirvāṇa (liberation), tṛṣṇā is a saṃskṛta (conditioned) and sāsrava (defiled) dharma, and extinction is an asaṃskṛta (unconditioned) and anāsrava (undefiled) dharma; for example, a person with faith has three characteristics: they like to be close to good people, they like to listen to the Dharma, and they like to practice dāna (giving). These three things are actions of body and speech, so they are included in the rūpa-skandha (aggregate of form), and faith is a caitasika (mental factor), so it is included in the saṃskāra-skandha (aggregate of mental formations). This is called the lakṣaṇa being different from the lakṣaṇīya. For example, samyag-dṛṣṭi (right view) is a lakṣaṇa of the mārga (path), and it is only a small part of the path; also, birth, duration, and cessation are lakṣaṇas of the saṃskṛta, and they are only a small part of the saṃskṛta dharma. In this way, a small part of the lakṣaṇīya is called the lakṣaṇa. Therefore, either the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, or the lakṣaṇa is different from the lakṣaṇīya, or a small part of the lakṣaṇīya is the lakṣaṇa; your saying that 'one' and 'different' cannot be established, so the lakṣaṇa and lakṣaṇīya are not established, is not correct.' Answer: 'Your saying that the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, such as consciousness and so on, is not correct. Why? Because it is through the lakṣaṇa that it can be known, so it is called the lakṣaṇīya, and that which is used is called the lakṣaṇa. No object can know itself, just as a finger cannot touch itself, just as an eye cannot see itself, so your saying that consciousness is both the lakṣaṇa and the lakṣaṇīya is not correct. 'Furthermore, if the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, then one should not distinguish what is the lakṣaṇa and what is the lakṣaṇīya; if one can distinguish what is the lakṣaṇa and what is the lakṣaṇīya, then one should not say that the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya. 'Furthermore, if the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, then the cause and effect are the same. Why? The lakṣaṇa is the cause, and the lakṣaṇīya is the effect, and these two are the same; but in reality they are not the same, so the lakṣaṇa is the lakṣaṇīya, this is not correct. 'Your saying that the lakṣaṇa is different from the lakṣaṇīya is also not correct. You say that the extinction of craving is a lakṣaṇa of nirvāṇa, but you do not say.' --------------------------------------------------------------------------------