English
English version: Furthermore, if the effect (fruit, *phala*) already exists in the cause (*hetu*), but cannot be obtained, then there should be a corresponding sign appearing, just as knowing there are flowers by smelling the fragrance, knowing there are birds by hearing the sound, knowing there are people by hearing laughter, knowing there is fire by seeing smoke, knowing there is a pond by seeing swans. If the effect already exists in the cause, there should be a sign appearing; now, the substance of the effect cannot be obtained, nor can the sign be obtained, thus it should be known that the effect does not exist in the cause originally. Furthermore, if the effect already arises from the cause, then it should not be said that cloth (*dīkā*) arises from threads (*tantu*), or that a mat (*āsana*) arises from reeds (*nalī*) . If the cause does not act, then other things will not act either. If cloth is not made by threads, can it be made from reeds? If threads do not act, nor do reeds, can it be said that cloth is made from nothing? If it is made from nothing, then it cannot be called an effect. If there is no effect, then there is no cause, as said before. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the effect already exists in the cause. Furthermore, if the effect does not arise from anything, then it is permanent (*nitya*), like the nature of Nirvana (*Nirvana*). If the effect is permanent, then all conditioned phenomena (*Samskrta-dharma*) are permanent. Why? Because all conditioned phenomena are effects. If all phenomena are permanent, then there is no impermanence (*anitya*); if there is no impermanence, then there is no permanence either. Why? Because permanence exists because of impermanence, and impermanence exists because of permanence, therefore it is impossible for both permanence and impermanence to not exist. Therefore, it cannot be said that the effect already exists in the cause. Furthermore, if the effect already exists in the cause, then the effect would further act as a cause for other effects, just as cloth acts as a cause for wearing (*ācchādana*), just as a mat acts as a cause for covering (*praticchādana*), just as a cart acts as a cause for carrying (*vahana*). But in reality, the effect does not act as a cause for other effects, therefore it cannot be said that the effect already exists in the cause. If it is thought that just as fragrance originally exists in the earth, but the fragrance will not be released unless water is sprinkled; the effect is also like this, if there is no convergence of conditions (*pratyaya*), then it cannot act as a cause. This is not correct, why? Just as you said, it is called an effect when it can be cognized, objects like bottles are not effects. Why? Because being cognized is an action, objects like bottles already exist and are not actions, therefore it is taking action as the effect. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the effect already exists in the cause. Furthermore, the condition of cognition (*hetu-pratyaya*) can only manifest things, but cannot produce things. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
如为照闇中瓶故然灯，亦能照余卧具等物；为作瓶故和合众缘，不能生余卧具等物，是故当知非先因中有果生。 “复次，若因中先有果生，则不应有今作、当作差别。而汝受今作、当作，是故非先因中有果生。 “若谓因中先无果而果生者，是亦不然。何以故？若无而生者，应有第二头、第三手生。何以故？无而生故。” 问曰：“瓶等物有因缘，第二头、第三手无因缘，云何得生？是故汝说不然。” 答曰：“第二头、第三手及瓶等果，因中俱无。如泥团中无瓶，石中亦无瓶，何故名泥团为瓶因，不名石为瓶因？何故名乳为酪因、缕为叠因，不名蒲为因？ “复次，若因中先无果而果生者，则一一物应生一切物，如指端应生车、马、饮食等；如是缕不应但出叠，亦应出车、马、饮食等物。何以故？若无而能生者，何故缕但能生叠，而不生车、马、饮食等物？以俱无故。若因中先无果而果生者，则诸因不应各各有力能生果。如须油者要从麻取，不笮于沙；若俱无者，何故麻中求，而不笮沙？若谓曾见麻出油、不见从沙出，是故麻中求而不笮沙。是事不然。何以故？若生相成者，应言余时见麻出油、不见沙出，是故于麻中求，不取沙；而一切法生相不成，故不得言余时见麻出油，故麻 现代汉语译本： ‘譬如为了照亮黑暗中的瓶子而点灯，灯也能照亮其他的卧具等物品；为了制作瓶子而聚合各种因缘，却不能产生其他的卧具等物品。因此应当知道，并非是先前的因中已经存在果。’ ‘再者，如果因中先前已经存在果，那么就不应该有‘现在做’、‘将来做’的差别。而你接受‘现在做’、‘将来做’的说法，因此并非是先前的因中已经存在果。’ ‘如果认为因中先前没有果而果却能产生，这也是不合理的。为什么呢？如果无中生有，就应该能长出第二个头、第三只手。为什么呢？因为是无中生有啊。’ 有人问：‘瓶子等物有因缘，而第二个头、第三只手没有因缘，怎么能产生呢？所以你说的不对。’ 回答说：‘第二个头、第三只手以及瓶子等果，在因中都是没有的。如同泥团中没有瓶子，石头中也没有瓶子，为什么称泥团为瓶子的因，而不称石头为瓶子的因呢？为什么称乳为酪的因、缕为布的因，而不称蒲草为因呢？’ ‘再者，如果因中先前没有果而果却能产生，那么任何一样东西都应该能产生任何其他东西，比如指尖应该能产生车、马、饮食等；这样一来，线不应该只能织成布，也应该能产生车、马、饮食等物。为什么呢？如果无中能生有，为什么线只能织成布，而不能产生车、马、饮食等物呢？因为都是没有的缘故。如果因中先前没有果而果却能产生，那么各种因就不应该各自具有产生果的能力。比如需要油的人要从芝麻中榨取，而不是从沙子中榨取；如果都是没有的，为什么要在芝麻中求取，而不从沙子中榨取呢？如果说曾经见过芝麻出油、没见过沙子出油，所以从芝麻中求取而不从沙子中榨取。这种说法是不对的。为什么呢？如果生是相互成就的，就应该说过去曾经见过芝麻出油、没见过沙子出油，所以从芝麻中求取，不从沙子中榨取；而一切法的产生不是相互成就的，所以不能说过去曾经见过芝麻出油，所以芝麻’
English
English version: 'For example, if a lamp is lit to illuminate a jar in the darkness, it can also illuminate other bedding and objects; but if various causes and conditions are brought together to make a jar, they cannot produce other bedding and objects. Therefore, it should be known that the effect does not pre-exist in the cause.' 'Furthermore, if the effect already pre-exists in the cause, then there should be no difference between 'doing now' and 'doing later'. But you accept the distinction between 'doing now' and 'doing later', therefore the effect does not pre-exist in the cause.' 'If it is argued that the effect arises from a cause in which it did not pre-exist, that is also unreasonable. Why? If something can arise from nothing, then a second head or a third hand should be able to arise. Why? Because it arises from nothing.' Someone asks: 'Jars and other things have causes and conditions, but a second head and a third hand do not have causes and conditions, so how can they arise? Therefore, what you say is not correct.' The answer is: 'A second head, a third hand, and effects such as jars, are all non-existent in the cause. Just as there is no jar in a lump of clay, and there is no jar in a stone, why is the lump of clay called the cause of the jar, and not the stone? Why is milk called the cause of cheese, and thread the cause of cloth, and not reeds?' 'Furthermore, if the effect arises from a cause in which it did not pre-exist, then any one thing should be able to produce any other thing, such as a fingertip should be able to produce carts, horses, food, and drink; in that case, thread should not only be able to produce cloth, but should also be able to produce carts, horses, food, and drink. Why? If something can arise from nothing, why can thread only produce cloth, and not carts, horses, food, and drink? Because they are all non-existent. If the effect arises from a cause in which it did not pre-exist, then the various causes should not each have the power to produce an effect. For example, someone who needs oil must extract it from sesame seeds, and not squeeze it from sand; if they are both non-existent, why seek it in sesame seeds, and not squeeze it from sand? If it is said that one has seen oil come from sesame seeds, and not seen it come from sand, therefore one seeks it from sesame seeds and does not squeeze it from sand. This is not correct. Why? If arising is mutually accomplished, one should say that in the past one has seen oil come from sesame seeds, and not seen it come from sand, therefore one seeks it from sesame seeds and does not squeeze it from sand; but the arising of all dharmas is not mutually accomplished, so one cannot say that in the past one has seen oil come from sesame seeds, so sesame' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 中求，不取于沙。
Chinese
“复次，我今不但破一事，皆总破一切因果。若因中先有果生、先无果生、先有果无果生，是三生皆不成；是故汝言余时见麻出油，则堕同疑因。 “复次，若先因中无果而果生者，诸因相则不成。何以故？诸因若无，法何能作？何能成？若无作、无成，云何名为因？如是作者不得有所作，使作者亦不得有所作。 “若谓因中先有果，则不应有作、作者、作法别异。何以故？若先有果，何须复作？是故汝说作、作者、作法诸因皆不可得。因中先无果者，是亦不然。何以故？若人受作、作者分别有因果，应作是难：‘我说作、作者及因果皆空，若汝破作、作者及因果，则成我法，不名为难。’是故因中先无果而果生，是事不然。 “复次，若人受因中先有果，应作是难：‘我不说因中先有果，故不受此难，亦不受因中先无果。’ “若谓因中先亦有果亦无果而果生，是亦不然。何以故？有、无性相违故；性相违者，云何一处？如明闇、苦乐、去住、缚解不得同处，是故因中先有果先无果二俱不生。 “复次、因中先有果先无果，上有无中已破。是故先因中有果亦不生，无果亦不生，有无亦不生，理极于此。一切处推求不可得，是故果毕竟不生。果毕竟不生故， 现代汉语译本：从中寻求，而不是从沙子中获取。 ‘再者，我现在不仅破斥一件事，而是总共破斥一切因果。如果因中先有果产生、先无果产生、或者先有果又无果产生，这三种产生方式都不能成立；因此，你说你曾经见过从麻中榨出油，就落入了同疑因的谬误。’ ‘再者，如果先在因中没有果，而果却能产生，那么诸因的相状就不能成立。为什么呢？如果诸因不存在，法又如何能作用？如何能成就？如果没有作用、没有成就，又怎么能称为因呢？这样，作者就不能有所作为，使作者也不能有所作为。’ ‘如果认为因中先有果，就不应该有作（行为）、作者（能动者）、作法（行为的方式）的差别。为什么呢？如果先有果，又何须再作？因此，你说作、作者、作法等诸因都是不可得的。认为因中先无果，也是不对的。为什么呢？如果有人接受作、作者分别有因果，就应该这样反驳：‘我说作、作者以及因果都是空性的，如果你破斥作、作者以及因果，那就成就了我的法，不能算作是反驳。’因此，因中先无果而果生，这件事是不成立的。’ ‘再者，如果有人认为因中先有果，就应该这样反驳：‘我不认为因中先有果，所以不接受这种反驳，也不接受因中先无果。’ ‘如果认为因中先有果也有无果，然后果才产生，这也是不对的。为什么呢？有和无的性质是相互违背的；性质相互违背的，怎么能存在于同一处呢？就像光明和黑暗、痛苦和快乐、去和住、束缚和解脱不能在同一处一样，因此因中先有果先无果这两种情况都不会产生。’ ‘再者，因中先有果先无果，在上面的有无中已经破斥过了。因此，先因中有果也不会产生，无果也不会产生，有无同时存在也不会产生，道理已经穷尽于此。在一切处推求都不可得，因此果毕竟不会产生。果毕竟不会产生，’
English
English version: To seek from within, not to take from the sand. 'Furthermore, I am now not only refuting one thing, but I am totally refuting all cause and effect. If in the cause, there is first a result produced, first no result produced, or first a result and no result produced, these three kinds of production are all untenable; therefore, when you say that you have seen oil extracted from sesame, you fall into the fallacy of a doubtful cause.' 'Furthermore, if the result arises when there is no result in the cause, then the characteristics of all causes cannot be established. Why? If all causes do not exist, how can the Dharma act? How can it be accomplished? If there is no action, no accomplishment, how can it be called a cause? Thus, the agent cannot act, and the agent cannot be made to act.' 'If it is asserted that the result already exists in the cause, then there should be no distinction between the act (karma), the agent (doer), and the mode of action (the way of acting). Why? If the result already exists, what need is there for further action? Therefore, your assertion that the act, the agent, and the mode of action, all causes, are unattainable. The view that there is no result in the cause is also incorrect. Why? If someone accepts that the act and the agent are distinct and have cause and effect, one should retort: ‘I say that the act, the agent, and cause and effect are all empty; if you refute the act, the agent, and cause and effect, then you are establishing my Dharma, and it cannot be called a refutation.’ Therefore, the arising of a result from a cause in which there is no result is not established.' 'Furthermore, if someone accepts that the result already exists in the cause, one should retort: ‘I do not say that the result already exists in the cause, so I do not accept this refutation, nor do I accept that there is no result in the cause.’' 'If it is asserted that the result arises when there is both a result and no result in the cause, this is also incorrect. Why? Because the natures of existence and non-existence are contradictory; if their natures are contradictory, how can they exist in the same place? Just as light and darkness, suffering and happiness, going and staying, bondage and liberation cannot exist in the same place, therefore, the arising of a result from a cause in which there is first a result and first no result is not possible.' 'Furthermore, the assertion that there is first a result and first no result in the cause has already been refuted in the above discussion of existence and non-existence. Therefore, the arising of a result from a cause in which there is first a result, no result, or both existence and non-existence is not possible; the reasoning is exhausted here. Seeking in all places is unattainable, therefore, the result ultimately does not arise. Because the result ultimately does not arise,' --------------------------------------------------------------------------------