English
This produces confusion and, as a result of this non-discrimination between the remembered ‘ silver ’ and the perceived ‘ nacre, ’ we think that we perceive the ‘ silver.’ It is, however, the only tenable theory of illusion from the standpoint of pluralists like the Mimainsakas and the orthodox Samkhya philosophers. Accord¬ ing to the pluralists, there can be no genuine relation between the reals that are absolutely in¬ dependent of one another. Hence, illusion, even as the mental ascription of the nature of one thing to another, is also impossible. The appearance of a positive relation is merely due to the non-appre¬ hension of their differences. Hume seems to have utilised this very doctrine while explaining the origin of the idea of personal identity. Hume’s argument is that owing to the extreme rapidity with which the discrete mental states succeed one another, they fail to be apprehended as discrete or different from one another, and this non-apprehen¬ sion of their difference produces the impression that they are continuous implying a permanent spiritual entity called the Self. The nearest approach to the doctrine of akhyati is the doctrine of the 4 identity of indiscernibles,’ formulated by Leibnitz, the un¬ compromising individualist, who holds the spiritual reals to be intrinsically different; what appears as 4 identity ’ is really identity that follows upon the non-apprehension (or non-discernment) of' the manifest differences that exist between the reals. A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA (2) According to the doctrine of Anyathakhyati (or Vipantakhyati) of the Nyaya-Vai^eshika and Yoga schools, there is in every illusion a judgment implying a positive relation or ascription of the nature of one thing to another and is not merely the negative fact of non-apprehension of the difference between the two. In the illusion of ‘ silver ’ in ‘ nacre, ’ there is the positive apprehen¬ sion of * nacre ’ as ‘ silver, ’ and not merely the non¬ apprehension of the difference between the ‘ nacre and the ‘ silver.’ It thus agrees with the doctrine of akhy&ti in holding that the fact that I remember * silver ’ is not noticed at the time of illusion, and thus there is the false identification of ‘ silver ’ (seen elsewhere) with the ‘ nacre ’ present before us. (3) The doctrine of Atma-khyati lays down, however, that there is khydti or some positive experience in illusion, but it is the experience of the object about which there is illusion. According to it, all objects of true as well as illusory percep¬ tion spring from the psychical flow ( ) and thus are not anything external to. it. The difference between a true and an illusory perception is traceable to different collocating conditions of this continuum. This explanation is flatly contradict¬ ed, as the Naiy&yika points out, by the perceived fact that illusion of ' silver ’ in ‘ nacre ’ arises in the form of ‘ this is silver ’ and not ‘ I am silver,’ which it would have done on the Buddhistic hypo¬ thesis that knowledge imposes upon itself, irrespec¬ tive of any external condition, the knower and the illusory percept. ANALYSIS OP EXPERIENCE 167 (4) Lastly, the doctrine of Aniroacanlya- khyati of the Vedantins implies that the positive experience (ignfflO * n illusion is neither of some¬ thing existent (^) nor of something non-existent ( ) hut something falling outside the category of the existent and the non-existent a veritable logical indefinable. Now, what is the essence or import of a pro¬ position which, as the embodiment of a complete meaning, is constituted of a relation between terms that bear different meanings. The Advafta- Vedanta admits that the judgment, as the meaning of a proposition, has for its essential presupposition the relation between the meanings of its constituent terms,* the subject and the predicate (q^T&farf&TT 3T <WI& )—and the apprehension of the meaning presupposes an order of successiveness ( ufjwftr:) as Samkara himself puts it. t Neverthe¬ less, as the Bhamati lays down so expressively, the terms indicating their respective meanings consti¬ tute the unity of the judgment as subservient to, and as the expression of, one unitary meaning.J In developing the point, the Bhamati further declares that the function of terms, constituting a proposi¬ tion, is not to be strictly confined to their respective meanings; had it been so, there would not have * Vide Bhamati on Satpkara’s com.- on V.S., IV. 1. ii. + Com. on IV. 1. ii. t v*r*rt On Eaipkara’s com. on V.S., 1.1. iv. A SYSTEMATIC STtJDY OP THE VBDiNTA been the apprehension of the meaning of a proposi¬ tion.* If the two terms ‘ horse ’ and ‘ running ’ (which we come across on analysing the proposition ’ the horse is running ’) meant simply ‘ horse ’ and ' running ’ and nothing more, the mere juxta¬ position of the two terms in question would not make ‘ the horse run.’ It would be a ‘ dead ’ horse. We cannot reconstitute the integral whole of meaning by the addition of its fractional parts, the terms, if they meant only what they stood for and nothing more. Mere self-centredness or selfish¬ ness ( ) would not even run a sentence, much less society. As the social fabric cannot subsist for a moment if the individuals composing it be absolutely self-centred, so a proposition can¬ not come into being and be the vehicle of a meaning ( qrantfc ) ^ the constitutive terms be absolutely self-centred in respect of their meaning. In point of fact, such a self-centred individual is a pure myth, a hypothetical something, a creature of mere theory, just as the term so confined within its meaning is an unreal fiction of the formal logician. An individual in isolation from society, as its natural medium of existence, is as much of an abstraction as the term apart from the proposition. Just as an individual has to ‘ die to live ’—to die to its narrow, exclusive self-centred nature in order to live a wider life of self-denying ordination as a member of an organic whole, so every term of a proposition has to break through the shell of its . * mflr s*r*t w ufir *r iranforo wtf—Ibfd. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE 159 self-centred meaning in order to be strictly a term, that is, a terminus, an element of a whole. As finely expressed by the Bhamatl: ‘ the terms con¬ vey the meaning of a proposition in the same way as do the faggots sustain a flame, for the purpose of cooking, by continually burning or negating, themselves.’* It may be said to illustrate in a narrower compass the meaning of ‘ ideality of the finite.’ There is thus a synthetic necessity (tfWFCSPl) but it has not necessarily an active import The Indian pragmatist might thrust in his head here and discover a pragmatic sig¬ nificance in the Vedantic rendering of the import of propositions. But that would be going too far* Prof. Dewey even would not venture to go so far. All that it means is that the subject-term having in all cases a transitive force points to, or tends towards, or ' intends,’ to use a figurative expression, the predicate-term. There is mutual expectation (*T P ffNn ) or ' syntactical connexion, 1 in the grammarian’s sense, between the subject and the predicate, and this synthetic connexion between them in respect of meaning has its basis in ‘ objec¬ tive intention 1 ( ) of the proposi¬ tional knowledge. This view of the Import of Propositions serves as the prolegomena to a judicious construction or apprehension of the Vedantic doctrine of '* Tattva - masi * ( ) or ‘ that art thou,’ which con- ‘ i) * *Vrtn*n$|q —On Sarpkara’s com. on V.S., 1.1, iv. 100 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA tains in a nut-shell, within the compass of three words, the teaching of Samkara-Vedanta. The ground is first of all cleared of all possible mis¬ understandings by way of the initial warning that the mere propositional, that is, relational form in which the doctrine is couched should not prejudice us against its non-relational significance, which alone counts, and not the relation of terms, in the matter of determining the true import of a pro¬ position. The text' tfft¥lf%’is not the assertion of a synthetic connexion or of an identity-in-difference which it resembles but has for its essence an inte¬ gral, undifferenced identity of meaning ( wjis is lgm ) which piakes it, in all conceivability a non-relational or supra-relational whole that alone gives us the true knowledge of ultimate Reality.* Reality, which is the ultimate goal of Truth, is according to Vedanta, a non-relational whole, a whole of chaitanya or Experience, eternally self-identical in nature and expressible in the form : A is A. There must, therefore, be an analytical necessity between the subject and the predicate of a proposition if it is to claim ultimate truth. Now, the Vedantic IWW fe is not simply an analytical proposition, much less a verbal or tautologous assertion, but a synthetic proposition in which the subject and the predicate are not different from one another. Tt is a peculiar type of proposition, sui generis or unique of its kind, not coming within the purview of Vedfoitt- faribhSshi, Ch. I, ANALYSIS OP EXPERIENCE 161 ordinary logic, Eastern or Western, which recognises the dichotomous division of propositions into analytical (verbal) or synthetical (real) propositions with no tertium quid in between them. It may strictly be called—to coin a new phrase—an analv- tico-synthetic proposition. It is, to begin with, synthetical to the learner, the disciple who is being newly initiated to the sacred lore of the Vedanta, but is analytical to the preceptor or Guru who has realised its analytic necessity only in ecstatic intui¬ tion, on the other side of all discursive thought, and necessarily of all judgment-forms.