English
None is real absolutely but while ‘ the cosmic phenomena, such as aka&a (vnqmn), etc. are seen to have a stable character until the oneness of the Self with Brahman is attained, the dream- phenomena are daily sublated.’* Thus the un¬ reality (*TTOT<nTOfl)of dreams is not to be construed in an absolute sense. Dreams are true so long as they last, and they are called unreal relatively to the objects of waking life, not absolutely (w gffr w iN *r ^n:). This shows the more or less arbitrary or conventional nature of the dis¬ tinction that we draw between the waking and dream worlds. Thus the hard and fast line of demarcation that is usually drawn between the two worlds will have to give way to a difference in degree, and ultimately in value. What we may profitably note here is the continuity between the four grades of consciousness, despite the emergence of real difference in each. To sum up, then, the net result of our foregoing inquiry, in the words of a profound Vedantic scholar: Waking, dream, dreamless sleep, and ecstasy with the intermediate stages constitute, then, a new dimension of the mind. This is not only a dimension of the mind but the one dimension of existence in which even the deepest of all distinctions, viz., that between the Com. on V.S,, III. 2. iv. 13 98 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDINTA subject and the object, has place. The ordinarily conceived duality between them gives place in Vedanta to the conception of a gradation of exist¬ ences, one pole of which is the lowest waking stage in which the self completely forgets itself, the stage of the mere object, and the other pole, the ecstatic stage in which the self not only denies the existence of everything else but denies the denial itself, the 'age of the pure subject. The gradation is not eternally spread out; the Samadhi state is not only a stage among stages, it is the truth of other stages,.. The self as identified with any stage, feels the stage below it to be illusory; thus there is a reconciliation between the absolute distinction of truth and un¬ truth on the one hand, and the continuous gradations of truth on the other.”* Thus it is easy to conclude, in the light of the above, that the state of ecstatic consciousness, or what is the same thing, Revelation, does not entail a breach in the continuity of our conscious existence. Although the very entrance into that consummate experience, the state of pure subject—necessitates a surrender of the subject-object relation, it is not a mere nebulous state of consciousness. This very surrender of the active knowing attitude is admitted¬ ly, responsible for its being classed with irrational or pathological phenomena of the mind. That is why, again, Revelation is so often looked upon as an ‘ illumination from the above,’ an ‘ act of Divine grace ’ working in an inscrutable manner in us, and baffling for ever the power of reason. Here is the * K. 0. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Vedantism, pp. 16-17. FKOM AUTHORITY TO FREEDOM 99 by-path of anti-intellectualism or irrationalism, which so often exploits reason in an agnostic interest, and accentuates the contrast between Theoretical and Practical Reason, Faith and Know¬ ledge, by antagonising reason to Authority as the custodian of revealed truths which are supposed to be beyond, above and even contrary to reason There are undoubtedly passages in Samkara's writings which lend themselves to a dualistic inter¬ pretation. His frequent appeal to the authority of the 3astras or Sruti (agffflnTnug^) and exaltation of it at the expense of Tarka or reasoning do presuppose a contrast between the two. But, here, too ‘ the contrast is really between the private consciously acting reason of the individual and the historic reason in which is summed up the experi¬ ence of the race.’ Samkara’s acceptance of indivi¬ dual reason (rj^rnfa:) as essentially a disintegrative force, leading in the end to an overthrow of all rational practice or usage has a decidedly anti-rationalistic tone about it, but he does not happily act up to the recipe prescribed by the anti-rationalist. Samkara seems to accept the homoeopathic principle of cure, so far as he retains the service of reason in matters spiritual. It is of course hedged in with conditions, so that it may not go astray, but conduce to the attainment of the summit in bonum. Mere ‘ arid dialectic * or ‘ unbridled reasoning ’ (fsrffWflfc) is an unmiti¬ gated evil, and, as such, abjured. Nor is uncriti¬ cised faith or acquiescence in the revealed doctrines 100 A SYSTEMATIC STUtY OP THE VEDANTA valued for its own sake; for the Sruti itself has in¬ sistently recommended manana (wnt) or discursive thinking as the necessary supplement to the passive reception of scriptural texts. This manana has been authoritatively defined as 4 the mental act, which leads to knowledge by way of arguments, defending the truths embodied in revealed texts, against objections likely to be pre¬ ferred by other sources of knowledge.’* It is thus as much a process of rationalisation, as an antici¬ patory refutation of objections. In its turn it leads to, and acts as a precondition of the next process known as nididhyasana (fi tfifts q rerc w) whose func¬ tion is to facilitate that type of mental activity which is calculated to a concentration upon self- knowledge, following upon the withdrawal of the psychical apparatus from its beginningless attach¬ ment to objects.! Thus it is only reasoned accept¬ ance of the scriptural texts (’gfftqrcnf'V) as streng¬ thened by an inward concentration, demanded by the process of nididhyasana or P er ' sistent contemplation, that can lead to revelation or immediate experience of Brahman the supreme object of our quest. The privileged life of thinking and critical reflexion,—through which alone, as the pathway WWWHI I W WW!-V ed&nta-paribha§a, Chap. VIII. <in mwm:—Ibid. FROM AUTHORITY TO FREEDOM 101 to blessedness, humanity has travelled for ages— does, however, entail its peculiar disciplines on the person who would qualify himself for it The right to think, to know and be free, has to be achieved—not without sacrifice and purification of the heart; and it is the ‘ pure in heart ’ that alone see God.’ Thinking is thus to be preceded by a moral effort; and the will to think conditioned by a will to believe. Accordingly, we have in the Vedanta a frequent insistence on the reformed or purified mind 1W) as the organ of immediate experience or revelation of Brahman.* Samkara is frankly of opinion that the study of metaphysics should in all cases be preceded by a propaedeutic discipline in the social ethos. It is only an arrogant rationalism that sets up extravagant claims in the matter of solving the riddles of. the Sphinx with the help of its own unaided reason. Although relying on reason, so far as the metaphysical discipline is concerned, Samkara, like Plato, recognised with unerring philosophic insight the service of ‘ un¬ conscious reason ’ as embodied in customary morals and cultural milieu in general, and thus, got beyond Socratic individualism. According to Saipkara the disciplines in question are four in number., In the first instance there must be a knowledge of the distinction between things eternal and non-eternal . It is prima fade impossible for the student, called to the study of the Vedanta, — Vedanta-paribhafd, Chap. VIII. 102 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA to be equipped with a full-fledged ‘ knowledge ’ of this type: all that is demanded of him is ‘ the metaphysical craving of the soul ’ which does not allow the philosophic inquirer to stop short of the goal, but as ‘ the discontent Divine ’ ever goads him on to probe deeper beyond the surface show of things. The second pre-requisite or sadhanam is a ‘ complete apathy ’ or indifference to the enjoyment of the fruits of one’s actions, whether here (in this life) or hereafter (in the life to come) ). What is meant here is that the philosophic inquirer must renounce all self-centred considerations, and approach his task with perfect disinterestedness. For interest, con¬ genital or otherwise, that predisposes the intellect with any definite bias, and thus blurs the vision of truth, is a serious disqualification in a seeker after truth. The cultivation of this spirit of detachment or indifference stands him in very good stead, when the student is confronted with such specific problems of life as the relation of happiness to the summum bonum of human life. If the philosophic inquirer does not profess mere lip-loyalty to this injunction, he will avert the mishap that befell Kant in his philosophic career. There we find the rigoristic preacher of ‘ duty for duty’s sake,’ who had scrupu¬ lously expunged all considerations of happiness from the moral life, staggering us by the baldly hedonistic lines on which he rounds off his theory— namely, ‘ the distribution of happiness in exact proportion to morality (which is the worth • of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes FROM AUTHORITY TO FREEDOM 103 the summum bonum of a possible world.’* Such tragedy of moral purism inculcates the supreme necessity of a spirit of disinterestedness as a philoso¬ phical pre-requisite. Although negative in formula¬ tion, it is not barely so but acquires, in practice, ‘ the expulsive power of a higher affection. ’ It is, in short, a preparation for that disinterested intellec¬ tual curiosity which characterises the genuine scientific temper—a well grounded plea for that cosmo-centric point of view in philosophy which, by thrusting aside all anthropocentric considera¬ tions, enables us to view things in their cosmic perspective. It is remarkable, indeed, that Mr.