English
It must be distinctly understood, at the very outset, that the anthropological interest in the Yedic religion gives an initial misdirection to all dispassionate enquiry by assimilating it to animism, spiritism, and the like. This serves only to mystify the issue instead of focussing its light on the central theme. The Egvedic religion, whatever else it might be, is not an anthropological specimen merely. It is in all conscience, a naturalistic polytheism, and not a polytheistic, or any other type of naturalism. It is no less different from naturalism in the modern sense of the term, than it is from the Greek proto¬ type of the case in Hylozoism. Then, again, the religion of the Egveda, although mainly nourished by its interest in the operations of nature or natural phenomena, is as much a natural, as a social religion. The devas or gods of the Egveda have had, like us mortals, their share of vicissitudes at the hands of interpreters. Some are of opinion that it is one and the same God that beams through the prote,an masks of godhood, and therefore, its ap¬ parent polytheism is but a masked monotheism. Some, again, hold in deference to the realities of the situation, as also a preponderately theistic interest, that the gods • are only 4 the allegorical representations of the attributes of the Supreme 46 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA Deity.’ Others, again, believe the gods to be mere magic formulae in the keeping of Levitical priest¬ hood of a primitive people. Sayana, whose com¬ mentary on the Rgveda stands to this day as the very monument of orthodox scholarship, favours a naturalistic interpretation of the gods. Although it sounds paradoxical, all of these explanations, and none of these, are true,—inasmuch as each con¬ tains only a fragment of truth, the highest plausi¬ bility belonging, of course, to Sayana’s interpreta¬ tion. Now, the plurality of the devas is frankly based on their functional differences. To put it bluntly, a deva is what he does—a category that is comprehensive enough to include the functions he is authoritatively invested with.* Accordingly, those who exploit, in the interest of non-dualism or singularism, the promiscuous naming of the gods, and the constant interchange of their functions, overlook this basic fact. It is their contention, pure and simple, that there is no distinction between the gods in respect of names and functions, and that this distinction between the gods has not been recognised because of their oneness in respect of substantive or essential existence. What detracts from the cogency of this argument is the simul¬ taneous acknowledgment made by these very people, following the Nirukta t that all the gods are but the members of one Supreme Spirit. The metaphor that is drawn upon in this regard by the Rgveda t wiwrits* fwn mfaifa wrf3*— vii. 4. THE VEDANTA IN THE MAKING 47 itself, viz., that of ‘ branches of a tree ’* is equally suggestive. What these two telling examples conclusively establish, by force of their logical im¬ plication, is that the gods maintain their integrity and individuality—a functional difference at least, though not a substantive one—without prejudice to the notion of distinction, without a difference, in the unity of the whole. There is no sense in speak¬ ing of the gods as parts or members of a unity—no matter whether it is the unity of a socius, or a self- conscious being—unless these parts or members are recognised as such in the unity of the whole. Whether this ‘ membership ’ in question stands committed to the Hegelian principle of ‘ unity- in-difference ’ need not deter us here; but what it clearly demands is the recognition that the so-called ‘ members ’ are not like * elements,’ to be massed together in a distinctionless unity—of the type of ‘ the Absolute in which all cows are black.’ For, after all, there is a world of difference between an ‘ element ’ and a ‘ member ’ of a whole, and it is only by an abuse of language that the two can be used synonymously. Here, as elsewhere, Yaska’s interpretation seems to be on the true line of advance, so far as it allows full latitude to varieties of function as the basis of multiple designations of each god.f It is on this basis that he proceeds to classify the Vedic * E.g., V. 40, v. t WW vfa Niruleta, Daivatakagdam, vii. 6. 48 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA gods, and proposes a triadic classification of these into terrestrial, aerial and celestial, corresponding to the three regions of and . Thus is laid the foundation of a science of mytho¬ logical interpretation recognised by Yaska—the Adhidaivata, the Aitihasika, the AdhiyajHa and the Idhyatmika school. Of these the Adhyatmika school of mythological interpretation which, in its enunciation of self as the central principle of explana¬ tion, distinctly anticipates the main findings of the S&ipkhya and Vedanta systems of thought, is worthy of our attention. Starting from the Purusa-sukta* (which though forming a part of the last mandala of the Rgveda, really belongs to the age of Brahmana speculation), there is to be found a persistent effort to institute a close correspondence and affinity be¬ tween the microcosm and the macrocosm, f Tn the Purusa-sukta itself, the gods are made out to be the agents of creation, and the body of the great Purusa the stuff of which the world is made. The creative act is figuratively spoken of as a sacrifice (*nn) with ‘ the Supreme Purusa himself as form¬ ing the victim.’ Muir is staggered at the sacrile¬ gious ‘ profanity of such a representation. Those who bring an open mind to bear on the question would much rather testify to the profundity and grandeur of the theme. Leaving aside its later * Rgveda, Xth Mandala, Sukta 90. t Cf. Keith, The Religion and Philosophy of the .Vedas 'and Vpanishads. t Vide Sanskrit Texts, Vol. V, p. 878. THE VEDANTA IN THE MAKING 49 symbolism together with all its fantastic specula¬ tions, one is constrained to .admit the force of its philosophic implication. Creation is herein con¬ ceived as a self-abnegation or a self-denying ordi¬ nance on the part of the creator. It is suggestive of an original self-heterisation and a passing over into the otherness of an external world as a point of extreme self-alienation. There can be, indeed, no suggestion of ‘ profanity ’ in a case of self-im¬ molation or self-sacrifice—a voluntary acceptance, on the part of the creator, of the bondage of creation. Thus is also secured a fundamental oneness of essence between the world within and the world without, between the subjective and the objective, without the suggestion of a basic dualism which is too likely to creep into any story of creation that is not otherwise armed against a radical antithesis between the two. What is, further, noteworthy here from the philosophic point of view is the prescription of the anthropomorphic method which has un¬ doubtedly its use so long as it is saddled with safe¬ guards. On the application of this method, what is interpreted as regards the gods ( adMdaivatam) as earth, atmosphere and sky becomes mind, breath and speech as regards the self (adhyatmam ), wind, fire, sun, the quarters and the moon corresponding respectively to breath, speech, eye, ear and mind. The parallelism of the macrocosm with the micro- Wlfil'fWlPl —Niruhtam ft 50 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA cosm, of the cosmic order (adhidaivatam) with the psychological functions of the man ( adhyatmam) comes in for further elaboration, when the space within the heart is held to correspond to cosmic space, the breath of man to the wind, the speech to fire, the eye to the sun, the ear to the moon, the mind to the lightning. It is held that there are five cosmic spaces, five gods of nature, five classes of beings, and correspondingly we have five vital airs, five senses, five parts of the body. Finally, there is Dharma, law, and truth for the world and for the man; and the cumulative force of all these evidences of parallelisms proves that ‘ the macro¬ cosm and the microcosm are interrelated in an indis¬ soluble union of reciprocal service and support.'* These suggestions of parallelism, although not pre¬ sented in a strictly philosophical form, are never¬ theless fraught with immense importance for later philosophic constructions. Viewed in their histori¬ cal perspective, they may be said to contain the germ-plasm of Idealism and Realism in Indian thought with all their minute ramifications and notable variations. But in themselves they stand at the parting of ways, and are susceptible as much of a realistic as of an idealistic construction. From the standpoint of epistemology or theory of know¬ ledge, the underlying assumption of all these paral¬ lelisms is, as was also in the case of Empedocles of old, that like is known by like (similia similibus * Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upanishads, Vol. n, THE VEOlNfA IN THE MAKING 51 percipiuntur). It would be perhaps more to the point to compare Schopenhauer’s ‘ anthroposophy ’ with its view of the world ( Weltanschauung ) as macranthropos, according to which man as the union of will (which is the thing-in-itself) and body (which is only an objectification of the will) furnish¬ es ‘ the key to the whole question of metaphysics.’ Such is indeed the implication of the cryptic saying current among thinkers of the Vaishnava school that what is in this pot of human body is to be found in the world abroad (i.e., the primordial egg). The best exposition we have had so far of the mean¬ ing and importance of the function of devata or god in a philosophic reference is to be found in Prof. K. C.