English
" Ndgas^na: "Is this 2 G 2 452 A MANUAL OF BUDHISM. palace, or any house in which you may happen to be, a non-ex- istent object brought into existence ?" Milinda : " The timbers were produced in the forest ; the clay used in its construction was in the ground ; by the exertions of men and women (from these materials), the palace was produced." N4gas6na : '* In like manner, no being is produced from that which is non-existent ; there is no such being. All sentient beings are produced from something that previously existed. Thus, if a seed or root be cast into the ground, it gradually increases in size, and becomes a tree, which bears flowers and fruit ; the tree is not a non-existent thing brought into existence ; there is no such tree. Again, a potter takes clay from the earth, and therewith manufactures different kinds of vessels ; these vessels are not something non-existent brought into existence ; they are produced from that which pre- viously existed. Again, for the prodaction of sound from the wen4 (a stringed instrument frequently referred to in eastern story) there must be the frame, the skin, the body, the wood, the strings, and the handle, together with the skUl of the player, or no sound is produced ; all these things are previously requisite that the sound may be elicited. Again, if there be no piece of wood to be rubbed and no upper piece, and no string for the binding of the pieces together, and no exertion of the man, and no rag, fire cannot be produced ; but if there be all these things, fire may be elicited. Again, unless there be the joti-pasdna, or burning-glass, and the rays of the sun, and the dried cow-dung^ no fire can be produced ; bnt if there be all these things, fire may be elicited. Again, if there be no mirror, and no light, and no face, no reflection of the features is produced ; but if there be all these things, an image of the features may be produced. In all these instances it is not a non-existent object that is produced ; the production is from something that previously existed ; and the same is to be predicated of the sentient being." 12. Again, the king said to Ndgas^na, '' Is there such a thing as the w6dagu, is such a thing received ?" Nagas^na; ** What is this wedagu of which you speak ?" Milinda : " It is pr4na-jiwa, it is inward life, or the internal living principle, by means of which figure is seen by the eye, sound is heard by the ear, odour is smelled by the nose, flavoar is tasted by the tongue, the tan- gible object is felt by the body, and thoughts are perceived by the mind. Thus, we sit in this palace, and when we are wishful to IX. THE ONTOLOGY OF BUDHISM. 453 see any object through any of the windows, we look oat of that particular window, whether it be towards the east, the south, the west, or the north ; even so, if the inward living principle be wishful to look out by the eye, or any other of the sentient organs, it looks out by that particular aperture or door." Ndgas^na : " I also will say something relative to the six organs of sense ; you must pay attention to what I say. If the inward living principle sees objects by the eye, we who are sitting here ought to see the same object by whatever window we might look out,* whether by the eastern window, the southern, the western, or the northern ; so also the inward living principle would see the outward object by means of the eye, but not by that alone ; it would see as well by the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the mind ; and it would hear sound equally by the eye, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the mind ; it would smell, in the same way, by the eye, the ear, the tongue, the body, and the mind ; it would taste by the eye, the ear, the nose, the body, and the mind ; it would feel by the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the mind ; it would think by the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the body. We who are in this palace, by putting our heads far out of the window, can clearly discern various objects ; in like manner, by the same rule, when the inward living principle opens the window of the eye, it ought to see clearly all the objects in an extended prospect ; and when it opens the window of the ear, and that of the nose, or the tongue, it ought distinctly to hear the sounds in the same space, and to smell the odours, and to taste the flavours, and to feel the objects. Were the noble, Dinna, who is near jou there, to go out of the door, could you tell that he had left this place, and gone out ?" Milinda ; ^' Yes." Ndgas^na : '* And if he were to return into the interior of the palace, could you tell that he had returned, and was standing in your presence?" Milinda : ** Yes." Ndgas^na : ** And can the inward living prin- ciple, when it has anything npon the tongue possessing flavour, tell whether it be sweet, sour, salt, bitter, acrid, or pungent ? " Milinda ? " Yes." Nagas^na : " And when that which possesses flavour enters into the stomach, can the inward living principle * And they who ssj, as some do, that the eje sees not anything, but it is the Bonl only that seeth through them, as through open doors, obserre not, that if the eyes were like doors, we might see things much bettor if our eyes were out, as if the doors were taken away.— Epicurus, according to Laertius and Lucretian. 454 A MANUAL OF BUDHISM. tell whether it be sweet, Bour, salt, bitter, acrid, or pungent ?" Milinda: "No." Ndgas^na : "Then your two declarations do not agree with each other. Suppose a man to have a hundred measures of honey, the whole of which is poured into one large yessel ; now if he puts his head into the yessel, whilst his mouth is bound over with a cloth tightly drawn, can he then discern whether the honey be sweet or sour ?" Milinda : "No." Nagasenat '* Why ?" Milinda : " Because the sweetness did not enter into his mouth." Ndgas^na : " Then your two declarations do not agree with each other.** Milinda: "Will you be kind enough to explain these matters to me ?" The priest then ag^in repeated the circle of existence, and said, " There is no such thing as the inward living principle of which you speak ; there is no w^dagu t besides that which is set forth in the circle of existence, there is no such a thing as the w^dagu connected with the body.*' But the king (as if not satisfied by the answer he had received) again said to Ndgas^na, " Is there such a thing as the w^agu ?" Ndgas^na : " There is not." Milinda : " Is there any separate being, any distinct principle of existence, connected with (or at- tached to) the nama-rdpa ?** Ndgas^na: "There is not." Milinda: " Then there is no one to endure the consequences of sin ; there is no responsibility.*' Ndgasena : " If there were not conception in some other place, then there would be no responsibility ; but there is this conception, and therefore the consequences of sin are endured. When a man steals a mango that belongs to some other person, is he not punished ?" Milinda : " Yes.*' N&gas6ua : "But the mango that he steals is not the mango that the other man set in the ground as seed ; then why is he to be punished ?" Milinda : '^ Because the mango that he steals was produced from the tree that grew from the mango that the other man set in good ground." Nagas^na : " Even so, from the karma, whether it be connected with merit or demerit, belonging to this nama-rdpa, another nilma-rdpa is produced (to which the karma is transferred) ; thus there is uo release, in this manner (apart from the reception of nirwana), from the consequences of sin." 13. The king again said, " Do the winyina, consciousness ; pragnydwa, wisdom ; and the life that is in the body composed of various elements, produce one effect and embrace one idea, or are the effects and ideas multiform ?" Nagas^na replied, " The win- yaua is like a man who, when he sees the gold coin called a IX. THE ONTOLOGY OF BUDHISM. 455 masaran, knows its denomination. Pragnydwa is like the gold- smith, who when he sees the masnran, knows whether it be a oonnterfeit or a genuine coin. The life within the body is not a living soal that enables the being who possesses it to eat, and drink, and go from place to place.'' Milinda : ** Then if there be no living principle what is it that sees colours, shapes, (be, bj the eye, hears sounds by the ear, smells by tlie nose, and so on ?