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This general character, moreover, was of a very general nature, constantly changing and yet remaining with one through the whole course of one's life. So far, the Northern Buddhists of all schools seem to have been in agreement, but in attempting to give a definite place to this dharma, dispute arose. Harivarman's Sattvasiddhi insists that it must be relegated to the Citta-viprayukta, or miscellaneous dharmas neither mental nor physical. The T'ien T'ai and the Hua-yen schools of Chinese Buddhism said that the character arising from physical and verbal action was material (rupa), but that mental action was not. The Yogacarins stated that conventionally, or from the relative standpoint, all three might be called physical. The Sarvastivadins, however, claimed that all such character is ultimately material, and dependent upon the four mahabhutas. In consequence, they classified this dharma as the eleventh of their material factors. (For further details of the Sarv. theory, A.K. 1-86 ; also the first half of 13, on Avijnapti karma.) 2. The material properties classified under mental object.1 The first ten dharmas, including the four mahabhutas, the five sense objects, and the five sense organs, all belong to the realm of sensuous or immediately experienced matter. In addition, however, there are certain aspects of matter of 1 A.S.S., f. l, p. 2fc. 130 MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY which we have no sensuous knowledge, and which are not the objects of the five sense organs but of the mind. Thus, atoms, etc., cannot be seen, they can only be inferred. The Yogacarins have placed in a separate category all those aspects of matter which are thus defined, whether these aspects be objectively existent or merely the result of mistaken creative imagination on the part of the mind. This includes, but is not confined to, the Avijnapti rupa of the Sarvastivadins, and constitutes the eleventh category of the Yogacarins. III. CITTA, OR MIND Having completed our survey of the Buddhist theory of matter, let us now examine their theory of the mind. This is, as we have seen, discussed in a two-fold way in Buddhist books : (1) Mind itself in its various divisions, known as Citta or Vijnana ; and (2) mental qualities evoked by mind in the process of its origination, and which are known as Caitasikas. In the present instance we are concerned with the first alone. But in order that we may understand the various types of mind enumerated by the Buddhists it is necessary, once more, to emphasize the caused and conditioned nature of all mentation. Buddhist books are constantly repeating the Buddhist adage that there is not ego entity, no self- existing mentator, and that not only is the mentating personality evoked by a combination of causes and conditions, but also that mind ceases to exist when sense object and sense organ cease to interact. Strangely enough, even the Yogacarins, who were idealists, refused to believe in a permanent individual mind-substance, but stated that though mind is the only ultimate reality, every individual mind is constantly changing and being remodelled under the influence of causal law. All this, of course, is in accord with the curious anti- substantialist position assumed by Buddhism all along the line. There is no eternal self -existing matter. Likewise there COSMIC ANALYSIS 131 is no eternal self-existing quiescent substance known as mind having a prior existence and which is merely stimulated into activity when brought into contact with the sense objects by means of the sense organs. Rather, certainly according to Hinayana Buddhism, is it a definite product created out of nothing by the interaction of the indriyas and visayas. This consideration is important, inasmuch as many of the so-called divisions of mind are types of mentation classified in accordance with the nature of the stimulus which brought them into being. Consequently, we find two different methods of classification. One is according to the physical basis from which mentation arises. This method of classification is common to all forms of Buddhism, including the three schools with which we are at present more particularly concerned. The other method of classification is more complicated, and deals with all possible states of mind which can arise at any given place, e.g. on earth, the Rupa dhatu, etc., or with the conditions (as opposed to the bases) under which they arise. This latter mode of classification seems to be peculiar to the Sthaviravadin school. Possibly, the clumsiness of the Southern list caused the philosophers of other schools to think such attempts at classification ill-advised. 1. Mind Classified according to the Bases which Evoke it Before proceeding to consider the divisions of the mind, however, it will be well to take into consideration the different terms that are used for mind, and see what they mean. Apart from Nama (name) in the compound Nama-Rupa, which covers the whole of the non-material part of the human personality, there are three terms which are most frequently employed. These are Citta, Manas, and Vijnana.1 Western scholars have not yet come to a standard translation of these important words, but provisionally we may say that Citta is mind, Manas is reason, and Vijnana is consciousness. 1 See discussion of each term, A.K. 4-13a. 132 MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY Citta, the Buddhists derived, probably wrongly, from Citra, or variegated (Exp., 1-85), a term which the Chinese render J| i|C, or arising by compounding. This derivation was probably given by way of added emphasis to the doctrine of the non-substantial nature of the mind. The term is very little used in the sutras, but came to be the standard word in later days for the whole of the subjective life, as opposed to rupa or even to the Caitasikas, and in some ways corresponds to our " soul ", " heart ", or " spirit ", provided that all these terms are de-atmanized. Manas, the Buddhists derived from a term to measure (ma) . It implies the calculation, evaluating, j udging of a thing. Consequently, it is frequently used when the mind is considered a reasoning factor. When used technically, therefore, we may call it Reason, but frequently it, like . Citta, may be rendered Mind. It is interesting to note, however, that when the Mahayanists say that the whole universe is but the creation of Mind, or that nothing exists outside the " mind ", it is Citta and not Manas that is used. Very occasionally Vijnana takes the place of Citta in this connexion. Vijnana is perhaps the oldest of the three terms, and in the early sutras, when the reincarnating personality is spoken of, it is Vijnana and not Manas, or even Citta, that ia mentioned. In later times, however, it came to be used almost exclusively for the sensatory, experiencing aspect of the mind. In this way Citta, or the mind as a whole, is said to be divided into so many Vijnanas or types of data-receiving forms of cognition. In the midst of all this confusion, it is agreeable to find that the Buddhists, at least the Sarvastivadins and Sthaviravadins, agree that there is only a difference in terminology, and that the thing spoken of is the same (C.P. 234 ; A.K. 4, 13). The slightly different use of the terms by the Yogacarins will be dealt with presently. As regards the actual number of divisions of Vijnana, the Sthaviravadins and the Sarvastivadins l are in agreement 1 A.K., 1-16, for full discussion. COSMIC ANALYSIS 133 in postulating but six, as opposed to the eight divisions of the Yogacarins. The six-fold division need not detain us long, for it has already been discussed in connexion with the dhatus and the fifth skandha. There is one vijnana for each of the five material sense organs, and one vijnana (Mano- vijnana) of a more general character, which exercises the functions of reason, judgment, memory, planning, etc. In addition to the other differences between the first five Vijnanas and Mano-vijnana which have already been given, the Buddhists assert that the former are purely passive, while the latter is active. Consequently, while certain phases of the former may come under the category good or bad, it is only because they have been influenced in a moral or immoral way by the former. Again, only a small number of the Caitasikas are associated with the first five vijnanas, while all of them are to be found in association with the Mano-vijnana.