English
" Query : If the four Mahabhutas always arise together, in all molecules, whether hard or moist, hot or mobile, how is it that we can sense one and not the others ? Answer : Because for the time being the nature of one happens to be predominant, so that our senses notice one and not the others." The Mahavibhasa is even more emphatic on this point, and in one passage 116 MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY (31-156) gives long arguments to support the Buddhist position. In this connexion one doctrine peculiar to the Sthaviravadin school must be noticed. They believe that only three of the Mahabhutas are tangible, i.e. that the water element cannot be felt, and, as no element is perceptible to the other senses, it follows that the very existence of this element can only be known by a process of inference. Thus we find S. Z. Aung (C.P. 155%) saying : " Particles of matter are held together by Apo (cohesion) (water) which cannot be felt by the sense of touch — e.g. when one puts his hand into cold water, the softness of the water is not apo but pathavi (earth), the cold felt is not apo but tejo (fire), the pressure felt is not apo but vayo (air) . . . From this one can easily see that the Buddhists are not dealing with Thales' water, Anaximenes' air, Heraldeitus' fire, or the Peripatetics' matter of Greek philosophy." For this reason we should prefer to call the mahabhutas forces rather than material elements, except for the fact that they are considered atomic and therefore are obviously material. What is the connexion between the four ultimates and the various derivative forms of matter ? Buddhaghosa, repre senting the Sthaviravadins, merely says that a derivative form of matter is aided by the four elements supporting (earth), binding (water), maturing (fire), and moving (air) it, like an infant prince being fed, bathed, dressed, and fanned. (Att. Sal. quoted Dham. Sang. K. D. trans., p. 174.) The Sarvastivadins and the Yogacarins deal more explicitly with the causal relation between them, giving a five-fold relationship, one for each of the mahabhutas taken separately, and one for them altogether. The Mahavibhasa (127-66) gives us the following chart : — 1. Producing, as a mother gives birth to a child all four. 2. Reliance, as a disciple relies upon his teacher fire. COSMIC ANALYSIS 117 3. Establishing, as the earth holds or sustains things . . . . . . . earth. 4. Sustaining, as food supports food . .< water. 5. Nourishing, as water fertilizes the roots of trees ....... air. The Abh. Sam. San. (l-2a), representing the Yogacarin school, defines each of these causal relations in the following way : — 1. Producing. — This is the originating cause, because the derivative dharmas cannot arise apart from the activity of the Mahabhutas. 2. Reliance. — This is the transforming cause, because, apart from the Mahabhutas, the derivatives have no intrinsic qualities of their own. 3. Establishing. — This is the co-ordinate transforming cause, because whenever the Mahabhutas undergo modification the derivatives undergo a like transformation. 4. Sustaining. — This is the cause of continued existence, because, depending upon the mahabhutas, the derivatives do not cease, but have a continuous development. 5. Nourishing. — This is the cause of growth, because increase (or stimulus) takes place owing to the nourishing force of the Mahabhutas. (b) The Derivative Dharmas The Sthaviravadins give twenty-seven or twenty-eight rupa dharmas in all, of which twenty-three or twenty-four are derived from the four Mahabhutas, while the Sarvastivadins and Yogacarins have only eleven. It is probable, however, that the twenty-seven represent an earlier tradition, owing to the greater crudity of the method of enumeration. It seems likely that the more philosophic thinkers of the Sarvastivadin and Yogacarin schools eliminated those dharmas which were inconsistent with a more logical, systematic, and scientific view of the universe. 118 MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY The following is a comparative list of the derivative material dharmas, as taught in the three schools : — 2. Sound 3. Smell „ 4. Taste „ 5. Touch „ 6. Sight object. 7. Sound „ 8. Smell „ 9. Taste „ 10. Touch „ 11. Unmanifested matter. (3) Yogdcdrin. 1. Sight organ. 2. Sound „ 3. Smell „ 4. Taste „ 5. Touch „ 6. Sight object. 7. Sound „ 8. SmeU „ 9. Taste „ 10. Touch „ 11. Matter included under dharma- dhatu. (1) Sthaviravadin. (2) Sarvdstivddin. 1. Sight organ. 1. Sight organ. 2. Sound „ 3. SmeU „ 4. Taste „ 5. Touch „ 6. Sight object. 7. Sound „ 8. SmeU „ 9. Taste „ 10. Touch „ 11. Female Sex. 12. Male Sex. 13. Food. 14. Organ of Life. 15. Space (akasa). 16. Gesture. 17. Speech. 18. Buoyancy. 19. Elasticity. 20. Power of Adaptation. 21. Power of Aggregation (birth). 22. Duration. 23. Decay. 24. Death. The curious crudity and iUogicality of the Sthaviravadin school is at once obvious. Here are placed, side by side, material objects and the modes or activities of these organs, such as buoyancy or elasticity, birth, death, etc. The Sarvastivadins have taken some of the categories out of this list and placed them, more appropriately, among the Citta-viprayukta dharmas. Akasa, in the sense of mere empty space, the apertures of the body, etc., being but the COSMIC ANALYSIS 119 absence of a thing, is not considered a separate dharma, although, as we have seen, Akasa, in the higher sense, is placed among the Asamskrta dharmas. The remaining dharmas of the Sthaviravadin list are ignored, for though masculinity and femininity were classed among the twenty- two indriyas yet, since they were not considered ultimate elements, they were omitted from the lists of dharmas. It may, at first sight, seem strange to us that even the logical Sarvastivadin and Yogacarin philosophers should have been content to keep the sense organs and sense objects as ultimate factors of existence, but the reasons for their doing so become obvious when the Buddhist theory of matter is taken into consideration. As we have already remarked in dealing with the dhatus, sight objects, smell objects, etc., are for the Buddhists really existing objects, separate from, though produced by the four mahabhutas. Thus, what we consider a single material object, such as a lump of earth, is really something very complex. It contains not only minute particles of all the four elements which are invisible, but also minute visible particles, another set of particles which can be tasted, others which can be smelt, etc., and since, according to the premises, the whole universe of inanimate matter consists of compounds of these ultimate sense particles in addition to the four mahabhutas, it would be inconsistent if they were not counted as separate dharmas. It is the same way with the sense organs. The particles of the caksur-indriya are quite different from the four mahabhutas, and equally distinct from the five kinds of sense object atoms. Hence they are ultimate factors of existence. Let us postpone for a moment examination of the eleventh categories of the Sarvastivadins and Yogacarins and deal somewhat more in detail with each of the sense organs and sense objects. (i) The Sense Organs We have already learned to distinguish between what the world knows as sense organs and what the Buddhists consider 120 MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY to be the true sense organs. The physical eye is not the true sense organ, though it contains minute percipient particles which constitute the organ of vision. Thus the physical eye is complex. Its molecules contain atoms of the four mahabhutas, and atoms of four out of the five sense objects (sound is generally excluded). It also contains the body organ (kaya indriya) atoms, and finally the atoms of the caksur indriya itself. This idea, common to all forms of Buddhism, is expressed by Buddhaghosa in the following words :• — " First the aggregate organism (physical eye) . . . There are fourteen constituents : the four elements, the six attributes dependent upon them . . . vitality, nature, body sensibility (kaya indriya particles), and the visual sentient organ (the true sight sense organ) . . . When the world seeing an obviously extended white object fancies it sees the eye, it only perceives the basis of the eye . . .