Chinese
属于。同样，在其他事物的自性中，将所取和能取视为存在，这是颠倒的见解。将圆成实性视为存在，这是正确的见解。他起自性属于两者。如宗义所说，在他起自性中找不到两个部分的实体。例如，在火轮中，可以辨识出火片、轮子和光亮三种。其中，将火片视为轮子是颠倒的见解。将火片视为火片是正确的见解。光亮属于两者。就像有人说的那样，如果火片和轮子都是实体，那么光亮也可能属于两者。如果轮子是实体而火片不是实体，那么光亮就是轮子本身的自性，没有第二个部分。如果火片是实体而轮子不是实体，情况也是一样。因此，当轮子显现时，一个火逐渐压制另一个，因为轮子根本不存在。因此，光亮只是火片本身，没有两个部分。同样，如果二取是实体，圆成实性也是实体，那么分别念也可能属于两者。但在二取显现之时，它是自证的自性，因为二取根本不存在。因此，分别念的两个部分无法成立。因此，烦恼无法找到应该断除的实体。这样，即使按照执着事物者各自的宗义，也无法找到应该断除的烦恼实体。那么，以中观的方式，对于一切法，也没有任何需要在胜义中建立的，对于想要息灭一切戏论者来说，怎么可能找到应该断除的实体呢？应该这样理解。对此有人说，即使在胜义中没有应该断除的实体，但在世俗中，可以辨识出正确的世俗和不正确的世俗。因此，在正确的世俗中，烦恼有应该断除的实体，这没有矛盾。对此应该说，当正确地建立
English
belongs to it. Similarly, seeing the apprehended and the apprehender as existing in the nature of other-powered phenomena is a perverse view. Seeing the perfectly established as existing is a correct view. The other-powered belongs to both. As it is said in the tenets, one cannot find two parts of substance in the other-powered. For example, in a fire wheel, one can distinguish three things: a piece of fire, a wheel, and brightness. Among these, seeing a piece of fire as a wheel is a perverse view. Seeing a piece of fire as a piece of fire is a correct view. Brightness belongs to both. It is like saying that if both the piece of fire and the wheel are substances, then brightness can also belong to both. If the wheel is a substance but the piece of fire is not, then the brightness is the very nature of the wheel, and there is no second part. If the piece of fire is a substance but the wheel is not, it is the same. Therefore, at the very time when the wheel appears, one fire gradually suppresses the other, because the wheel never exists. Therefore, the brightness is merely the piece of fire itself, and there are no two parts to the brightness. Similarly, if the duality is a substance and the perfectly established is also a substance, then conceptualization could belong to both. But at the very time when duality appears, it is the nature of self-awareness, because the two never exist. Therefore, the two parts of conceptualization cannot be established. Therefore, one will not find a substance to be abandoned in afflictions. Thus, even if one follows the tenets of those who view things as real, one will not find a substance to be abandoned in afflictions. Then, in the Madhyamaka way, there is nothing to be established in the ultimate sense for all phenomena. For those who wish to pacify all elaborations, how could they find a substance to be abandoned? This should be understood. To this, someone says: Even though there is no substance to be abandoned in the ultimate sense, in the conventional sense, one can distinguish between correct conventionality and incorrect conventionality. Therefore, in correct conventionality, there is a substance to be abandoned in afflictions, and there is no contradiction. To this, it should be said: When one correctly establishes
Chinese
如果认为存在需要进行辨别的事物，那么所有世俗的差别都可以同样地被确立。如果认为不存在需要如实辨别的事物，那么所有的世俗差别都将变得相同。此外，有这样的说法：对真实和非真实的世俗差别进行区分，是通过现象相似但作用能力不同来区分的。例如，瓶子的形状可以执行盛水的功能，而瓶子影像的形状则不能执行盛水的功能。这种区分仅仅是确立了人我之实有作用，而不是确立了法我之实有作用。那么，如何确立人我之实有呢？有两种，即外部和内部的相续。其中，内部的相续是指，将男人、女人、人、天等每个人我相续都执着为一个个实有。按照法的观点来看，每个人我都是由六界、六处、五蕴组成的，仅仅是众多聚合在一起而产生一个整体的错觉，并不能找到天、人等有情之实有。从外部相续的角度来看，对于柱子和瓶子等相似的、持续存在的事物，会执着认为存在一个瓶子的自性，或者一个柱子的自性。但这些法也仅仅是五界和外部的六处而已，并不能找到一个瓶子的单一自性之实有。因此，像这样说“瓶子可以执行盛水的功能”，也是确立了人我之实有作用。如果从法我的角度来看，任何显现为心识的对境之相，那本身就是法。这样一来，瓶子的影像之所以显现，是因为瓶子的缘故，仅仅是瓶子的颜色和形状的作用，而不是触觉等的作用。影像也可以执行颜色的作用。作用的区分也大多是通过利益和损害来确定的。例如，太阳的影像会损害眼睛，而月亮的影像则有益处。
English
If it is thought that there is something to be distinguished, then all the distinctions of convention can be established in the same way. If it is thought that there is nothing to be truly distinguished, then all the distinctions of convention will become the same. Furthermore, it is said that the distinction between true and untrue conventions is made by the difference between being able to perform a function and not being able to, even though they appear similar. For example, the shape of a pot can perform the function of holding water, but the shape of the image of a pot cannot perform the function of holding water. This distinction merely establishes that the substance of a person performs a function, but it does not establish that the substance of a dharma performs a function. How then is the substance of a person established? There are two kinds, belonging to external and internal continua. Of these, the internal continuum is that each person's continuum, such as male, female, human, or god, is apprehended as a separate substance. According to the perspective of dharma, each person is merely a collection of six elements, six sense sources, and five aggregates, and the mind arises with the mere aggregation of many; the substance of sentient beings such as gods and humans is not found. From the perspective of the external continuum, one apprehends that there is a single nature of a pot or a single nature of a pillar in things like pillars and pots that exist in a similar, continuous stream. But these dharmas are merely the five elements and the six external sense sources; the substance of a single nature of a pot is not found. Therefore, when it is said, "The pot performs the function of holding water," this also establishes that the substance of a person performs the function. If one looks at the substance of dharma, then whatever appears as the characteristic of an object to the mind is itself a dharma. In that case, since the image of a pot appears because of the pot, it is merely the effect of the color and shape of the pot, and not of tactile sensations, etc. An image can also perform the function of color. The distinction of function is mostly determined by benefit and harm. For example, the image of the sun harms the eye, while the image of the moon benefits it.
Chinese
阳光也能消除阴影。能容纳水的是触觉，而不是颜色。因此，颜色和触觉不能放在一起比较，因为不同的法有不同的作用。因此，比如瓶子能做容纳水的作用，而瓶子的影像却不能。这样安立，只是随顺世间的名声，认为人我的实性能起作用。人我本身尚未成立，哪里会有作用的实体呢？这样去论证，就像被水冲走的人抓住拔起的草一样。对此有人说：如果不希望在胜义上成立，世俗如果未经观察则令人愉快，如果经过观察则无法忍受理智的堆积，因此不违背理智的损害。如果这样，仅仅在世俗中成立就不需要理智了吗？虽然显现上相似，但通过能否起作用的差别来区分正确和不正确。这难道不是理智吗？无论是正确地成立，还是暂时地成立，如果连各自程度的成立所需的理智堆积都无法忍受，那么仅仅是名称又如何成立呢？例如，即使不能像摧毁敌军的大象那样，忍受驮着军队，用锤子鞭打的堆积，但如果连耕田的牛也无法忍受肩负轭，用树枝鞭打的堆积，那么又如何能使用耕田这个名称呢？与羊羔的堆积有什么区别呢？同样，即使无法忍受在胜义上成立为实有的理智，但在仅仅是正确的世俗中成立为实有，如果不成立法的实性能起作用，反而成立人我的实性能起作用，那么又如何能称之为正确的世俗呢？与世间凡夫的观点有什么区别呢？持有这种分离的观点，真是非常令人惊奇啊！例如，过去出现过的转轮王名
English
Even sunlight dispels shadows. It is touch that holds water, not color. Therefore, color and touch cannot be compared, as different dharmas have different functions. Thus, a vase performs the function of holding water, but the image of the vase does not. This assertion merely conforms to worldly fame, assuming that the substance of a person can perform actions. If the person itself is not established, how can there be a substance that performs actions? To argue in this way is like a person being carried away by the water grasping at uprooted grass. To this, someone might say: If you do not wish to establish it ultimately, the conventional is pleasing if unexamined, but unbearable to a heap of reasoning if examined. Therefore, there is no contradiction to being harmed by reasoning. If that is the case, does merely establishing something conventionally not require reasoning? Although appearing similar, correctness and incorrectness are distinguished by the difference between being able to function and not being able to function. Is that not reasoning? Whether establishing something correctly or establishing it temporarily, if even the heap of reasoning required to establish it to its respective extent is unbearable, then how can even a mere term be established? For example, even if one cannot endure the burden of an army and the goad of a hammer, like an elephant that destroys the enemy's forces, if even an ox that plows a field cannot endure the burden of a yoke and the goad of a vine, then how can the term 'plowing a field' be applied? What difference is there from a pile of goat droppings? Similarly, even if one cannot endure the heap of reasoning for establishing something as substantially existent ultimately, but even in establishing something as substantially existent in merely correct conventionality, if one does not establish that the substance of a dharma performs a function, but instead establishes that the substance of a person performs a function, then how can this even be called correct conventionality? What difference is there from the view of ordinary worldly people? Holding such a separate view is truly a cause for great wonder! For example, a famous universal monarch who appeared in the past...
Chinese
唉呀！因为人的欲望没有满足，所以去了三十三天的处所。天神帝释天分给他一半的座位，得到了和天神一样的权力和享受。但是，从那以后，贪欲更加强烈地增长。由于那个力量，再次堕落到阎浮提。变得愚昧后，问人们：这个地方是谁的地方？又说：我们从老一辈那里听说，这个地方最初是名为“名闻无边”的国王的地方。听说是这样的。说完之后，就像欲望的心理疾病被风吹动的蜡烛一样，当场就死了。人们听到这件事后，变成了非常稀奇的事情，说道：从头顶出生，获得七宝的名闻无边啊！和天神帝释天一样，没有比这更伟大的人了。因为欲望的疾病而死，没有比这更卑贱的人了。唉！对于这件事，我们都觉得很奇怪。就像这样说一样。一切法在胜义谛中，一切戏论都寂灭，就像什么也不需要做一样。然而，执着于真实的世俗的自性，认为有应该舍弃和接受的事物，这是非常不合适的执着，真是奇怪的事情啊！如果不想真实地去做，那么一切世俗都会变得平等，这是怎么样的呢？例如，当把绳子看成蛇的时候，绳子是真实存在的。蛇是完全不存在的。把绳子看成绳子的心是正确的认识。把绳子看成蛇的心是错误的认识。因为错误是不清净的，所以那个心也不是像它所显现的那样存在，因此不能获得它的自性，只是从其他事物上假立的。然后，再次仔细观察那根绳子，看到它只是由草或毛的许多部分组成的。当绳子是单独圆形的想法消失时，组成部分是真实存在的。绳子和蛇是平等的，完全不存在的。只看到组成部分的心是正确的认识。绳子的心和蛇的心一样，是错误的认识。然后又是毛和
English
Alas! Because human desire was not satisfied, he went to the place of the Thirty-Three Heavens. The lord of the gods, Indra, shared half of his seat with him, and he obtained the same power and enjoyment as the lord of the gods. However, from that point on, the craving of desire grew even stronger. Due to that power, he fell back to Jambudvipa. Having become deluded, he asked the people: Whose land is this? He further said: We have heard from the elders that this land was originally the land of a king named 'Fame Without End.' So we have heard. As soon as he said this, like a candle moved by the wind due to the mental illness of desire, he died on the spot. When the people heard of this, it became a very astonishing thing, and they said: This Fame Without End, who was born from the crown of the head and obtained the seven precious things! Since he was equal to the lord of the gods, Indra, there has been no one greater than him. Because he died from the illness of desire, there is no one more base than him. Alas! We consider this to be very strange. It is like saying this. In the ultimate truth, all phenomena are completely pacified from all elaborations. While seeming as if there is nothing to be accomplished, this clinging to the characteristics of true conventional reality, holding that there are things to be abandoned and adopted, is a very inappropriate clinging; it is a strange thing. If one does not wish to truly accomplish anything, how can all conventionalities become equal? For example, when a rope is seen as a snake, the rope is truly existent. The snake is completely non-existent. The mind that sees the rope as a rope is correct knowledge. The mind that sees the rope as a snake is mistaken knowledge. Since delusion is impure, that mind itself does not exist as it appears, therefore it cannot attain its own nature; it is merely imputed from something else. Then, upon examining that same rope carefully, one sees that it is merely composed of many parts of grass or hair. When the thought that the rope is a single round thing disappears, the component parts are truly existent. The rope and the snake are equal; they are completely non-existent. The mind that sees only the component parts is correct knowledge. The mind of the rope is like the mind of the snake; it is mistaken knowledge. Then again, the hair and