English
It is one dharma. It is different dharmas. Thus, it is established. Relying on those, it is established that there is and is. Like this, the essence is one. There is one. The essence is different. There is different. The dharma is one. There is one. The dharma is different. There is different. Thus, it is established. Among these, establishing "is" is establishing truth. Establishing "there is" is establishing the object of focus. Again, establishing "is" is establishing by depending on something. Establishing "there is" is establishing by relying on something. How are these? Among these, what is establishing one essence? It is rejecting from many similar or dissimilar kinds. Like this, a pot is rejected from dissimilar kinds such as pillars, and also rejected from a second pot of the same kind, thus establishing the essence of the pot as one. Among these, what is establishing different essences? It is established by depending on one essence. Like this, depending on one pot of the same kind, it is rejected, and the second pot and so on are also established as different. Placing dissimilar kinds such as pillars on one side, it is rejected, and the pot, spindle, horse, elephant, and so on are established as different. Among these, establishing one dharma and different dharmas is similar to that reasoning. Furthermore, there are two ways of establishing one: separating and establishing one, and collecting and establishing one. When establishing different, there are also two: rejecting and establishing different, and dividing and establishing different. Among these, what is establishing one essence as existing? It can be considered as existing in a general substance, or it can be considered as an imputed existence. From a single generality having many essences, this is one essence existing, separating and establishing one essence as existing. Separating and establishing one essence as being is, from those existing in many essences without relying on generality, depending, rejecting, and separating, this is one essence. Thus, it is established as being. Among these, what is collecting and establishing one essence? Like this, what and what are one, where is one
Chinese
因此，进行论证。像这样，在论证法与有法本体同一时，论证自性同一，如乌巴拉花即是它，蓝色即是它，瓶子即是它，有为法即是它，这样论证自性同一。法与有法在自性上也是同一的，像这样，蓝色即是乌巴拉花，粗糙即是乌巴拉花，有为法即是瓶子，无常即是瓶子，这样归纳为自性同一而进行论证，这种方式也同样适用于论证存在和所是两种方式。其中，在论证自性各异的存在时，从共性中分离出来进行论证。在论证所是时，从一者中排除而进行论证。其中，在论证法为一时，在进行区分论证时，瓶子的自性是什么，它的所有部分都是能持水的，是有为法，是无常。这样排除其他特性，从一法中排除而进行论证。如果论证法与有法二者为一法，则将自性作为一方，它的所有部分都论证为一法。在归纳不同自性而论证为一法时，什么和什么是一，在哪里是一呢？柱子的自性和瓶子的自性，二者都是有为法，是一。这样归纳而论证为一法，论证为存在或所是。其中，在论证法为不同时，分开而论证为不同，就像这样，瓶子的一个自性，颜色、形状、触觉和特征等各自区分。在特征中，有为法和无常等特征各自区分。排除而论证法为不同时，像这样，有为法是从无常中排除的，是其他法，像这样，有为法是诸行显现成就的特征，无常是诸行坏灭的特征，因此，如果成为有为法本身就是无常，则诸行不会显现成就。同样，如果无常本身是有为法，则诸行不会坏灭。这样进行论证。所有这些也都是存在的
English
Therefore, one argues. Like this, when arguing that the dharma and the possessor of dharma are of the same essence, one argues for the sameness of self-nature. For example, the Utpala flower is that itself, the color blue is that itself, the vase is that itself, the conditioned is that itself. Thus, one argues for the sameness of self-nature. The dharma and the possessor of dharma are also argued to be the same in essence. Like this, the color blue is the Utpala flower itself, roughness is the Utpala flower itself, the conditioned is the vase itself, impermanence is the vase itself. Thus, summarizing, one argues for the sameness of self-nature. This very method is also used to argue for the two ways of being existent and being so. Among these, when arguing for the existence of different self-natures, one argues by separating from the general. When arguing for being so, one argues by excluding from one. Among these, when arguing for the dharma as one, at the time of distinguishing and arguing, whatever is the self-nature of the vase, all its parts are capable of holding water, are conditioned, and are impermanent. Thus, excluding other characteristics, one argues by excluding from one dharma. If one argues that the dharma and the possessor of dharma are two as one dharma, then taking self-nature as one side, all its parts are argued as one dharma. When summarizing different self-natures and arguing as one dharma, what and what are one, and where are they one? The self-nature of the pillar and the self-nature of the vase, both are conditioned, are one. Thus, summarizing, one argues as one dharma, arguing as existent or being so. Among these, when arguing for the dharma as different, separating and arguing as different is like this: in one self-nature of the vase, color, shape, tactile sensation, and characteristics are distinguished separately. Among the characteristics, conditioned and impermanence, etc., are distinguished as separate characteristics. When arguing for the dharma as different by excluding, like this, the conditioned is excluded from impermanence and is another dharma. Like this, the conditioned is the characteristic of the manifestation and accomplishment of phenomena, impermanence is the characteristic of the cessation of phenomena. Therefore, if the conditioned itself becomes impermanent, then phenomena will not manifest and accomplish. Similarly, if impermanence itself is conditioned, then phenomena will not cease. Thus, one argues. All of these are also existent.
Chinese
并且成立“是”的体性，其中，以“有”的声音和心识，以不舍弃其他差别的状态来显示；以“是”的声音和心识，以舍弃其他差别的状态来显示。如此成立的能立，也是依于两种心识的势力。如此，以执持整体的心识来成立为一的时候，如果成立自性为一，那么法与有法也找不到自性各异；法与法也找不到自性各异。那个自性就成为要么唯一存在，要么不存在的实物。它的法就只是作为那个自性的差别和特征，各自没有实物的组成部分。这样一来，自性就成立为没有众多组成部分的唯一实物存在或“是”。其中，以分析实物的心识来分别的时候，想要存在于一体的共相，因为被分为多种自性，所以唯一的共相就坏灭了。因为自性被分为多种差别，所以唯一的、没有组成部分的实物自性就坏灭了。因为唯一的差别被分为组成部分，所以唯一法的实物就坏灭，无法成立。这样依次分别，一和多的心识即使分别到劫末也无法返回，而要成立事物本来的自性存在，形色无法用体积来穷尽，心和心所无法用种类来穷尽，最终没有不变成如虚空般体性的地方。有些时候，舍弃趋向于两种方向的心识，依靠二者的部分来观察，有为法和它的体性无常二者，在相同和相异二者上都找出过失，也显示要从二者中解脱。同样，他起和圆成实性也是如此。这样一来，所有主张实物存在的宗派，自己的宗义是用执持整体的心识来成立自性唯一的实物存在，其他的宗义是用随后分析的心识来破斥，成立为没有实物，即使如此成立，也没有达到衡量和穷尽所知，只是大小污垢的差别而已。或者这样，本体和差别
English
And it establishes the nature of "is," wherein, with the sound and mind of "exists," it shows in a way that does not abandon other distinctions; with the sound and mind of "is," it shows in a way that abandons other distinctions. Thus, the act of establishing is also subject to the power of two kinds of minds. Thus, when establishing as one with a mind that grasps the whole, if it establishes the self-nature as one, then the dharma and the possessor of dharma also cannot find different self-natures; dharma and dharma also cannot find different self-natures. That self-nature becomes either existing as one or not existing as a substance. Its dharma is only made as a distinction and characteristic of that self-nature, and there are no parts of substance in each. In this way, the self-nature is established as a single substance that does not have many parts, existing or "is." Among them, when distinguishing with a mind that analyzes substance, the commonality that wants to exist as one, because it is divided into many self-natures, the single commonality is destroyed. Because the self-nature is divided into many distinctions, the single, partless substance self-nature is destroyed. Because the single distinction is divided into parts, the substance of the single dharma is destroyed and cannot be established. Thus, if you distinguish in order, the minds of one and many can be separated until the end of the kalpa, but to establish the original nature of things as they are, form cannot be exhausted by volume, and mind and mental events cannot be exhausted by types. Ultimately, there is no place that does not become like the nature of space. Sometimes, abandoning the mind that tends to two directions, relying on the part of both, when examining the conditioned phenomena and its nature of impermanence, both the same and the different, faults are found in both, and it also shows that one should be liberated from both. Similarly, the nature of other-powered and perfectly established are also like that. In this way, all philosophical tenets that view things as entities, their own tenets are established by the mind that grasps the whole as the existence of a single substance of self-nature, and other tenets are refuted by the mind that analyzes afterwards, establishing that there is no substance, but even if it is established in this way, it has not reached the measure and exhaustion of what is to be known, it is only the difference between large and small stains. Or like this, essence and difference
Chinese
既可以作为一个整体来建立，也可以作为个体来建立，也可以从二元对立中解脱出来而建立。当作为一个整体来建立时，法在本质上也可以是一个整体，本质也可以是一种法。像这样，如果目标是安立所有法以使其易于建立，那么这些逻辑上的损害仅仅在于你们这些视事物为实有的人，彼此之间相互矛盾。这些逻辑甚至无法触及大圆满的少许部分。例如，就像想要用视力和目光来衡量大海的深度和天空的尽头一样。在声音的教法中，无论说什么词语，都只是为了否定不存在和非是，以及为了肯定存在和是。因此，建立事物也大多是通过对它有益的条件和作用的条件来说明的。对它有益的条件就像这样：像“具有”这样的词语显示一般，像“是什么”这样的词语显示自性，像“本身”这样的词语显示特殊。作用的条件也像这样：使之长久行走的是“长久行走”，显示功德；使之长久行走的是“长行”，显示功德，这也只是显示存在和是，除此之外没有别的。此外，仅仅是从不完整的名称使其完整，以及仅仅是具有区分，就被称为具有意念的边际。例如，像“布的白色”这样的事物，即使没有显示存在和是的条件，也与那个意义没有不同。此外，在理性的教法中，通过四种理性的方式进行辩驳和建立，也离不开两种否定和两种肯定。即使通过四种理性的方式来衡量，也仅仅是看到那些视事物为实有的人的宗派彼此损害。此外，理性本身变得过分，最终也只是看到损害。因此，它不会损害大圆满的方式，就像之前说的那样。那么，四种理性的方式是：一般来说，在建立法是依缘而生起的特征时，通过自性的方式来建立的是法性的理性，通过果的方式来建立的是作用的理性，通过因的方式来建立的是依赖。
English
It can be established as a whole, and it can be established as individual. It can also be established by being liberated from duality. When establishing as a whole, the Dharma can also be one in essence. Essence can also be one Dharma. Like this, if the aim is to establish all Dharmas in a way that makes them easy to establish, then these logical harms are merely that you who view things as real, contradict each other. These logics cannot even touch a small part of the Great Perfection. For example, it is like wanting to measure the depth of the great ocean and the end of the sky with sight and gaze. Also, in the teachings of sound, whatever words are spoken, they are only to negate what is non-existent and is not, and to affirm what is existent and is. Therefore, establishing things is also mostly explained through conditions that benefit it and conditions of action. Conditions that benefit it are like this: words like "having" show the general, words like "what is" show the self-nature, and words like "itself" show the particular. Conditions of action are also like this: making it walk for a long time is "walking for a long time," showing merit; making it walk for a long time is "long walk," showing merit, which also only shows existence and is, and there is nothing else besides that. Furthermore, merely making a name complete from an incomplete one, and merely having distinctions, is called having the edge of intention. For example, things like "the white of the cloth," even without the condition of showing existence and is, are no different from that meaning. Furthermore, in the teachings of reason, refuting and establishing through the four types of reason also do not go beyond two negations and two affirmations. Even if measured through the four types of reason, it is merely seeing that the tenets of those who view things as real harm each other. Furthermore, reason itself becomes excessive, and in the end, it only sees harm. Therefore, it does not harm the way of the Great Perfection, as said before. So, the ways of the four reasons are: In general, when establishing the characteristic that Dharma arises dependently, establishing through the way of self-nature is the reason of Dharma-nature, establishing through the way of result is the reason of action, and establishing through the way of cause is dependence.