English
Therefore, it follows that even inanimate objects can give rise to intelligence. The reason is accepted. If you say that the pervasion is not established, then, the object that knows external objects must be effective. Because in phenomena, it is impossible for both inanimate and animate to exist simultaneously. If it is the former, then it arises from it and appears as it is. Therefore, all phenomena are necessarily produced from the mind. If it is known that the first is a relationship of identity, then, does the mind have identity in external objects? Or do external objects have identity in the mind? If it is the latter, then the mind itself must be an inanimate object that is the opposite of intelligence. If this reason is not established, then the commitment is broken. Wherever there is identity in external objects, it is necessarily pervaded by inanimate objects, like coarse things and atoms. If it is the former, then a thesis is established that there are no other phenomena other than the mind, because they are identical in essence. Wherever there are no other phenomena other than the mind, then the pot is the mind, like going to the Golden Island. Proving the absence of extremes with a non-common reason will be shown below. The third is the measure of incidental topics: Even so, is maintaining the appearance of each as it is the basis of the nature or essence of reality? If it is the former, it is also not permissible. The scriptures say, "How is the gathering? If secret mantras are performed on what appears, then there will be no difference between the Buddha's intention and the consciousness of sentient beings." Furthermore, the instructions of the Stages of the Path also say, "If it is not true, it cannot be freed from bondage; the sound of time destroys the false impermanence; separated from the noble path, one must enter prison; suffering will not disappear because it is the root of error." This contradicts the scriptures, and there is also harm from reasoning. The consciousness of ordinary beings, which is the subject, must be a valid measure. Because it takes as its object what is known without error. If it is accepted, then error will cease forever. If this reason is not established, then the commitment is broken. Wherever what is known without error is taken as its object, it is necessarily without error, like the direct cognition of the noble ones. If it is the latter, then, the scriptures say, "How is the gathering? If secret mantras are performed on what does not appear, then other heretics will also become Buddhas." Furthermore, the instructions of the Stages of the Path also say, "In the unsurpassed Great Vehicle, purity and suffering are also not different in conventional truth, the view of high and low is...
Chinese
结束。 这与上述说法相矛盾。而且，从理证的角度来说，这个错觉现象，应是法性的遍及对象，因为它们的本体不同。如果承认，那么“自性中没有缺失”的说法就被排除了。如果前提不成立，那么是以外在不同的方式遍及，还是以内在无别的方式遍及？如果是前者，那么法性就成了有戏论的；如果是后者，那么基础本身也会变成错觉。凡是本体不同，就不能作为遍及的能作所作，就像柱子和瓶子一样。 有人会问。回答：在两种观点中，驳斥其他观点： 某些噶日瓦派的人说，在分别念产生时，没有不是基础的；而没有分别念的错觉并非如此。这样说是不合理的，因为产生分别念依赖于因缘，还是不依赖？如果是前者，那么它就不是自性的显现，因为它依赖于因缘。如果承认，那么自性就成了有为法。如果是后者，那么在没有分别念的时候，它不是基础；而在产生分别念的时候，它被认为是基础。 还有些觉仁波切派的人说，这个显现不是法性本身，而是法性的遍及对象。这样说也是不合理的，应该考察是以不同的方式遍及，还是以无别的方式遍及，这在前面已经驳斥过了。 还有些吉扎扎派的人说，这个显现没有舍弃法性的本体，但又不具备法性。这样说也是不合理的，所谓“没有舍弃”，是指有法还是无法？如果是前者，那么它就应该具备法性。如果是后者，那么“没有舍弃”的承诺就失效了。 还有些色多杰沃派的人说，从显现的角度来说，因为显现是法性的自显现，所以它是法性；但从执着的角度来说，因为它执着于不同的对境，所以它不是法性。这样说也是不合理的，显现和执着，两者的心识本体是一还是异？如果是前者，那么从执着的角度来说，它也应该是法性的自显现，因为同一个本体，显现和不显现是矛盾的。如果承认，那么认为从执着的角度来说它不是法性的观点就失效了。凡是同一个先前的本体，显现和不显现两种情况不相符，就像乌巴花的颜色一样。如果是后者，那么在舍弃执着错觉的时候，显现错觉就不会被舍弃，因为它们的本体不同。如果承认，那么圣者在入定时没有见到任何法，又该如何解释道之智慧？凡是本体不同，所舍弃的对象也不同，就像毒药一样。
English
End. This contradicts the above statement. Moreover, from the perspective of reasoning, this illusory appearance should be the object pervaded by the Dharmata, because their entities are different. If you concede, then the statement "there is no deficiency in the nature itself" is excluded. If the premise is not established, then does it pervade in a different way, or in an undifferentiated way? If it is the former, then the Dharmata becomes elaborate; if it is the latter, then the basis itself will become an illusion. Wherever the entities are different, they cannot be the agent and object of pervasion, just like a pillar and a pot. Someone might ask. Answer: Among the two views, refuting other views: Some Kariwa people say that there is nothing that is not a basis at the time of conceptualization; and this illusion of non-conceptualization is not like that. This is unreasonable because the arising of conceptualization depends on conditions, or does not depend on conditions? If it is the former, then it is not a manifestation of nature, because it depends on conditions. If you concede, then nature becomes conditioned. If it is the latter, then it is not a basis at the time of non-conceptualization; but it is considered a basis at the time of conceptualization. Some Kyo Rinchen people say that this appearance is not the Dharmata itself, but is the object pervaded by the Dharmata. This is also unreasonable, and it should be examined whether it pervades in a different way or in an undifferentiated way, which has been refuted before. Some Kyi Tsakra people say that this appearance has not abandoned the essence of the Dharmata, but does not possess the Dharmata. This is also unreasonable, and whether "not abandoned" refers to an existent phenomenon or a non-existent phenomenon should be examined. If it is the former, then it should possess the Dharmata. If it is the latter, then the commitment of "not abandoned" is broken. Some Sle Dorje Wo people say that from the perspective of appearance, because appearance is the self-appearance of the Dharmata, it is the Dharmata; but from the perspective of clinging, because it clings to different objects, it is not the Dharmata. This is also unreasonable, are the minds of appearance and clinging the same entity or different? If it is the former, then from the perspective of clinging, it should also be the self-appearance of the Dharmata, because for the same entity, appearance and non-appearance are contradictory. If you concede, then the view that it is not the Dharmata from the perspective of clinging is broken. Wherever the two situations of appearance and non-appearance do not match for the same previous entity, it is like the color of an Utpala flower. If it is the latter, then when clinging illusion is abandoned, appearance illusion will not be abandoned, because their entities are different. If you concede, then how can the wisdom of the path explain that the noble ones do not see any phenomena in meditative equipoise? Wherever the entities are different, the objects to be abandoned are also different, just like poison.
Chinese
如同荆棘一般。自宗是，自性法性中，圆满具足的体性，不杂染于错乱还灭之相。本体无别，如是说。如经中所说：嗔恨不杂，苦恼心，圆满之中，空无我。彼性不杂且圆满，无作本然唯此性。如是宣说之故。如是，圆满自性不杂，是否就是那个本身？若是，如同不杂非法性一般，从圆满的角度而言，也不是。若不是，则不会成为无别。如果有人这样问，那么，仅此而言，油是否就是芝麻？若是，如同芝麻不显现为液体一般，油也不应显现为液体。若不是，则芝麻和油的本体不会成为无别。第二，广述本来清净和任运成就的差别，有四点：辨别分类，思考一异之考察，遮破有缺失之基，成立自宗无过失。第一点中，也有总的分类和支分的分类。第一，如同黄金和金锈一般，认为法性之基与无明相应之任运成就者；如同水晶和水晶的颜色一般，认为法性之基没有错乱之因，垢染是突发性的本来清净者，这二者。如是说：无明与智慧，非为异体性，于此不悟与证悟之道一味性。此外，又说：一切皆清净，并非事物之显明清净，唯于分别中，方能得清净。第二，支分上的分类是，任运成就也有：总任运成就，支分任运成就，任运成就散漫者三种。本来清净也有：法界本来清净，智慧本来清净，大清净三种，总共六种。第二，思考一异之考察是，如此，本体之基安住于无定无方的状态，以及错乱或者有基有方的显现，如同水和牛奶混合一般，连表述方式的差别也没有而成为一体，或者如同瓶子和毛毯一般本体各异，或者如同瓶子上的作用和无常一般，本体是一个，而表述方式各异，或者如同吃过唐姜后所显现的幻觉一般，在虚空中显现出毛发缠绕的车轮一般
English
Like thorns. The self-tradition is that the nature of reality is completely perfect, and its appearance is not mixed with delusion and reversal. It is said that its essence is inseparable. As it is said in the scriptures: "Hatred is not mixed, tormented mind, in the perfection, emptiness and selflessness. That nature is unmixed and perfect, unmade, just as it is." Therefore, if that perfection is not mixed, is it the same or not? If it is the same, then just as being unmixed is not the nature of reality, it also follows that it is not from the perspective of perfection. If it is not the same, then it will not become inseparable. If someone asks, then, in that sense, is oil the same as sesame seeds or not? If it is the same, then just as sesame seeds do not appear as liquid, oil should also not appear as liquid. If it is not the same, then the essence of sesame seeds and oil will not become inseparable. Secondly, to explain the difference between primordial purity (ka dag) and spontaneous presence (lhun grub) in detail, there are four points: identifying the distinctions, contemplating the examination of one and different, refuting the basis of faults, and establishing the faultlessness of one's own system. In the first point, there is also a general distinction and a specific distinction. First, like gold and gold rust, the spontaneously present ones who believe that ignorance is concomitant with the basis of reality; like crystal and the color of crystal, the primordially pure ones who believe that there is no cause of delusion in the basis of reality and that defilements are adventitious, these two. As it is said: "Ignorance and wisdom are not different entities, in this path of non-realization and realization, they are of one taste." Furthermore, it is also said: "Everything is said to be pure, but it is not the manifest purity of things, only in analysis can purity be attained." Secondly, the specific distinctions are that spontaneous presence also has: general spontaneous presence, specific spontaneous presence, and scattered spontaneous presence, these three. Primordial purity also has: primordial purity of the expanse, primordial purity of wisdom, and great purity, these three, making a total of six. Secondly, contemplating the examination of one and different is as follows: the basis of essence abides in a state of indeterminacy and directionlessness, and this appearance of delusion or a basis with characteristics and direction, like water and milk mixed together, without even a distinction in the way it is expressed, is it one, or is it different in essence like a vase and a blanket, or is it like action and impermanence on a vase, is the essence one but the ways of expression different, or like the appearance of having eaten thang khrom, in which a wheel of tangled hair appears in the sky