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Sanskrit vocables, also, when transliterated, I give, as a rule, in the same style of type, 5 some sacred text, ‘as cited, with approval, by S’ankara A’chfrya,* sdéakhya imports ‘ascertainmeut of the truth concerning pure “soul” S‘ankara, again, and in like manner taking no account of the etymology of the word, interprets it, on his own authority, by ‘the conception that the qualities of purity, passion, and darkness, are perceptible by me; and that I, being distinct from them, am the spectator of their operations, eternal, hetero- geneous from the qualities, soul.’+ { ” * In his commentary on the Vishnu-sahasra-ndéma from the Mah4bhérata, XII, 7006. The definition to which S’ankara accedes, may be from some Purana, It is not to be found in the legal institutes of Vyasa, where I had hoped to ineet with it. The passage in which this definition occurs, together with the verse which the passage explains, here follow : ayia: nigger: aaa aleatafa: | aefi: afrarara cfa efaaqaaa aa aeigraetrafa wefe: wae Faq CUA | GY Gg Feaquavaresa: | afraas siege War- waaay atrearqe: | aefawe afearamga we- frafagrara: aaa veefanfeiiaa | xia sega | eff sad afte aeraiata qa fearai are afatcta qaa | t Vie aa Ta GaCHaHifs AT wa SU GY GatiswaAIaTTCaT- fact frat aafaway wife fara! Gitd-bhdshya, XIII, 12. The repugnance of the Vedantis to the Sinkhya can easily be illustrated. The word sénkhya, substantive or adjective, occurs, in the Bhagavad-gétd, in five several passages: IL, 39; IIL, 3; V., 4, 5; XUIL, 24; XVIIL, 13, In three of these passages, the first, and the last two, the theory of Kapila is clearly intended. Yet the commentators, who hold, with few exceptions, to the Vedanta, are most averse, in the majority of these cases, from owning that even the existence of atheism is recogniscd by the poem. In the three instances above mentioned, they, accordingly, explain sénkhya by dtman, dima-tatiwa, bhakti-s’dstra, Brahma, para-pumdn; sankhyd being defined, respectively, by ¢attwa-jndna, adhydtma-s dstra, bhakti, upanishad, upanishad. As renderings of the first, we also find dhydnin, jnéna, paramdtma-vastu-viveka, paramdrtha-vastu-viveka, vedénta, and yathdvasthita-vishayayd buddhyd’nu- sanhita-nirnayuh ‘a conclusion induced on the cognition of a reality.’ G But, whatever may have been the sense originally intended, and perhaps ‘now lost, of the term in question, it is not impro- bable that it carried a reference, ‘more or less obscure, to the radical independence of scriptural authority, which may be affirmed of Kapila. In the comprehensive spirit of all Hin- duism, it is true that he has frequent recourse to Vaidika vouchers* for subordinate articles of belief. Yet, in spite of this semblance of catholicity, it is obvious that the essentials of his system must be justified, if justified at all, rather by av appeal to reason than to revelation. The S4nkhya, indeed, with all its folly and fanaticism, may, for a Hindu school of doctrine, Where Kapila’s tenets are, in all likelihood, not alluded to, sdénkhya is said to mean bhagavat and sannydsa ; sankhyd corresponding to kirtandtmikd bhaktih and samyag dtma-mati, Additional synonymes of the former, simi- larly employed, are bhakta, bhakti, jndna-nishtha, jndna-nishthé, jndnin, nishpépa-purusha, sannydsin, s'uddhdntahkarana, and s'uddha-chetas. ™ S‘ankara A’chirya; Gétd-bhdshya: Raminuja A’charya; Géd-bhdshya: Stirya Pandit; Paramértha-prapé: S‘ridhara Swami; Subodhiné : Madhu- sudana Saraswati; Bhagavad-gitdé-gidhértha-dipiké: Kalyina Bhatta; Ra- sika-ranjant; Jayarima Tarkavagis’a; Bhagavad-gité-sdrdrtha-sangraha: Sadinanda Vyisa; Bhagavad-gité-bhéva-prakds'a: Pais'dcha-bhdshya, by anon.: Kes‘ava Bhatta; Gitd-tattwa-prakdsiké: Rimachandra Saraswat! Gitd-tdtparya-s'uddhi. Of these writers, Raminuja, Madhustidana, Sadinanda, and the anonym- ous author of the Pais’écha-bhdshya, refuse to hear of there being any allu- sion, in the Gité, to the system of Kapila. Adwaitananda, in his Brahma-vidydbharana, an expositorial work connected with the Aphorisms of the Vedanta, suggests that the word panchavins‘ati; adduced from the sacred writings as demarking the number of the Sinkhya principles, may intend 20 x% 5 instead of 20 + 5. In disproof of this conceit, see one of the Sanskrit extracts at p. 2, supra; and the Mahdbhd- rata, XII., passim, but, particularly, chapters 307, 308, 309, * These citations from the Vedas can hardly be referred to a politic affecta-, tion of orthodoxy; to the quieting, on easy terms, of the misgivings of the \ unwary. The Jainas, who go the length of openly denying the divine. origin ’ of the Vedas, and who repudiate their authority generally, . yet admit it when Yeconcilable with their own tencts. As. Res., Vol. XVII, p. 248. 7 . be allowed a fair share of circumspection. In its dogmatism it has restricted itself, for the most part, to the supersensuous, a phrase too frequently convertible with the indeterminate. It would, accordingly, often have been difficult to demonstrate that it was not in the right; and it has signified nothing that it was in the wrong: the Hindus never having been known to approve themselves, ethically, any worse for their atheism than for their ; theism. What is more, the scrupulous vagueness with which it touches on the subject of matter, is, surely, something in its favour. It may have gone widely astray in the cloud-land of metaphysics; but it offers few parallels to the puerile hylology of the Nydfya, It may contravene the spiritual intuitions of humanity ; but it has rarely called down the gods from Olympus, to move the derision of modern science. Other praise of the Sdnkhya than this, would, however, scarcely consist with the exactions of just criticism. On the assumption that it has come down to us legitimately elucidated, it is next to impossible, not- withstanding its fantastic show of method, to trace, in it, a single vestige of consistency. As apprehended in the present day, correctly or incorrectly, it must, in short, be ranked, with every other, even the most perspicuous, scheme of atheism, as little better than a chaotic impertinence.* ( * The notion that the existence of God is susceptible of dialectic demon- stration, has been surrendered, in later times, by most Christian theologians of any credit : it now being, more ordinarily, maintained that our conviction of deity, on grounds apart from revelation, reposes solely on original consciousness, antecedent to all proof. The idea of God must, indeed, necessarily be postulated as the basis of all human speculation. See Hagen- bach’s History of Doctrines, passim. Kant declares that the various objective arguments for the establishment of theism, may be reduced to the teleological, the cosmological, and the ontological. All these, I am told, have been urged, by the Hindus, in combating the Bauddhas, the Mimansakas, and the Sankhyas. But further investigation would be requisite before I could produce these arguments, as employed by the Bréhmans, with any approach to a complete exhibition. ( 3 | Indistinct allusion seems to ie made, by the author of the Sénkhya Aphorisms, to anterior* cultivators of the atheistic philosophy, and, in so many words, to ‘ venerable preceptors’+ of the theory. Of the latter, Sanandanaj alone is specified by uame, and once only : but, equally with all the authorities less distinctly commemorated in company with him, his writings, if he ever wrote, have long been forgotten. Panchasikha, though, like Sanandana, expressly mentioned, is yet denied his honour- able designation. On the first occasion§ where his opinion is reported, it is noted with disapprobation ; and, in the sole remaining instance|| where it is brought forward, it is dismissed ( No one of these arguments makes more directly against such atheism as that of the Sankhya, than the cosmological proof, or, rather, para- logism ; it having been shown to be built on a logical fiction. This | argument is admirably put by Diodorus of Tarsus, who lived in the fourth century : * * 6b 5é tes dyévntov Aéyou adrdv Thy TpoThy, 76 wavrwv dduvaTurepov ciodyer rpom) yap wdOos éoriv dpxdpuevov, Kat odk dy tes elrot Tpomivy dvapxov' Kal ovytépws eireiv, Tov orotxeiwy Kal Trav é& abrav Lowy re Kat cupdtav y Tdvaodos TpoTy, Kal TOY axNEaTOY Kal Xpw_ATWY Kal TOY Gruv rowrirov 4 torxtAn Siapopa, povov obyt duvyvy adinot, pajre dyévyrov pare airéparov voile tov Kéopov, pyr ad dmpovdyrov, dv de, abrots Kat 76 elvat Kai TO eb elvar tapacxdpevov, caps cidévar Kal édierdxtus eriotracba. Photii Bibliotheca, ed. Bekker., p. 209, b. * * * * For change is an incident that has a beginning; and one would never speak of change as without a beginning. And, to be summary, the all-wise Change of the elements, and of the thence arising animate beings and bodies; and the intricate diversity of forms, and colours, and other properties; all but give forth an articulate voice, telling us not to think of the universe as unoriginated, or self-actuated, or, yet, without a Providence ; but to know of a truth, and to be unhesitatingly assured, that there is a God, who endowed them with both being and excellent being. * IIL, 41. t A’chdrydh: V., 31. t VI., 69. § V., 32. || VI, 68. Vedanti Mahadeva, annotating V., 32, infers, simply from the name of Panchas‘ikha being given in the singular number, that Kapila purposes to mark him asa separatist. The singular must, then, be 9 with an air of sufferance rather than of approval. Of Sanandana nothing is known further than that he is classed among the mind-engendered progeny of Brahmé.* Panchas‘ikha is usu- ally described in the same enigmatical terms:+ but the Wahd- bhdvatat also speaks of him as having had a human mother, Kapila; and it assigns him to the line of Pards‘ara.