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Bhamati, 11. 11. 28. 270 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [cH. perceiving of an object is not the object itself; it is always felt that the perception of the blue is different from the blue which is perceived; the blue stands forth as the object of perception and the two can never be identical. This is universally felt and acknow- ledged, and the Buddhist idealist, even while trying to refute it, admits it in a way, since he says that what is inner perception appears as if it exists outside of us, externally. If externality as such never existed, how could there be an appearance of it in consciousness? When all experiences testify to this difference between knowledge and its object, the inner mental world of thoughts and ideas and the external world of objects, how can such a difference be denied? You may see a jug or remember it: the mental operation in these two cases varies, but the object remains the samel. The above argument of Sankara against Buddhist idealism conclusively proves that he admitted the independent existence of objects, which did not owe their existence to anybody’s knowing them. External objects had an existence different from and inde- pendent of the existence of the diversity of our ideas or percepts. But the idealism of the Yoga-vdasistha is more like the doctrine of the Buddhist idealists than the idealism of Sankara. For according to the Yoga-vasistha it is only ideas that have some sort of existence. Apart from ideas or percepts there is no physical or external world having a separate or independent existence. Esse est percipi is the doctrine of the Yoga-vasistha, while Sankara most emphatically refutes such a doctrine. A later exposition of Vedanta by Praka¢- ananda, known as Veda. 1-siddhanta-muktavali, seems to derive its inspiration from the Yoga-vasistha in its exposition of Vedanta on lines similar to the idealism of the Yoga-vasistha, by denying the existence of objects not perceived (ajfdta-sattvanabhyupagama)?. Prakasananda disputes the ordinarily accepted view that cognition of objects arises out of the contact of senses with objects; for objects for him exist only so long as they are perceived, i.e. there is no independent external existence of objects apart from their perception. All objects have only perceptual existence (pratitika- sativa). Both Prakasananda and the Yoga-vasistha deny the existence of objects when they are not perceived, while Sankara not only admits their existence, but also holds that they exist in the same form in which they are known; and this amounts vir- tually to the admission that our knowing an object does not add 1 Sankara’s bhdsya on the Brahma-siitra, 11. 2. 28. * Siddhdnta-muktavalt. See The Pandit, new series, vol. x1, pp. 129-1 39. > Buddhist and Vedanta Idealism 271 anything to it or modify it to any extent, except that it becomes known to us through knowledge. Things are what they are, even though they may not be perceived. This is in a way realism. The idealism of Sankara’s Vedanta consists in this, that he held that the. Brahman is the immanent self within us, which transcends all changeful experience and is also ultimate reality underlying all objects perceived outside of us in the external world. Whatever forms and characters there are in our experience, internal as well as external, have an indescribable and indefinite nature which passes by the name of ma@ya!. Sankara Vedanta takes it for granted that that alone is real which is unchangeable; what is changeful, though it is positive, is therefore unreal. The world is only unreal in that special sense; maya belongs to a category different from affirmation and negation, namely the category of the indefinite. The relation of the real, the Brahman, to this maya in Sankara Vedanta is therefore as indefinite as the maya; the real is the unchangeable, but how the changeful forms and characters become associated with it or what is their origin or what is their essence, Sankara is not in a position to tell us. The Yoga-vasistha however holds that formless and characterless entity is the ultimate truth; it is said to be the Brahman, cit, or void (Sénya); but, whatever it may be, it is this characterless entity which is the ultimate truth. This ultimate entity is associated with an energy of movement, by virtue of which it can reveal all the diverse forms of appearances. The relation between the appearances and the reality is not external, indefinite and indescribable, as it is to Sankara, but the appearances, which are but the unreal and illusory manifestations of the reality, are produced by the opera- tion of this inner activity of the characterless spirit, which is in itself nothing but a subject-objectless pure consciousness. But this inner and immanent movement does not seem to have any dia- lectic of its own, and no definite formula of the method of its operation for its productions can be given; the imaginary shapes of ideas and objects, which have nothing but a mere perceptual existence, are due not to a definite order, but to accident or chance (kakataliya). Such a conception is indeed very barren, and it is here that the system of the Yoga-vdsistha is particularly defective. Another important defect of the system is that it does not either criticize knowledge or admit its validity, and the characterless entity which forms its absolute is never revealed in experience. 1 See my A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, ch. x. 272 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha _—_—[cH. xu With Sankara the case is different; for he holds that this absolute Brahman is also the self which is present in every experience and is immediate and self-revealed. But the absolute of the Yoga-vasistha is characterless and beyond experience. The state of final emancipa- tion, the seventh stage, is not a stage of bliss, like the Brahmahood of the Vedanta, but a state of characterlessness and vacuity almost. In several places in the work it is said that this ultimate state is differently described by various systems as Brahman, distinction of prakrti and purusa, pure vijfana and void (sinya), while in truth it is nothing but a characterless entity. Its state of mukti (emanci- pation) is therefore described, as we have already seen above, as pasanavat or like a stone, which strongly reminds us of the Vaisesika view of mukti. On the practical side it lays great stress on paurusa, or exertion of free-will and energy, it emphatically denies daiva as having the power of weakening paurusa or even exerting a superior dominating force, and it gives us a new view of karma as meaning only thought-activity. As against Sankara, it holds that knowledge ( j#iana) and karma may be combined together, and that they are not for two different classes of people, but are both indispensable for each and every right-minded enquirer. The principal practical means for the achievement of the highest end of the Yoga-vasistha are the study of philosophical scripture, asso- ciation with good men and self-criticism. It denounces external religious observances without the right spiritual exertions as being worse than useless. Its doctrine of esse est percipi and that no experiences have any objective validity outside of themselves, that there are no external objects to which they correspond and that all are but forms of knowledge, reminds us very strongly of what this system owes to Vijfianavada Buddhism. But, while an important Vijfianavada work like the Lankavatara-sittra tries to explain through its various categories the origin of the various appearances in knowledge, no such attempt is made in the Yoga- vasistha, where it is left to chance. It is curious that in the Sanskrit account of Vijfianavada by Hindu writers, such as Vacaspati and others, these important contributions of the system are never re- ferred to either for the descriptive interpretation of the system or for its refutation. While there are thus unmistakable influences of Vijfanavada and Gaudapada on the Yoga-vasistha, it seems to have developed in close association with the Saiva, as its doctrine of spanda, or immanent activity, so clearly shows. This point will, however, be more fully discussed in my treatment of Saiva philosophy. CHAPTER XIII SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS Ir may be urged that the speculations of the thinkers of the medical schools do not deserve to be recorded in a History of Indian Philosophy. But the force of such an objection will lose much in strength if it is remembered that medicine was the most important of all the physical sciences which were cultivated in ancient India, was directly and intimately connected with the Samkhya and Vaisesika physics and was probably the origin of the logical speculations subsequently codified in the Nyaya-siitras}. The literature contains, moreover, many other interesting ethical instructions and reveals a view of life which differs considerably from that found in works on philosophy ; further, it treats of many other interesting details which throwa flood of light on the scholastic methods of Indian thinkers. Those, again, who are aware of the great importance of Hatha Yoga or Tantra physiology or anatomy in relation to some of the Yoga practices of those schools will no doubt be interested to know for purposes of comparison or con- trast the speculations of the medical schools on kindred points of interest. Their speculations regarding embryology, heredity and other such points of general enquiry are likely to prove interesting even to a student of pure philosophy. Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda. Susruta says that Ayur-veda (the science of life) is an upanga of the Atharva-Veda and originally consisted of 100,000 verses in one thousand chapters and was composed by Brahma before he created all beings (Susruta-samhita, 1. 1.