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He further clarifies his doctrine of the relation of Brahman to ajfana and points out that the association of ajfidna is not with the one pure Brahman, nor with individual souls, but with the pure light of Brahman, which shines as the basis and ground of individual souls (pratyaktva) ; for it is only in connection with this that the ajfana appears and is perceived. When with the dawn of right knowledge pure Brahman as one is realized, the ajfdna is not felt. It is only in the light of Brahman as underlying the individual souls that the ajnana is perceived, as when one says, “I do not know what you say’’; so it is neither the individual soul nor the pure one which is Brahman, but the pure light as it reveals itself through each and every individual soul!. The true light of Brahman is always there, and emancipation means nothing more than the destruction of the ajfana. In the third chapter Sarvajiiatman describes the ways (sadhana) by which one should try to destroy this ajvia@na and prepare oneself for this result and for the final Brahma knowledge. In the last chapter he describes the nature of emancipation and the attainment of Brahmahood. The Samksepa-sariraka was commented upon by a number of distinguished writers, none of whom seem to be very old. Thus Nrsimhagrama wrote a commentary called Tattva-bodhini, Puru- sottama Diksita wrote another called Subodhini, Raghavananda another called Vidyamrta-varsini, Visvadeva another called Szd- dhanta-dipa, on which Rama Tirtha, pupil of Krsna Tirtha, 1 najfanam advayasamasrayam istam evam nadvaita-vastu-visayam nisiteksandnam nananda-nitya-visayasrayam istam etat pratyaktva-matra-visayasrayatanubhiteh. Samksepa-sdartraka, i. 211. 8-2 116 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. based his commentary Anvayartha-prakasika. Madhustdana Sara- svati also wrote another commentary, called Samksepa-sariraka- sara-samgraha. bn Anandabodha Yati. Anandabodha is a great name in the school of Sankara Vedanta. He lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century?. He refers to Vacaspati’s Tattva-samiksa and criticizes, but without mentioning his name, Sarvajfiatman’s view of the interpretation of the nature of self as pure bliss. He wrote at least three works on Sankara Vedanta, viz. Nyaya-makaranda, Nydaya-dipavali and Pramana-mala. Of these the Nyaya-makaranda was commented upon by Citsukha and his pupil Sukhaprakasa in works called Nyaya-makaranda-tika and Nyaya-makaranda-vivecant. Sukha- prakaga also wrote a commentary on the Nydaya-dipavali, called Nyaya-dipavali-tatparya-tika. Anubhitisvartipa Acarya (late thir- teenth century), the teacher of Anandajfiana, also wrote commen- taries on all the three works of Anandabodha. Anandabodha does not pretend to have made any original contribution and says that he collected his materials from other works which existed in his time?. He starts his Nya@ya-makaranda with the thesis that the apparent difference of different selves is false, since not only do the Upanisads hold this doctrine, but it is also intelligible on grounds of reason that the apparent multiplicity of selves can be explained on an imaginary supposition of diversity (kalpanika- purusa-bheda), even though in reality there is but one soul. Arguing on the fact that even the illusory supposition of an imaginary diversity may explain all appearances of diversity, Anandabodha tries to refute the argument of the Samkhya-karika that the diversity of souls is proved by the fact that with the birth and death of some there is not birth or death of others. Having refuted the plurality of subjects in his own way, he turns to the refutation of plurality of objects. He holds that difference (bheda) cannot be perceived by sense-perception, since difference cannot be perceived without perceiving both the object and all else from which it differs. It cannot be said that first the object is perceived and then the difference; for perception will naturally _ 7 Mr Tripathi in his introduction to Anandajfiana’s Tarka-samgraha gives Anandabodha’s date as A.D. 1200. ‘ Nana-nibandha-kusuma-prabhavavadata- ny ayapadesa-makaranda-kadamba esa. Nydya-makaranda, p. 359. xT] Anandabodha Yati 117 cease with awareness of its object, and there is no way in which it can operate for the comprehension of difference; neither can it be held that the comprehension of difference can in any way be regarded as simultaneous with the perception of the sensibles. Nor is it possible that, when two sensibles are perceived at two different points of time, there could be any way in which their difference could be perceived; for the two sensibles cannot be perceived at one and the same time. It cannot, again, be said that the perception of any sensible, say blue, involves with it the per- ception of all that is not blue, the yellow, the white, the red, etc.; for in that case the perception of any sensible would involve the perception of all other objects of the world. The negation of the difference of an entity does not mean anything more than the actual position of it. It is not, however, right to hold that all positive entities are of the nature of differences; for this is directly against all experience. If differences are perceived as positive entities, then to comprehend their differences further differences would be required, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. Moreover, differences, being negative in their nature, cannot be regarded as capable of being perceived as positive sensibles. Whether differ- ence is taken as a subject or a predicate in the form “the difference of the jug from the pillar,” or “‘the jug is different from the pillar,”’ in either case there is comprehension of an earlier and more primitive difference between the two objects, on the basis of which the category of difference is realized. Anandabodha then discusses the different theories of error held by the Nyaya, Mimamsa, Buddhism, etc. and supports the amrva- caniya theory of error!. In this connection he records his view as to why nescience (avidya) has to be admitted as the cause of world- appearance. He points out that the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained without the assumption of a cause which forms its substance. Since this world-appearance is unreal, it cannot come out of a substance that is real, nor can it come out of something absolutely non-existent and unreal, since such a thing evidently could not be the cause of anything; hence, since the cause of world-appearance cannot be either real or unreal, it must have for its cause something which is neither real nor unreal, and the neither-real-nor-unreal entity is avidya?. 1 See the first volume of the present work, ch. x, p. 485. 2 Nyaya-makaranda, pp. 122, 123. 118 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. He next proceeds to prove the doctrine that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness (atmanah samvid-riipatva). This he does, firstly, by stating the view that awareness in revealing itself reveals also immediately its objects, and secondly, by arguing that even though objects of awareness may be varying, there is still the unvarying consciousness which continues the same even when there is no object. If there were only the series of awarenesses arising and ceasing and if there were constant and persistent awarenesses abiding all the time, how could one note the difference between one awareness and another, between blue and yellow? Referring to avidyd, he justifies the view of its being supported on Brahman, because avidya, being indefinable in its nature, 1.e. being neither negative nor positive, there can be no objection to its being regarded as supported on Brahman. Moreover, Brahman can only be regarded as omniscient in its association with avidyd, since all relations are of the nature of avidyd and there cannot be any omni- science without a knowledge of the relations. In his Nydya-dipavali he tries by inference to prove the falsity of the world-appearance on the analogy of the falsity of the illusory silver. His method of treatment is more or less the same as the treatment in the Advazta- siddhi of Madhustidana Sarasvati at a much later period. There is practically nothing new in his Pramana-mala. It is a small work of about twenty-five pages, and one can recognize here the argu- ments of the Nya@ya-makaranda in a somewhat. different form and with a different emphasis. Most of Anandabodha’s arguments were borrowed by the later writers of the Vedanta school. Vyasatirtha of the Madhva school of Vedanta collected most of the standard Vedanta arguments from Anandabodha and Prakagatman for re- futation in his Nyayamrta, and these were again refuted by Madhusiidana’s great work, the Advaita-siddhi, and these refuted in their turn in Rama Tirtha’s Nydyamrta-tarangini. The history of this controversy will be dealt with in the third volume of the present work. Maha-vidya and the Development of Logical Formalism. The Buddhists had taken to the use of the dialectic method of logical discussions even from the time of Nagarjuna. But this: was by no means limited to the Buddhists. The Naiyayikas had also adopted these methods, as is well illustrated by the writings x1] Mahda-vidya and Development of Logical Formalism 119 of Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vacaspati, Udayana and others. Sankara himself had utilized this method in the refutation of Buddhistic, Jaina, Waisesika and other systems of Indian philo- sophy. But, though these writers largely adopted the dialectic methods of Nagarjuna’s arguments, there seems to be little attempt on their part to develop the purely formal side of Nagarjuna’s logical arguments, viz.