English
The principal analysis of volition in Hindu Philosophy is to be found in the Nyaya-Vaisesika works. Pragastapada divides animal activities into two classes, firstly, those that are of a reflex nature and originate automatically from life-functions (jivana-pirvaka) and subserve useful ends (kam api artha-kriyam) for the organism, and, secondly, those conscious and voluntary actions that proceed out of desire or aversion, for the attainment of desirable ends and the avoidance of undesirable ones. Prabhakara holds that volitional actions depend on several factors, firstly, a general notion that something has to be done (karyata-jfidna), which Gangabhatta in his Bhatta-cintamani explains as meaning not merely a general notion that a particular work can be done by the agent, but also the specific notion that an action must be done by him—a sense which can proceed only from a belief that the action would be useful to him and would not be sufficiently harmful to him to dissuade him from it. Secondly, there must be the belief that the agent has the power or capacity of performing the action (krti-sadhyata-jnana). This belief of krtt-sadhyata-jnana leads to desire (ctkirsa). The Prabhakaras do not introduce here the important factor that an action can be desired only if it is conducive to the good of the agent. Instead of this element they suppose that actions are desired when the agent identifies himself with the action as one to be accom- plished by him—an action is desired only as a kind of self- realization. The Nyaya, however, thinks that the fact that an action is conducive to good and not productive of serious mischief is an essential condition of its performance. ’ The Gita seems to hold that everywhere actions are always being performed by the gunas or characteristic qualities of prakritz, the primal matter. It is through ignorance and false pride that one thinks himself to be the agent!. In another place it is said that for the occurrence of an action there are five causes, viz. the body, the agent, the various sense-organs, the various life-functions and biomotor activities, and the unknown objective causal ele- ments or the all-controlling power of God (daiva)*. All actions 1 Gitd, 11. 27; XIII. 29. ' 2 adhisthanam tatha karta karanam ca prthag-vidham : vividhas ca prthak cesta daivam caivatra pafticamam. Ibid. xviil. 14. 33-2 516 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita [cH. being due to the combined operation of these five elements, it would be wrong to think the self or the agent to be the only per- former of actions. This it is said that, this being so, he who thinks the self alone to be the agent of actions, this wicked-minded person through his misapplied intelligence does not see things properly’. Whatever actions are performed, right or wrong, whether in body, speech or mind, have these five factors as their causes*. The philosophy that underlies the ethical position of the Gita consists in the fact that, in reality, actions are made to happen primarily through the movement of the characteristic qualities of prakrtz, and secondarily, through the collocation of the five factors men- tioned, among which the self is but one factor only. It is, therefore, sheer egoism to think that one can, at his own sweet will, undertake a work or cease from doing works. For the prakrti, or primal matter, through its later evolutes, the collocation of causes, would of itself move us to act, and even in spite of the opposition of our will we are led to perform the very action which we did not want to perform. So Krsna says to Arjuna that the egoism through which you would say that you would not fight is mere false vanity, since the prakrti is bound to lead you to action’. A man is bound by the active tendencies or actions which necessarily follow directly from his own nature, and there is no escape. He has to work in spite of the opposition of his will. Prakrtz, or the collocation of the five factors, moves us to work. That being so, no one can renounce all actions. If renouncing actions is an impossibility, and if one is bound to act, it is but proper that one should perform one’s normal duties. There are no duties and no actions which are absolutely faultless, absolutely above all criticism; so the proper way in which a man should purify his actions is by purging his mind of all imperfections and impurities of desires and attachment. But a question may arise how, if all actions follow necessarily as the product of the five-fold colloca- tion, a person can determine his actions? The general implication of the Gita seems to be that, though the action follows necessarily as the product of the fivefold collocation, yet the self can give a direction to these actions; if a man wishes to dissociate himself from all attachments and desires by dedicating the fruits of all his actions to God and clings to God with such a purpose, God helps him to attain his noble aim. 1 Gita, xvitl. 16. 2 Tbid. xvii. 15. 3 Ibid. xvill. 59. XIV] Eschatology 517 Eschatology. The Gita is probably the earliest document where a definite statement is made regarding the imperishable nature of existent things and the impossibility of that which is non-existent coming into being. It says that what is non-existent cannot come into being, and that what exists cannot cease to be. In modern times we hear of the principle of the conservation of energy and also of the principle of the conservation of mass. The principle of the conservation of energy is distinctly referred to in the Vyasa-bhasya on Patanjalt-sitra, 1v. 3, but the idea of the conservation of mass does not seem to have been mentioned definitely anywhere. Both the Vedantist and the Samkhyist seem to base their philosophies on an ontological principle known as sat-karya-vada, which holds that the effect is already existent in the cause. The Vedanta holds that the effect as such is a mere appearance and has no true existence; the cause alone is truly existent. The Samkhya, on the other hand, holds that the effect is but a modification of the causal substance, and, as such, is not non-existent, but has no existence separate from the cause; the effect may therefore be said to exist in the cause before the starting of the causal operation (karana-vyapara). Both these systems strongly object to the Buddhist and Nyaya view that the effect came into being out of non-existence, a doctrine known as a-sat-karya-vada. Both the Samkhya and the Vedanta tried to prove their theses, but neither of them seems to have realized that their doctrines are based upon an a priori proposition which is the basic principle underlying the principle of the conservation of energy and the conservation of mass, but which is difficult to be proved by reference to a posteriori illustration. Thus, the Samkhya says that the effect exists in the cause, since, had it not been so, there would be no reason why certain kinds of effects, e.g. oil, can be produced only from certain kinds of causes, e.g. sesamum. That certain kinds of effects are produced only from certain kinds of causes does not really prove the doctrine of sat- karya-vada, but only implies it; for the doctrine of sat-karya-vada rests on an a priori principle such as that formulated in the Gita —that what exists cannot perish, and that what does not exist cannot come into being!. The Gita does not try to prove this pro- position, but takes it as a self-evident principle which no one could 1 ndsato vidyate bhavo nabhavo vidyate satah. Gita, 11. 16. 518 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita [cH. challenge. It does not, however, think of applying this prin- ciple, which underlies the ontological position of the Samkhya and the Vedanta, in a general way. It seems to apply the principle only to the nature of self (aman). Thus it says, “O Arjuna, that principle by which everything is pervaded is to be regarded as deathless; no one can destroy this imperishable one. The bodies that perish belong to the deathless eternal and unknowable self; therefore thou shouldst fight. He who thinks the self to be destruc- tible, and he who thinks it to be the destroyer, do not know that it can neither destroy nor be destroyed. It is neither born nor does it die, nor, being once what it is, would it ever be again... Weapons cannot cut it, fire cannot burn it, water cannot dis- solve it and air cannot dry it.”” The immortality of self preached in the Gita seems to have been directly borrowed from the Upanisads, and the passages that describe it seem to breathe the spirit of the Upanisads not only in idea, but also in the modes and expressions. The ontological principle that what exists cannot die and that what is not cannot come into being does not seem to have been formulated in the Upanisads. Its formulation in the Gita in support of the principle of immortality seems, therefore, to be a distinct advance on the Upanisadic philosophy in this direction. The first argument urged by Krsna to persuade Arjuna to fight was that the self was immortal and that it was the body only that could be injured or killed, and that therefore Arjuna need not feel troubled because he was going to kill his kinsmen in the battle of Kuruksetra. Upon the death of one body the self only changed to another, in which it was reborn, just as a man changed his old clothes for new ones. The body is always changing, and even in youth, middle age and old age, does not remain the same. The change at death is also a change of body, and so there is no intrinsic difference between the changes of the body at different stages of life and the ultimate change that is effected at death, when the old body is forsaken by the spirit and a new body is accepted.