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Another Mimamsa view objects to this theory of dual bhavana and asserts that the suffix lim involves the notion of an order to work (prerana), as if the relation of the Vedas to us were one of master and servant, and that the Vedic vidhi as expressed in the lin suffix conveys the command (praisya-praisayoh sambandhah). The vidht goads us to work, and, being goaded by it, we turn to work. It does not physically compel us to act; but the feeling we have from it that we have been ordered to act constitutes the driving power. The knowledge of widhi thus drives us to our Vedic duties. When a man hears the command, he feels that he has been commanded and then he sets to work. This setting to work is quite a different operation from the relation of the command and the commanded, and comes after it. The essence of a Vedic sentence is this command or niyoga. A man who has formerly tasted the benefits of certain things or the pleasures they produced naturally intends to have them again; here also there is a peculiar mental experience of eagerness, desire or in- tention (kita), which goads him on to obey the Vedic commands. This akita is a purely subjective experience and cannot, therefore, be experienced by others, though one can always infer its existence from the very fact that, unless it were felt in the mind, no one would feel himself goaded to work?. Niyoga, or a prompting to work (prerana), is the sense of all vidhis, and this rouses in us the intention of working in accordance with the command. The actual performance of an action is a mere counterpart of the intention (akiita), that is subjectively felt as roused by the miyoga or the 1 Yatha hi sthaly-adhisrayanat prabhrtya nirakanksaudana-nispatter ehaiveyam paka-kriya salilavaseka-tandulavapana-darvi-vighattanasravandady-aneka-ksana- samudaya-svabhava tatha prathama-pada-jnanat prabhrti a nivakansa-vakyartha- paricchedad ekaiveyam sabdi pramitih. Nydya-manyjart, p. 345. : 2 Ayam api bhautika-vyapara-hetur atmakita-viseso na pramandntara-vedyo bhavati na ca na vedyate tat-samvedane sati cesta yadvantam drstva tasyapi tadrk- prerana’vagamo ’numiyate. Ibid. p. 348. Dil 31 482 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita [cH. driving power of the vidhi. This view differs from the view of Kumiarila in this, that it does not suppose that the propulsion of the Vedic command takes effect in a twofold bhavana, through the whole process of the conception and the materialization of the action in accordance with the Vedic commands. The force of the command is exhausted in prompting us to action and arousing in us the inward resolution (@kiita) to obey the command. The actual performance of the action comes as a natural consequence (artha). The force of the vidhi has a field of application only when our ordinary inclinations do not naturally lead us to the performance of action. Vidhi, therefore, operates merely as a law of command which has to be obeyed for the sake of the law alone, and it is this psychological factor of inward resolution to obey the law that leads to the performance of action. Mandana, in his Vidhi-viveka, discusses the diverse views on the significance of vidhi. He interprets vidhi as a specific kind of prompting (pravartana). He distinguishes the inner volitional intention of attaining an end and its translation into active effort leading to muscular movements of the body. Pravartanad here means the inner volitional direction of the mind towards the performance of the action, as well as actual nervous changes which are associated with itt. The command of the Vedas naturally brings with it a sense of duty or of ‘‘oughtness”’ (Rartavyata), and it is this sense of kartavyata that impels people to action without any reference to the advantages and benefits that may be reaped by such actions. The psychological state associated with such a feeling of ‘‘oughtness”’ is said to be of the nature of instincts (pratibha). It is through an instinctive stimulus to work, proceed- ing from the sense of ‘‘oughtness,”’ that the action is performed. The Nyaya doctrine differs from the above view of vidhi as a categorically imperative order and holds that the prompting of the Vedic commands derives its force from our desire for the attainment of the benefits that we might reap if we acted in accordance with them. So the ultimate motive of the action is the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, and it is only with a view to attaining the desired ends that one is prompted to follow the Vedic 1 Bhava-dharma eva kascit samihita-sadhananuguno vyapara-padarthah; tad yatha atmano buddhy-ddi-janana-pravrttasya manah-samyoga eva’yam bhava- dharmah tadvad atrapi spandas tad-itaro va bhava-dharmah pravrtti-janana' - nukilataya vyapara-visesah pravartand. Vacaspati’s Nydya-kanikad on Vidhi- viveka, pp. 243, 244. xIV]_ Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gita 483 commands and perform the sacrifices. In this view, therefore, the prompting, or prerana, has not in it that self-evident call of the pure imperative or the rousing of the volitional tendency through the influence of the imperative; the prompting felt is due only to the rise of desires for the end. Most of the above interpretations of vidhi are of much later date than the Gita. No systematic discussion of the nature of vidhi which can be regarded as contemporaneous with or prior to the date of the Gita is now available. But even these latter-day explanations are useful in understanding the significance of the force of the notion of the imperative in the Gita. It is clear from the above discussion that the notion of the impera- tive of vidht cannot be called moral in our sense of the term, as has been done in a recent work on Hindu Ethics!. For the imperative of vidhi is limited to the injunctions of the Vedas, which are by no means coextensive with our general notion of morality. According to the Mimamsa schools just described virtue (dharma) consists in obedience to Vedic injunctions. Whatever may be enjoined by the Vedas is to be considered as virtue, what- ever is prohibited by the Vedas is evil and sin, and all other things which are neither enjoined by the Vedas nor prohibited by them are neutral, i.e. neither virtuous nor vicious?. The term dharma is therefore limited to actions enjoined by the Vedas, even though such actions may in some cases be associated with evil consequences leading to punishments due to the transgression of some other Vedic commands. The categorical imperative here implied is scriptural and therefore wholly external. The virtuous character of actions does not depend on their intrinsic nature, but on the external qualification of being enjoined by the Vedas. 1S. K. Maitra’s Hindu Ethics, written under Dr Seal’s close personal supervision and guidance. 2 Kumiarila holds that even those sacrifices which are performed for the killing of one’s enemies are right, because they are also enjoined by the Vedas. Prabhakara, however, contends that, since these are performed only out of the natural evil propensities of men, their performance cannot be regarded as being due to a sense of duty associated with obedience to the injunctions of the Vedas. Kumirila thus contends that, though the Syena sacrifice is attended with evil consequences, yet, since the performer is only concerned with his duty in connection with the Vedic commands, he is not concerned with the evil conse- quences; and it is on account of one’s obedience to the Vedic injunctions that it is called right, though the injury to living beings that it may involve will _bring about its punishment all the same. Samkhya and some Nydya writers, however, would condemn the Syena sacrifice on account of the injury to living beings that it involves. 31-2 484 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita [cH. Whatever is not enjoined in the Vedas or not prohibited in them is simply neutral. It is clear, therefore, that the term dharma can be translated as ‘“‘virtue” only in a technical sense, and the words ‘“‘moral” and ‘‘immoral” in our sense have nothing to do with the concept of dharma or adharma. The Gita distinguishes between two kinds of motives for the performance of sacrifices. The first motive is that of greed and self-interest, and the second is a sense of duty. The Gita is aware of that kind of motive for the performance which corresponds to the Nyaya interpretation of Vedic vidhis and also to the general Mimamsa interpretation of vidhi as engendering a sense of duty. Thus it denounces those fools who follow the Vedic doctrines and do not believe in anything else; they are full of desires and eager to attain Heaven, they take to those actions which lead to rebirth and the enjoyment of mundane pleasures. People who are thus filled with greed and desires, and perform sacrifices for the attain- ment of earthly goods, move in an inferior plane and are not qualified for the higher scheme of life of devotion to God with right resolution!. The Vedas are said to be under the influence of mundane hankerings and desires, and it is through passions and antipathies, through desires and aversions, that people perform the Vedic sacrifices and think that there is nothing greater than these. One should therefore transcend the sphere of Vedic sacrifices performed out of motives of self-interest. But the Gita is not against the performance of Vedic sacrifices, if inspired by a sheer regard for the duty of performing sacrifices. Anyone who looks to his own personal gain and advantages in performing the sacrifices, and is only eager to attain his pleasurable ends, is an inferior type of man; the sacrifices should therefore be performed without any personal attachment, out of regard for the sacred duty of the performance.