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A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature So Far as it Illustrates the Primitive Religion of the Brahmans - Max, 1859

English

jugational terminations, Nouns, derived from verbs by means of krit-suflSxes, Nouns, derived from nouns by means of taddhita-suffixes, and four kinds of Com- pounds, — these constitute language." ^ In the Nirukta this division is no longer considered suflScient. A new problem has been started, one of the most important problems in the philosophy of language, whether all nouns are derived from verbs? No one would deny that certain nouns, or the majority of nouns, were derived from verbs. The early gram- marians of India were fully agreed that kartri, a doer, was derived from Icri, to do ; pdchaka, a cook, from pack, to CQok. But did the same apply to all words ? iS&kat&yana, an ancient grammarian and philosopher, answered the question boldly in the affirmative, and he became the founder of a large school, called the Nairuktas (or Etymologists), who made the verbal origin of all words the leading principle of all their researches. They were opposed, and not without violence, by another school, emphatically called the Vaiydkaranas or Analysers, who, following the lead of G&rgya, the etymologist^, admitted the verbal origin of those words only for which an adequate grammatical analysis could be given. The rest they left unexplained. Let us hear how Y&ska states the arguments on both sides. After having explained the characteristics of the four classes of words, he says : *^ l^&kat&yana maintains that nouns are derived from verbs, and there is an universal agreement of all Ety- mologists (Nairukta) on this point. G&rgya, on the contrary, and some of the grammarians say, not all BISTORT OF GRAMMAB. 165 (nouns are derived from verbs). For first, if the accent and formation were regular in all nouns and agreed entirely with the appellative power (of the root), nouns such as go (cow), adva (horse), purusha (man), would be in themselves intelligible.^ Se- condly, if all nouns were derived from verbs, then if any one performed a certain action, he would, as a subject, be called in the same manner. For instance, if MvUj horse, were derived from oi, to get through, then any one who got through a certain distance, would have to be called a^va, horse. If trina, grass, were derived from tridj to pierce, then whatever pierces would have to be called trina. Thirdly, if all nouns were derived from verbs, then everj^hing would take as many names as there are qualities belonging to it. A pillar, for instance, which is now called stMnaj might be called dares ay a^ hole-rest, because it rests in a hole; or sanjantj joinevj because there are beams joined to it. Fourthly, people would call things in such a manner that the meaning of nouns might be at least intelli- gible, whatever the regular formation may be by which the actions of these things are supposed to be expressed. Instead of purusha^ man, which is sup- posed to be formed from purisaya, dwelling in the body, they would say purUaya^ body-dweller ; instead of asva^ horse, ashtrij pervader; instead of trina^ grass, tardana^ piercer. Fifthly, after a noun has been formed, these etymologists begin to discuss it, and say for instance that the earth is called prithiv% broad, from prathana^ stretching. But, who stretched it, and what was his resting-place while he stretched 1 This construction is against the Commentary, but, if the MS. such as we have it, is correct, it seems to me the only possible construction. M 9 166 HISTOBT OF GRAMMAR. the earth ? Sixthly, where the meaning cannot be discovered, no modification of the root yielding any proper signification, 6&kat&yana has actually taken whole verbs, and put together the halves of two distinct words. For instance, in order to form satya^ true, he puts together the causal of % to go, which begins with ya, as the latter half, and the participle of 6, to be, which begins with sa. Lastly, it is well known, that beings come before being, and it is therefore impossible to derive the names of beings which come first, £rom being, which comes after. "Now all this arguing," Y&ska continues, "is totally wrong. For however all this may be, first, with regard to what was said, namely that, if !§&kat4- yana's opinion were right, all words would be signi- ficative, this we consider no objection ^, because we shall show that they are all significative. With regard to the second point, our answer is, that we see as a matter of fact that it is not so, but that of a number of people who perform the same action, some only take a certain name, and others do not. Not every one that shapes a thing is called takshatij a shaper, but only the carpenter. Not every one that walks about is called a parivrAjaha^ but only a religious mendicant. Not everything that enlivens is called jtvana^ but only the sap of the sugar- cane. Not everything that is bom of Bhiimi (earth) is called BMmija^ but only the planet Mars (an- g&raka).^ And the same remark serves also as an 1 The Commentator translates, *' even if it were so, even if some remained inexplicable, this would be no objection ; " for boni gram- matici est nonnulla etiam nescire. ' The remarks of the Commentator on this passage are so HISTORY OF GRAM11A.R. 167 answer to the third Abjection. With regard to the fourth objection, we reply, We did not make these words, we only have to explain them ; and there are also some nouns of rare occurrence, which you, gram- marians, derive by means of krit-suflixes, and which are liable to exactly the same objection. For who could tell, without some help from etymologists, that some of the words mentioned in the Aikapadika- chapter mean what they do mean ? Vratati is derived by you from vrindtiy he elects, but it signifies a garland. The same applies to your grammatical derivations of such words as damimaSj jdiya^ dtndra^ carionsy that they deserve to be copied. ** You may well ask, (he says) why this is so. But, my friend, go and ask the world. Quarrel with the world, for it is not I who made this law. For although all nouns are derived from verbs, yet the choice of one action (which is to be predicated in preference to others) is beyond any control. Or it may be that there is a certain law with regard to those who perform certain actions more exclusively. A man who performs one particular action more exclusively,what- ever other actions he may perform, will have his name from that particular action. Nor do we say that he who at one time and in one place shapes things is a carpenter, but he who at any time or any place is a carpenter, him we always call carpenter. This is not a predicate restricted to one, it may freely be given to others. Now and then there may be other actions, more peculiar to such persons, and they may take other names accordingly, yet their proper name remains carpenter.** And with regard to the next problem the Commentator says: ^'A carpenter may well perform other actions, but he need not therefore take his name from them. If it is said, several things might have one and the same name, and one and the same thing might have different names, all we can answer is, that this is not proved by the language such as it is. Words are fixed in the world we cannot say how (svabh&vatah, by nature)." This, together with the text^ shows a clearer insight into the nature of Homonyma and Synonyma^ or, as the Peripatetics called the latter, Polyonyma, than anything we find in Aristotle. M 4 168 HISTOBT OF GRAMMAR. jdgarHkaj darvihomin. In ansWer to the fifth objec- tion we say, Of course we can discuss the etymolo- gical meaning of such words only as have been formed. And as to the questions, who stretched the earth, and what was his resting-place, all we can say is, that our eyes tell us that the earth is broad, and even though it has not been stretched out by others, yet all men speak as they see. With respect to the sixth objection, we admit, that he who combines words without thereby arriving at their proper meaning, is to be blamed. But this blame attaches to the individual etymologist, not to the science of etymology. As to the last objection, we must again appeal to the facts of the case. Some words are derived from qualities, though qualities may be later than subjects, others not." I doubt whether even at present, with all the new light which Comparative Philology has shed on the origin of words, questions like these could be dis- cussed more satisfactorily than they were by Y&ska.