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As in the Zasterya and Brihadaranyaka Upanishads :-—"‘ From the happiness felt by the emperor of the universe to that pertaining to the position of Hiranyagarva, there is commen- urate increase of happiness in the proportion as affection la present,” 73- But it may be objected, if like knowledge, Self be naturally blissful, then as in al! modifications of the intellect, intelligence 1s said to be present, there should likewise be blissulness. 74 The reply is:—That is not possible. Because, a lamp Is a form both of light and heat, but Its light only pervades & room; like it, Intelligence only is manifested and not blissfulness. 75. Just as the presence of smell, form, taste and touch in the same substance is recognised by the senses—one only by each—smell by means of the nose; form, eye; taste, tongue; and touch, skin; so of the two—intelligence and bliss —intelligence alone is manifested. 76. If it be alleged, Intelligence and bliss are not separate and after dividing the maternal property turnest me into a beggar asking me “ To give all this to thee,” and pointing the sanctioned works which Iam to perform and the prohibited works which I am net to perform, thus veritably reducing me to the position of a servant so far as obedience to the Vedas is concerned; but now by the help of Guru, I will snatch from thee, the present fund of blissfulness, inasmuch as I! have done away with our associate-created-difference of visibility and invisibility, etc., and joined intelligence with intelligence for they are one.” In this manner does a theusophist become Brana, 294 PANCHADAS!E. and distinct, but smell, form, ete., are mutually distinct; then the question is, whether that non-distinction of Intelligence and bliss exists in the witness (Self), or elsewhere—in the modifications of associate? [This is for the dissenter to answer.} 77- lithe first view be admitted, then look at the identity of smell, etc., in the same flower too. And if you hold smell, form, taste and touch are distinct (for the presence of distinc- tion in the several senses through which they are cognized), you should Jikewise admit a distinction between Intelligence and bliss, for a difference in the modification of the intellect caused by the active and good qualities of the mind. 78. When as a result of meritorious work, the mind has assumed the modification of good quality, a person then dis- covers intelligence and bliss are identical ; because the modifi- cation of good quality is pure and fai:it!ess (transparent). But the modification of active quality is impure, and that is why ihe part representing bliss remains covered and hidden as if under a sheath. 79. Just as a sour fruit eaten with salt has its acidity covered, so from the modifiction of active quality blissfulness is covered.* ®* Just as in bewilderment or confusion of the mind, subjects -situated near, and visible are not discovered, so from its active modification, the mind fails to take cognition of felicity. Or for his being the subject of excessive love, the felicity of Self, mani~ tested always, is only ordinary; but when it is reflected in the modification of the mental function, then it is intensified, Just as a looking glass receives the reflection of a person but does not give a faithful image, so are the modifications produced from the active and dark qualities capable of receiving the reflection of intelligence only and not bliss, for which it is not discovered. Like the removal of acidity from an unripe and sour mango by means of salt, the felicity naturaliy present in Self is removed by the modifications of the mental function stirred up by activity and ig- norance, PANCHADAS!. Bo. If it be asked, even admitting the supreme blissful- ness of Self to be due to excessive love for him, without men- tal reatraint (Yoga) what would be the result? [No emancipa+ tion would result from the knowledge that blissfulness of Self is owing to excessive affection which all individuals have for him; and that he is quite distinct from son, wife, physical body, and the other four sheaths; or as they are otherwise called, things ‘ dear,” ‘ worthless,’ and ‘hateful.’ Such discri- mination is not enough, something more is needed and that is ‘visible knowledge’ of Self. Such is the purport of the con- tention which his antagonist asks the Siddhandi to solve.} 81. [And he replies.]—I say the same result follows dis- crimination of Self as is produced from Yoga. Visible know- ledge follows equally in the former as in the latter. [To be more explicit, mental restraint has already been pointed out in the preceeding section to be the means for the rising of knowledge, so the present consideration of Self—primary, secondary and unreal—and discriminating him from the five sheaths foodful and the rest, is alike productive of gnosis.) - 82. O€ them (Yoga and discrimination) as a source of knowledge where is the authority? The Gita says “ What- ever position a person attains to, from the discrimination uf Self from not-self, is equally attained by the Yogi.” [So that the result is equal in both] 83. To some qualified persons practice of Joga is diffi- cult; to others again, discrimination of Self from not-self is impossible ; knowing this, Srex Karisunxa pointed out these two separate paths for the acquisition of knowledge. 84. Thus then, as the Gita speaks of equality of result following the practice of mental restraint and discrimination of Self, how can ye dissenter hold the first to be superior? Then again, so far as desire and hate are concerned, neither a Yogi nor a person of discrimination is subject to them. 85. One who knows Self to be very dear, has no more 396 PANCHADASI. desire for temporal enjoyment, hence be has no ardent desire ; Gnd as he has no enemy, be has ao hate in him. 86. If you contend, discriminate persons are seen {0 ex- preas their hate; the reply ts, it holds equally true with a Pogt. In short, whatever causes pain to the body, etc., from the sting of a scorpion to the Injury caused by tigers and other wild animals, are equally objects of hate both in a Fog? as well as a man of discrimination. And if during suck con- duct, you cease to recognise the discrimination of the latter, I may 4s well cease to call the former a Fogt. 87. If you say, that inasmuch asa person of discrimina- fion sees the objective world, which a Yogd does not, therefore is the latter superior, The reply is, in ordinary practice this material world is equally dealt with by both. If you say, there is no cognition of phenomena fn Yoga; it holds equally true when the person is in his discriminating mood. 88. And that imperception of phenomena will be spoken of, in the following section. It is faultless. 89. One who experiences in his person the blissfulness of Self, and takes no heed of this vast material expanse, in short sees them not, if such a theosophist, be your Yogi, may you be content, and grow in years. go. [The purport of the work is thus briefly declared.]—~ Almananda forms the second chapter of the treatise Brohmananda containing five chapters. It is written for the benefit of qualified persons of dull intellect; and it treats on the natural blissfulness of cach individual self situated most intrinsically. SECTION XIII, (t) Adwaitananda or the Felicity of Non- Duality. {Ix the first chapter (corresponding to Sect. XI) felicity has been declared to be threefold, z7s., that proceeding from the cognition of Branma, self-knowledge, and temporal enjoy- ment; to them has been added In the preceeding treatise another variety, to wit, self-happineas (A‘mananda): to prevent any misapprehension as to Its antagonism to the first three forma, the author thus opens the present work :-—] ‘What has already been spoken of as ‘felicity proceeding from (Yoga) mental restraint (Yogananda) is no other bue self-happiness, Just as happiness derived from the cognition of Branwa is due to the practice of Yoga. for which it is called Vogananda; and for its being unassociated, self-happiness (nijananda) ; 30 with the view of declaring the desirability of knowing the felicity of Branwa by a separate consideration of the three forms of Self—secondary, unreal and primary—the word ‘Af/mananda’ has been made use of.) If it be asked, how can self-happiness which is material be identical with the felicity of Branma which is devoid of duality (secondless)? Listen to what follows. a. Says the Zarterya Upanishad:—‘From ether to the physical body, all this vast material expanse has been produced from self-happiness, and nothing else ; therefore it is second- less and identical with Branaa.” 3- "This material universe has been produced from happiness, is seated in, and merges into it.”"* Therefore there * Sexual intercourse is the source of animal life and as its gratification is attended with felicity, it can easily be understoad why happiness is said to be the mainspring of phenomena. Death resembles profound sleep, which too, is full of happiness; therefore we find in the text happiness to be the cause of phenomena ; they 298 PANEHADASI. can be no contention as to its primal cause being Self, and not happiness. Ifany one beso inclined as to maintain a distinction between happiness and the objective world; the reply is, a8 the universe is its product, it cannot be distinct from happiness; for the resulting product is never distinct from its cause, as jar from earth. 4. If it be alleged, jar is the product of the potter and they are distinct, so that the above rule does not hold true; the reply Is, there are two varieties of causes, instrumental and material; of which the material is non-different from its product.