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[I€ it be contended, Branwa may be perfect and Infinite, but that does nox imply supreme felicity; toclear such & misapprehension it is said :—What is perfect is full of biiss and no happiness is to be found in what is finite and limited by the three distinctions of knower, knowledge and the object to be known; therefore, as Branma is secondiess, It is full of bliss. So spoke Sawarkumar to Narap when he came to enquire of Self-knowledge to remove his extreme un- happiness. 18. Though Narap was well read in the Puranas, Vedas and the other Shasfras, yet was he devoid of Self-knowledge, consequently felt very miserable. (Chhandogya Upanirhad, Chapter VII.) 19. Previous to his studying the Vedas, he was worried with the three varieties of misery,—personal, accidental and elementary,—but subsequently in addition to them, the pain attending study, and the mortification of forgetfulness, besides censure from one superior in learning, and the feeling of pride towards his inferior—all these—come for his share. 20. Then he repaired to the sage SanaTxumar and said. “ Bhagavan| I am extremely miserable, do impart me the necessary instruction that I may surmount all grief.” And the sage replied, “‘ Happiness is the only remedy.” ai. Inasmuch as worldly enjoyments are covered with thousand miseries, it is proper to regard them as auch; there. 254 PANCHADAS!. fore what has already been said about finite substances con- taining no happiness holds true. 22. If it be contended, material objects as they are finite may be devoid of happiness, but the secondless Reality is also similarly conditioned; if it were otherwise, one should have experienced that felicity, and since such experience is wanting, it cannot be present. Then again, the admission of its experience involves duality, for there must be a knower lo experience felicity, and the subject of knowledge. Thus will duality be established, antagonistic to the secondless, non- dual Brauaa and injurious to It 23. [To this the Siddhantt repties.] The secondless is not the seat of, but happiness itself, The same cause which makes the secondless happiness, prevents it also from being its seat or receptacle. If proofs be wanted, they are not necessary, because Brann. is self-illuminated. ay. And regarding the sclfmanifestibility of Brauma ¥ admit your words as proof, inasmuch as you confess the secondlessness, but contend only for an absence of felicity. 25. If you say, you never intended to admit the second Jess Brauxta, but simply referred to our words, to advance objections against them ; then say what existed prior to the evolution of this vast material expanse ? 26. Whether in that prior condition, there existed the secondless Brauma, or the objective world, or something different from both? Now something different from duality and non-duality is inadmissible, for it exists nowhere. Duality could not exist prior to the secondless Baauma, as that had not yet been ushered into existence, consequently you are forced to fall back upon the secondless, 27. If you say, this only establishes the secondless Branma analogicaily, and not by inference, May I then enquire of you whetber you call that to be an argument based’ on reason and analogy which is with er without illustration? ‘There does not exist a third form. PANCHADAS!. 255 28. An argument without inference and example is worthless. Therefore in connection with the first variety (i.¢, with example) adduce an illustration that will be con- formable to the sacred writings. 29. If you say, like the imperception of phenomena in prefornd slumber, cyclic periods of destruction are secondless, owing to sunilar imperception ; then the question for you to answer is, whether in regard lo profound slumber being second- Jess, you reter to yonr own slumber or chat of another person for an example. If your own slumber be the example of secondlessness, what is the illustration of that slumber? Do reply 30. Ifthe profound slumber of another person be regard+ ed as such example, how grand is your device? A person who knows not his profound slumber can have very little know- ledge of it in another, 31. Just as in my own case, I do nothing while sleeping, so im the case of another, when he is actionless, that is his profound slumber ; if you draw your inference in this way, that necessarily amounts to an inferential admission of the self- manifestibility of your own profound slumber. 33. And that self-manifestibility is such a condition where no sensory organ can go, and of which there is no example, yet it cannot but be admitted. 33 If you say, let profound slumber be secondless and self-manifested, but how can there be any feticity in it? The anawer is, since there is no misery, you are constrained to admit the existence of felicity in profound slumber. 34. Where is the proof of absence of misery in profound slumber? Universal experience and the Sruéf alike estab- lish it. ‘A blind person forgets his blindness, one pierced in the ears forgets that he is so, and a sickman imagines in sleep that he is in health.” And this is ratified by experience. 35- Jf it be contended, absence of misery does not amount to happiness, for in stones, etc., misery is absent yet 256 PANCHADASI. there is no happiness, Such e@ contention is untenable and extremely opposed to profound alumber—the subject of dispute. 36. Presence of heppiness and absence of misery can be inferred from the appearance of a person. The usual marks by which one or the other, or both, are made out, are too well- known, so that the face may properly be regarded as the index of what a man has for his share; but so far as stones are concerned, from an absence of the usual signs by which happi- ness or its reverse can be traced, it is impossible to conclude that misery only is wanting in them. 37- Individual happiness and misery are a matty of personal experience, and they cannot be inferentially known ; but like their presence known from experience, their absence is known too. 38. Thus then, like the perception of happiness, want of misery in profound slumber is likewise established from the same source (experience); and for such absence of misery, it must be admitted as a condition of uninterrupted felicity. 39. IE that condition of profound slumber were not one of felicity, what necessity would there be to undergo trouble and expense for making the bed soft, neat and tidy to induce sleep? : 40. If the bedding be looked upon as a means for the removal of pain, it is natural to believe its capability of producing happiness in a bed-ridden patient by removing his pain, And in health—in the absence of pain attending illness, the necessity for its removal is likewise wanting—that bedding and the rest are the means of procuring happiness. 41. But since such happiness of profound slumber is accomplished by the usual means—bedding, cot, and the rest, it must be material. To such a contention, the reply is, whether happiness preceding the advent of sleep, or during it, is considered material? The Vedanti inclines to the firat view, and says happiness felt prior to the advent of sleep may PANCHADASI. 257 be declared material, ic. derived from material resources— bedding and posture. 42. Now for the second query. Happiness attending profound slumber is not due to any cause. Then, knowledge of the usual means, bedding, etc., is wanting, consequently the happiness felt cannot be ascribed to them as its source. Bat it may be argued, if the happiness of profound slumber be not material, ¢¢., uncreate and eternal, why is it not experienced like material enjoyment? Because the sleeper who expe- riences that happiness in sleep, being immersed in happiness, ft ia not perceived like happiness proceeding from material enjoyment. Hence it is said, prior to sleep, the intellect of the aleeper approaches the felicity produced from bedding, etc., and subsequently during slumber, is immersed in exquisite felicity. 43. To be more explicit.— iva, engaged in work daring the hours of wakefulness, gets tired, and repairs to his bed for sleep ; the fatigue, produced from work, is removed, and with the return of mental quiet, brought about by rest, he feels the happiness caused by the bedding, etc. 44. What is the nature of material happiness? Pain following an ungratified desire in the shape of material acquisi- tion (say wealth, etc.,) is experienced by the individual during the course of his daily labor, for destroying which he repairs to bis bed; his intellect is now directed inwards where it meets with the reflection of natural felicity [of Self}; and this reflection of felicity is material happiness, Here too, after experiencing that material happiness, the individual who experiences it, as well as his experience and the subject of that experience, subject him to work and fatigue. 45. And for the removal of that labour and fatigue, Ftv tums at once into the blissfulness of Branma to be one with It. Asin the Sruéi‘* Pupil | then (in profound slumber) Five merges into Braxma to be one with It.” 46. Five examples are adduced in the Srwt to illustrate PANCHADASI. the blissfulness of profound slumber, zz, of the eagle, hawk, infant, emperor, and Méahabrahmana (an eminent Brahman learned in the Shasfras). These are:— 47. Just as an eagle, with its leg tied to a string round its keeper’s wrist, tempted to fiy hither and thither at the sight of prey, but unable to find any comfortable resting spot alights upon the hand where the other end of the string is attached : 48.