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’ Now between the respective doctrines set up by these supporters of reflection and reflected image, the difference is this—A reflection is false, but a reflected image is true, and not false. For, the expounders of reflected inzaz- conclude as a natural inference that the reflected image of the face in a mirror, is not a shadow of that face, inasmuch as a shadow is situated in the same site, where its ‘wriginal is placed ; but in the case of a face reflected in a mirror, & PANCHADASI. - 209 ts said to be wanting in the indications of the latter; and hence distinct ; but its luminosity is manifested like that of the Uniform. 34. Asan earthen jar is non-different in its composition from earth, so is reflex intelligence non-different from (Boodhz) Intellect, for an identity of their condition. But it may be is always placed in front, or exactly opposite to the original, hence a reflected Image is not a shadow in a looking-glass. But for making a subject of the mirror, the function of the internal organ, Projected by the organ of sight, makes that mirror its subject, at the same time, it ceases or retreats from that mirror, and makes the face, situated on the neck, its subject. As quick playing (Bunite) makes the wheel of a fire-brand perceived, while ac- tually it has no wheel, so the velocity of mental function for making a subject of the mirror and face, produces the perception of that face in the glass as situated in it; while actually it is placed on the region of the neck, and not in the glass, and is not a shadow: and, by the velocity of the mental function, the know- ledge of a face in a glass, is reflection. In this manner, from the connection of the associated mirror, the face placed on the region of the neck appears both as a visage and its reflection. More+ over, on due reflection, it is to be found, there is no reflection. Similarly by the close connection of the associate formed by Ignorance, the site of visage in the unassociated Intelligence is known Iswara, and its reflection, Five. And there are no separate conditions of Zsmwara and Fiva. The perception of a Fiva in Intelligence, from Ignorance is called its reflection in Ignorance; so that, both the considerations of visage and its reftection are unreal, while actually they are true; for the site of their actuality is the face and its reflection in amirror; and in the subject of the illustration—Intelligence—~ that face and intelligence are true. According to this view, as a reflection proceeds from the original, it is consequently true; and @ reflected shadow, for its being the shadow, 1s untrue. This then is the difference between the expressions ‘reflection’ and ' refleteted shadow,’—Duoxt’s Edition of Vicharsagar, pp. 328-330. 32 12 PANCHADASI, apprehended; in thet case, distinction of intellect from thé Physica) body, will be done away with; therefore to settle the question, it is said, what is maintained by @ theosophist is very fittle to the purpose, because it is easy to admit intellect as not ‘en additional entity distinct from the body. 35. If it be alleged, subsequent to death, when the physi- cal body is absent, existence of intellect is eatablished from the testimony of the Srufi; then as in the Pradesha Srait, ‘reflex’ is described to be distinct from Intellect, it is but proper to regard it in that way. 36. If you say, it is possible for the associate of Intellect to enter a body : the reply is, sclf distinct from Intellect is said to enter according to the authority of the Aiterya Upanishad :— “ Self distinct from Intellect with a desire of entering, enters the body.” 37. “This body with its insentient sensory organs cannot exist without the intelligence of Self,” having considered in this manner, he enters the body through the cavity of Brahma situated on the crown of the head, corresponding to the anterior fontanele, and experiences waking, dreaming and profound slumber. 38. If it be contended, How can the unassociated Supreme Self enter a body? It may as well be said in reply, in that case it is impossible to attribute to him the instrumentality of creation. Thus then, both his entrance and instrumentaiity or Causation equally are due to Maya, and with the destruction of that Illusion, they too are equally destroyed, therefore the ‘cause of their destruction is alike. 39- Yajwavatxra in his discourse on Self-knowledge with his wife Maitreyi, cites passages from the Sruft to explain the destruction of associate ss follows:—‘The Supreme Intelli- gence Self, taking his birth with the physical body, organs wensory and active, etc., dies with the destruction of the body, and subsequent to its demise no knowledge abides in it.” In other words, though distinct from the body and the PANCHADASL aur rest, which are material, self for keeping company with them, appears to be destroyed when the associates succumb to death. 40. “The Supreme Self is eternal, and unassociated, hig associates are destroyed only,” [and not he]. In this manner, Sruti explains the Uniform Intelligence (Self) devoid of associate, to be distinct from the associated reflex intelligence. “He is indestructible.” And “unconnected with the body and the rest.” 41. “ When leaving the physical body, Jiva does not die; because he is without birth and death, the body alone dics.” In this passage, the Srufi does not seek to expound that with death, he is emancipated and freed, but subjected to metempsy- chosis. 42. Té then the associated Jiva is subjected to destruction, how can he have any identity of relation with, “I who am the Supreme Brahma and indestructible?” Therefore it is said, this knowledge is not of identity; it is community of reference and that is capable of existing even in the presence of obstae cle or antagonism.* * Though the spiritual soul or intelligence (Boodhi) with the reflex is the seat of the perception ‘I am Brahma,’ and not the Uniform, yet such reflex knows that the Uniform Intelligence and its principle of individuality are the Atma, indicated by the first personal pronoun ‘I,’ which also is the same as ‘Aham.' Now ‘Aham’ establishes the Uniform intelligence as always non= different from Brahma, as the space covered by jar is always one with the infinite space from which it cannot be in any way demar= cated. Hence the Vedantin describes this mutual relationship of the Uniform with Brahma as ‘dfnkshya Samanadhikerana’ main predicament or inference in which several things are in cluded, ‘When a thing is always non-different from another thing, their association is called a &Mfukshya Samanadhikarana. As for instancee the space engrossed by a jar is always non-different 28 * ara PANCHADASI. 43. As from mistake or illusion when the stump of a tree ‘ia taken for a man, not to know it asa stump does not affect the other knowledge that it isa man; so when the perception of egoism “I am an agent, and instrument” is destroyed by the knowledge “I am the Supreme Brahma,” the objective world is destroyed. 44. Surgswar Acwarya has in this manner pointed out in his work Wiskarmya Siddhi* the antagonism of community of from the Infinite space which is ever present along with it, there- fore the jar-space is the infinite space~and as such, the first has in relation to the last, the condition of a predicament in which it is included with it. In the same manner, the Uniform Intelli- gence has in connection with Brahma a similar ‘main inclusive predicament,’ because they are always non-different from one another, Or, as in a person mistaking the stump of a tree for man, after the tree is known, the form of man disappears and the trec is rendered apparent, Here the person bas a community of refer~ ence to the tree, of the second kind; similarly by the disappear- ance of the reflected Intelligence, it becomes one with Universal Intelligence, which is one with Brahma, hence its reference to ‘I’ is the same with Byakma, and not distinct from it. Such a ‘community of reference’ the reflex intelligence has with Brekma by merging or disappearing into it. ® Surzswara, the reputed disciple of Sankaracaarya, is the author of Niskarmya Siddhs. He is opposed ta the doctrine of a theosophist’s acting with impunity. For him there is nothing proper to do ; to this end says the Vicharsagar :—~"If after hearing the utterances of Vedanta, any one has an inclination still left in him as to what is proper, he has not learnt the first principle, or primitive truth. For this reason, the constant removal of the use- tess, and which answers no purpose, and acquirement of felicity, that is constantly got as a result of hearing the Vedante, is men- tioned by the Deva Guru in Niskarmya Siddhi—Vicharsogor, “Duote's Edition, pp. 120-121. PANCHADASI, Bit reference : for this reason, community of reference is destroyed in the expression “J am Brahma.” 45. As in “All this is indeed Brahma” the Supreme Brahma has a community of reference with “all this”—the Objective world—so in “I am Brahma” there is possible for the game reference with Jiva. : 46. But objection may be taken to it, for in bis work Vivarana, PRAKASHATMACHARAN Swamt, speaks of the oppo+ sition af community of reference ¢Vadh Samanadhtkarana), To explain this, it is said :-—With a desire of declaring self to be identical with Uniform Intelligence, the author of Vivarana ascertains the incompatibility of community of reference and Beeks to do away with it.* 47. Bothin the Vivarana and other works, professors have sought to establish the indication of ‘Thou’ in the Uniform Intelligence—the Supreme Brahma, and having aecertained the incompatible community of reference (Vadh Samanadhikarana) have spoken of the main inclusive predica- ment referring to the same subject.t 48.