English
That clever Vedantin Nischal Dass Swami, the author of Vrit#i Parvakar, has entered into an examination of this indication, but this is hardly the place to introduce his metaphysical disquisitions ; suffice itto say, that visible knowledge is of two sorts, (2) ascertaining (avijna) and (6) recognition (praty } When from prior impressions and connection of sense, a thing is known, it is called recognition (pratyavijna). It is of this form “That is this.” Hera even, modification {of the mental function produced by the relation} of sensory organ pervades the subject, for which non-distinction is. produced between the two intelligences, vis.,—of the mental : PARCHADAS. 355: ttt JO. ‘Therefore, for a knowledge of the vialbllity of Brahma, tone should always ascertain the significations of the trensces- dental phrase ; and there can be no contention abont it. 7 7i. The indication of the transcendental phrase ‘ That art, Thou’ is now being set forth :—Tetelligence associated with | the internal organ sustaining* the perception of Self or modification and of the subject. Knowledge proceeding from the sensory organ takes the form “This is” it is called (cojne pratkskyc) known before. But in the principal Siddhanta, prior impression of a thing known before as for instance, the knowledge conveyed by the expression “' That is this,” “That,” the portion Fepresented by ‘that’ is in the form of recollection, hence invisible, and ‘this’ yisible ; for which ‘that is this’ is a mixture of invisible with visible perception and not the latter only, For its being ‘external and internal, each variety of visible knowledge is either external or internal, Now the former has'five more sub-divisions from the organ through which that knowledge is brought about = aural, cuticular, ocular, palatal, and olfactory. The internal, on the other hand, has two sub-divisions, afmogochara and anatmo gochara. The first for its being predicate of self is sub-divided into two and the last is into three varieties,’ on account of indi+ cating the perception of Thou, and That, and their non-difterence, # We have seen it mentioned three different forma of indicas tions implied by a word. They require a passing notice, for in- tance, A jar.’ Here the jar is said to be the subject of both its function (a water carrying vessel, etc.,) and the word itself. Now the function is situated in the internal organ and the word is situated in the tongue and the jar itself rests on the ground, wo that the three are different; similarly the function of self (aham) and the subject of the word, is intelligence of the internal oxgan Jive, and here ‘self’ (function) is situated in the internal organ, the word has for its site the tongue, and the subject—the eaidowed intelligence of the internal organ rests on its own dig-: ity, so that, the function is distinct from the word self, Though | far that function being subordinate ts the mind, it ia nondistinct (com Jiva, yet as there is difference between a jar and ite ether, . ot - oe wg : PANCHADASI- individvality and manifested by becoming the subject of that ‘word [‘Self’] ts indicated by the word ‘Thon.’ In other words, consciousness manifested in the form of “I am ]”—the intel- Jectual soul associated with the internal organ—-and forming the sabject of that word [atom or egoity] is the predicate of ‘Thou,’ 72. The literal signification of ‘That’ is now being defined. The associated intelligence of Maya which ia the cause of the Universe, the indication of omniscience, the property of invisibitity—which is existent, intelligence, and bliss is the predicate of the word ‘That.’ 73. When the eame Parabrahma is said to be visible and invisible, finite and infinite, limited and whole, thet is to say with properties naturally opposed to each other, it therefore ean be ascertained by recourse to Indication [of abondaning the conflicting portion]. 74. Asin the phrase “That Devadatta ia thie,” ‘that’ refera to past time and ‘this’ to the present time, both have reference to the same person, but by omitting the conflicting element according to the canons of the indication of abandon ing a part, Devadatta alone is meant. Similarly by abandon- ing the conflicting part from the signification of the transe cendental phrase “That art Thou” there remains the non- conflicting Intelligence which is meant® hence the indication of abandoning a part is easily admissible. ‘on account of distinction in their mature and properties, similarly for the qualification of the mind and the property of its intellie gence being distinct, for all practical purposes a difference be- tween Jivaz and the mind or internal organ is maintained, cone sequently there is distinction between the function of self and the word. Then again the indicative indication of the word self is the illumination of function, vis., the uniform intelligence, which is entirely different from that function. This is what is meant. .* That’ and ‘Thou’ are marked by the qualities of invisi-: Sility and visibility, a result of associate, so if from intelligenos; 7S. Te ta not poasible to inclade the relative and predt-| cated signification in the meaning of the phrase ‘That art Thou’ but as to their referring to- one Impartite, there can be. no question and that has been admitted by all learned men. [For instance, in the ordinary phrase “Bring the cow.” Tt is said that the verb ‘to bring’ reminds a person of the desire of the speaker; in short the servant is asked to obey which is common to them both, the conflicting element of invisi+ bility and visibility be abandoned, there remains only intelligence. That is to say -— Intelligence + Invisibility=Intelligence+ Visibility ; steiking off invisibility and visibility we have Intelligence=Intelligence, # In Logic the source of the sense of a word depends either upon the property of its force or that of its indication. But there are four other varieties of sense (1) desire; (2) fitness; (3) purport; and (4) proximity, connection or relation between two proximate terms and the sense they convey ; for instance, “Bring the cow.” Here a desire is expressed ; when there is a relation between the sense of one word with another, it is called fitness, as the {relation of ‘cow’ with the verb ‘bring,’ here the relation is that of a subject and predicate; forthe person who has been asked to bring the cow is the subject of the verb ‘bring’ which is the predicate of that person, Desire of a speaker is called purport, when the speaker addressing another orders him to bring the Gam, it expresses that desire, in a variety of ways according to the time of the day: for example, if it bethe time of cooking, it should signify fire; if during bathing it should convey the sense of water, and during milking time it would signify a cow, etc. Thus then, as ordinary words are construed according to the time and other incidents connnected with the speaker, so is the purport of Vedic phrases to be ascertained from the commentaries in the form of ‘the commencement’ and ‘termination’ ‘result,’ novelty, etc.; and as in human speech the desire of the speaker is ascertained, so in the Vedic utterances the purport is Iswara’s~< desire. The contiguity of words is called proximity. Strength of a fit term and the relation of the property of indication, ersat- “AB didster’s wish by Dttdging the cee, coustquéntly'¢ relstion _ fd ‘acknowledged between the words ‘bring’ and ‘cow,’ tid fits is the relative signification. Now for the predicate "A blue and fragrant lotus.” Here the lotus is marked by thé quatities ‘blue’ end ‘fragrant.’ The transcendental phrase That art Thou’® is not to be construed like the ‘Blae lotus’ dod that is not allowable ; bat as one Impartite and pervad- Isg no impediment to remember its sense, is also likewise cafled proximity. In the illustration the two terms ‘cow’ and ‘bring’ aré eontiguously placed, likewise the strength creates no impediment in recollecting the sense to bring the cow, hence it is proximate. ‘Thus then, we find the source or cause of ascertaining the purport of & term, depends upon desire, fitness, purport and contiguity whieh are 90 many causes, and no term can be construed without them. This stands true in the case of all words. * As for instance, “you bring the cow.” Here there is a close connection or say relation between the subject ‘you,’ the ‘dbject, ‘cow’ and the predicate ‘bring’ ; and the sense is plain enough, as it asks another to fulfil the speaker’s desire; and this sense with the relative connection is the purport. It is an example @f proximity. Soin the construction of a transcendental phrase, it is quite inapplicable, for if it be said let the word\‘That’ indicate the meaning of the word ‘Thou’ and vice versa by relation and Proximity, then it will tell against other Sruti texts where it has bean Idld dows it is unassociated, unconditioned.” ‘That’ is marked by in lity and ‘Thou’ refers to intelligence marked by visibility, hence the one is incompatible with the other. Neither can the sentence be construed literally as ‘the lotus is blue,’ for here the literal sense suits, inasmuch as between the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ there is the relation of subject and predicate, as blue excludes other colors as white, green, red, etc. tind lotus, such other substances as cloth, jar, etc. Thus then, we wee the necessity, why in construing the necessity, why in cons- teising the sentence ‘That art Thou’ the use of & subject and rélation does not apply, and Ganete sts to be sheared the canons of Indication. lag everywhere In.all things Is the purport ‘admitted by all: learned men, hence to have recourse to Indication is proper. 6. The meening of Impartite is thes set forth.