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123 ource of creating the above named conditions of relation and control; when they are destroyed, by the advent of knowledge, or say, discrimination, the chance of creating the relationship and control is alike destroyed; on this ground an antagonist may take his stand. In that case, he is one with a follower of Sankkya. (For indiscrimination is either want of discrimi- nation, or something else; or something opposed to it. Now these are the three forms; of them the first is untenable, for, want implies an absence or nothing, and that cannot act as a productive cause of something, hence want or absence of discrimination cannot account for a cause of relation and and control. Neither the second form holds good; for we do not find that ‘something else ;’ as for instance, a jar, to be such cause; and the third form as it maintains something opposed to discrimination, clearly establishes ignorance which is the same with Prakriti of Sankhya. Thus then, it upholds Sankhya, 233. If for the purpose of attributing bondage and release, Sclf be declared to be manifold, even that is not possible, for Maya is quite capable of doing that. 234. How? Like things created in a magical performance, (as the creation of a tree bearing mangoes or other fruits,) what is difficult of being produced is easily created by (Afaya) Illusion and for its being naturally endowed with opposite or antagonistic properties [s.¢., unreal], creates bondage and release or emancipation. Now it cannot be contended that as the first is an action of ignorance, consequently emancipa- tion must be admitted as a necessity ; as that will be against Srutt, for nowhere does Srufi suffer the actualitity of emancipation, like that of bondage, to prevail. 235. As for instance in reference to his actual condition Jiva is said to be truly “Without destruction, and origin, neither subject to bondage nor emancipation, without the mieans (hearing and the rest) and any desire of release, and in whom hag ceased ignorance. 324 PANCHADASI. 236. But the milch cow Maya has two calves, Jiva end Iswara, who, according to their inclination, drink the milk of daality, but that does not affect non-duslity anyhow, nor can cause it any injury. 437. Except a difference in name, there is no difference really present between the Uniform Intelligence and Brahma, just as there is none whatever between the space appropriated by a jar and the great body of it ontside, Infinite ether (Mahakas), 238. That Non-dual Principle or Entity [Secondless Brahma] which was present prior to the creation of the universe, (as is said in the Sru/t) is even present now, and wilt so continue in the future ¢. ¢., during emancipation ; there is no doubt about that, but it is true. Then why are people generally so fond of creating a difference? Ignorance or Ilusion alone leads people astray and that is the reason why the generality of mankind are fond of creating a difference between the Individual Self and Brahma. 239. But the question is, if the unreality of the universe and reality of the secondless Entity or Principle, Brahma, which form the subject under consideration, be an established conviction with the wise, why are they found to behave like a man of the world [ignorant]? Where then is the necessity of acquiring knowledge of self. Therefore it is said, from the force of fructescent works, many wise persons are found to have, the same inclination for using material objects as they were accustomed to, prior to the rising of knowledge, but as they are free from illusion they are never ensnared in its meshes as ignorant persons are. 240. To show that the wise are free from error, the oppo- site condition of the ignorant is being first cited here. The ignorant have a firm belief in their mind as to the reality of. enjoyment or suffering, both in the present sphere as well in the next (heaven, etc.,] and there is neither room for the secondiess Brahma, nor is It discernible in their mind. PANCHADAS!. 241, The wise have an exactly opposite belief ; hence according to their individual perception and _corviction, people create either bondage or release. 243. [Arguments for establishing the reality of Brahma and unreality of the universe are now being given.] The manifestibility of the secondless Brahma is derived from the Shastras and not from experience. It may be contended, as. the secodless Brahma ia not visible, hence it is impossible to ascertain It with any definite precision. But this assertion is untenable, inasmuch as Brahma in the form of intelligence is everywhere manifest and is clearly the subject of perception and experience in every individual. Then again, if it be said, this manifestibility of intelligence can be admitted, but as its entireness cannot be perceived, the universe also in its entirety is not perceived, therefore you are constrained to admit an equality between non-dual Brahma and the dual objective world, 80 far as an absence of complete perception goes ; and ifin regard to the latter that does not stand in the way of your conception, why is Brahma to remain unmanilested then? 243. Thus then, the manifestibility or perception of both the phenomenal and noumenal in the same province being equal, if that does not prevent you from enquiring into the reality of the former, what objection can there be to hold similar view with regard to the secondless Brahma ?* 244. Now the Vedantin’s opponent adopts @ different line of argument to do away with non-duality. He saye—the * As in a pot of boiled rice, by feeling one tice, the whole of, its contents are known to have beer well cooked, so by the faculty of ascertainment residing inside the physical body, in intelligence, ‘felicity, fulness, eternal freedom, unassociation,’ etc., which Brahma is endowed with, are easily perceived in every individual self after the destruction of ignorance has ceased to produce any more illusion. 126 PANCHADASL. “secondless’ is without a duality. Hence non-duality and ite reverse, ore naturally opposed to each other; and froma perception of the phenomenal, no noumenal can be made out. Adopting a similar course, the Vedantin may as well exclaim, from their natural antagonism, when the secondless Brahma (noumenal) is manifested, the phenomena! must cease. Thus then both of us are equally placed so to speak; but bis opponent replies to this:—The perception of intelligence is not opposed to the phenomenal, hence we are not in the same position. In other words from an absence of antagonism between your perception of the non-dual Brahma ip intelli- gence, and our duality, there is no similarity with the question raised by you and me. 245. But inasmuch as the phenomenal is unreal though it is manifested, its reality (apparent) is not opposed to that of the secondiess Brahma, and a Siddhanti says in reference to it:—If you say so, then listen to me: the phenomenal is in @ condition of non-being, impermanence or non-existence (@sa?) but full of illusion ; and that Brahma is the only Reality which no pralaya can affect, but continues to the end fully manifested. 246. “To the end” is being illustrated :—-These unthink- able worlds are full of illusion and created out of it, hence they are unreal. Having thus ascertained them, it is natural to consider Brahma as the only Reality. [‘Unthinkable’ signifies what is not fit for thinking; these worlds for their being material are unreal, and for the matter of that ‘indes- eribable.’ Therefore having found ovt the unreality of the phenomenal, to regard the secondless Brahma as the only Reality ia but natural.) 247. If subsequently, the reality of phenomena reasserts again in your mind after having known them to be unreal, you are again to have recourse to arguments and analysis over and over, till that error ceases to exist, [and for such PANCHADASI. 129 fepetition there is the authority of Vyasas laid down in the Sariraka Sutras, Chap. iv.] 248, But it may be enquired how long is that necessary to be practised? Hence it is said, arguments for discriminat~ ing the secondless Reality, or the means ‘hearing’ and the rest to that end, are not attended with pain and as they are beneficial, inasmuch as they destroy every thing else which is harmful to such knowledge of non-duality, they can be had recourse to od Jibitum. In thie respect, they differ from the supporting arguments of duality, for they are painful, as they cost an effort on the part of the individual seeking to establish it. 249. Moreover, it may be argued that a person even with his knowledge of Brahma, is subject to hunger and thirst, in short,—of the same worldly pursuits as he used to be before, in his state of ignorance; now whether the declaration “I am hungry,” “I am thirsty,” indicates self? Or the first personal pronoun has reference mainly to the Intelligence which is self? To such a question, a Vedantin admits the first view, so that the principle of egoism or individuality, you may well see, and no one asks yon to do otherwise [not to see.] It may as well be mentioned here, that the second view is inapplicable, because self is unrelated and unassociated, and he can have no concern with hunger, thirst and the rest. 250, But this discussion does not stop here: a dissenter fs apt to maintain, though hunger and thirst may not properly de the subjects of self, yet through illusion or mistake one ie Apt so to perceive ;—and says a Vedantin, in such a circum. atance [of attributing hunger and thirst to self through illusion} the best plan is to destroy that illusion, and to practise dis crimination always. a5t. For, illusion comes from interminable desire which has no beginnning; and for its removal, the repeated practice of discrimination [from things real and unreal] is very proper.