English
When the eyes are open, then (the intelligent faculty) perceives the light ; when the eyes are shut, then the intelligent faculty per- ceives the darkness (within). And this constitutes the difference between what is called seeing external objects and internal ones. What about this supposition ? "Buddha replied to Ananda: You say that when you close your eyes you see darkness. Let me ask with respect to the properties of this darkness — is it something adapted for the eye, or is it independent of it ? If it is something adapted for the eye, then it must be placed before the eye (when it is per- ceived.) How, then, do you say that the process is an inward one ? Or if it be an inward process, then it is just as if you con- sidered yourself dwelling in a dark chamber without sun, or moon, or lamp. But let me ask in this case, would the darkness which is within the chamber in which you dwell be identical with your inward organs, which you say are naturally dark ? But if you. take the other alternative, and say that the nature of the percep- ^ The stomach, gall, bladder, larger and smaller intestiiics and secreting 29G A CATENA OF BUDDHIST tion of which we are now speaking is not adapted for the eye, then how can we speak of ' seeing ' at all ? " But, putting on one side the question of external perception, let us suppose that, by turning the sight inwards when the eye is shut, there is what you call a process of perceiving the darkness within the body — let me ask, when you open your eyes, ought there not to exist the same power of turning the sight back so that you should perceive your own face ? If not, then I do not see how you can speak of turning the sight inward, when the eyes are shut. 31.^ " But if, for the sake of argument, you suppose that the eye is able to perceive the face, then it must follow again that both the intelligent mind and the eye itself exist externally to the body, i. e. in space. Let us suppose you consent to this, then it results that the eye, thus existing in space, is not a part of your own body. So that it is just as though you were to say that when Tathagata now beholds your face, it is you who behold it ; or if you still say that your eye, thus existing in space, has the power of individual perception, you must allow that your real eye has no power of perception at all, or else you would have two distinct organs of sight, and therefore you ought to see two Tathagatas now before you instead of one. Altogether, there- fore, we may conclude that your present theory is incapable of proof. 32. " Ananda resumed : I have repeatedly heard Buddha in his instructions to the four classes of his hearers" say ' that from the conceptions of the mind are pi'oduced every kind of sensible phenomenon, and from the influence of these phenomena again the various types of mind are produced.' I now surmise that the groundwork of this power of thought is the essence of my inteUigent mind, and according to whatever subject of consider- ation is brought before it, that in the union of this essence with the external phenomenon,-'^ the active intellectvial mind resides, so that we cannot speak of it either as within or without or between. 1 I have here commenced to number the clauses, in order to enable the student to refer to the original. By numbering each section in the original, the translation may be at once verified. 2 Fah Hian, p. 155. ' 'J'his theory api)r()aclic3 very nearly to that of Aristotle respecting vKn and uvjia, or the " conceptualist" argument. SCRIPTDRES FROM THE CHINESE. 297 33. " Buddha addressed Ananda : You say now, that by the generative power of the external phenomenon is produced every sort of individual mind, and that in the act of combination con- sists tlie active intelligent faculty ; but the very fact of the mind not existing previous to this combination, proves that what we generally call ' mind' is bixt an empty word,^ and therefore what combination can there be ? But if it is possible for that which is so nnreal, to form by combination a reality, yet in this case we should have to suppose that there are nineteen categories of sense (instead of eighteen), because tliere would be seven dusts or objects of sense instead of six,- which is contrary to all truth. But if you say that this mind has a real and substantial existence {i.e., externally), then you can touch it with your hand — and moreover, the mind or essence which combines with the pheno- menon must either come from within you or enter from without you ; if the first, then we return to the theory already discussed and disproved, viz., of being able to see within the body ; if the latter, then, before joining with the phenomenon, it should be able to distinguish the face of the possessor of it (which it clearly cannot do). 34. " A nanda objected. True ! but yet it seems to me that the distinct duty of the eye is to see, and of the intelligent mind to recognise and discriminate, and therefore it is not right to speak of the mind as seeing. Buddha said : If the eyes are able ' The argument here, and also in the Paramita works, to the effect that "individual mind" is unreal and a mere "word," coincides with Home Tooke's theory, go ably followed up by his disciple, Edward Johnson {Nuces Pkilosophicce, 1841). But the Buddhist goes beyond the sensational theory of these philosophers. Mr. Johnson says, "The fact is, every word has two meanings — a verbal meaning and a meaning in Nature : the meaning in nature is some thing or things capable of affecting us through the senses; if the verbal meaning does not direct us to the meaning in Nature, then it is nothing more than "vox et prseterea nihil" {mices Philosophim, 270). So said the Buddhist ; but he did not, therefore, deny the existence of that which neither the senses can appre- hend nor words express. 2 Vide Daily Use of Shamans, p. 82. The six dusts are the six objects of sense ; the eighteen categories (dhatu) are the six senses, the six objects of sense and the six species of knowledge resulting. The ovaia or essence would be a seventh object of sense, alluded to iu the text. 298 A CATENA OF BUDDHIST to see independently of the mind, then, as you sit here within this Hall, may you not say that the doors see ? Then, again, if your hypothesis is correct, a dead man ought to be able to see, because the physical structure of the eye remains unaltered ; but if he can see, how do you say he is dead ? 35. " Ananda, consider again with respect to your intelligent mind — if it is a real substantial entity— then it is either one, i.e., a simple substance, or compound; and, then agaiu, as it is located in your body, it is either everywhere present within its limits, or confined to certain points. Regard the mind as a simple and uniform substance, it would follow that, if yon touch anything with one finger, then all the fingers ought to feel tlie contact, and if this is so, then the object touched can have no fixed locality, or if it has a distinct whereabouts, then the theory of the mind being one in its matter, cannot be maintained. But if the mind be complex, then when it takes cognizance of many men, which of the observing minds is yours ? Again, if the intelli- gent mind be diffused in its substance, then the same difiiculty about one finger touching a thing, and the rest not perceiving it, is to be answered. But if the mind be not diffused, but confined to one place, then if you touch your head and foot at the same time, if the head feels, the foot ought not to feel ; but this is not the case ; and therefore your supposition about the intelligent mind being identical with the result of combination between a pheeno- menon and a hidden perceptive essence, is not tenable. 36. "Ananda, replying to Buddha, said: World-honoured one! I have also heard you discoursing with Manjusri and other emi- nent disciples, when you were engaged in the discussion of the question of the true (or sole) condition (of Being), say, that the intelligent mind was located neither within nor without. 37.