English
Let me ask you, illustrious disciple, with respect to the flatulence and the oil : the one does not exist in the other, any more than the horse exists in the ox; this, then, is an instance of the third kind of nothingness or non-existence to which you referred. And so with reference to the other medicines ; the cold does not exist in the honey, nor the honey in the cold. Well, in the same way, there are throe moral dis- eases— covetousness, aversion, delusion ; and for these there are three medicines or cures — 1. The perception of im- purity ; 2. A heart full of love ; 3. A knowledge of the nexus of cause and effect. Illustrious disciple, by expelling covetousness, there is produced a non-covetous disposition; SCRIPTURES FROM THE CHINESE. 175 by expelling aversion, there is produced a placable disposi- tion ; and by expelling delusion, there is produced an intel- ligent state of mind. Yet the three diseases do not co-exist in the three medicines, nor vice versa. Illustrious youth, because of this non-existence of the one in the other, we come to speak of permanence, joy, personality, and purity, as the result of the eradication of the disease. Basita said, Tathagata speaks of permanence and non-permanence ; but what are these ? Buddha replied. Illustrious disciple, matter (Rupa)is impermanent; getting free from this there is perma- nence j and so, with respect to all the skandhas down to *^manas,^ getting rid of these there is permanence. Illustrious disciple, whatever male or female follower of mine is able to realise the impermanence of the five skandhas, he or she has arrived at the condition of permanence. [On which Basita is convinced.] '^'^ Again, there was a Brahmatchari called Sena, who said: Gotama, is there such a thing as ^ I ' ? Tathagata remained silent. Again he said : Gotama, is there no such thing as ' I ^ ? Tathagata remained silent. And so a second and a third time. Sena then said : Gotama, If there is such a thing as ^I,' it is universally diffused, and is a definite unity.^ Gotama, why are you silent and answer me not ? Buddha said : Sena, do you say that this ''I^ is universally difiused? Sena, in reply, said : not only I say so, but all wise men are of the same opinion. Buddha said : Illustrious youth, if this be the case, then surely the whole body of sentient creatures existing in the five conditions of life should at one and the same time be receiving a common recompense ; and there- fore you, a Brahmatchari, should at one time be suffering in Hell and enjoying the delight of Heaven. Sena replied : Gotama, according to our Law, there are two kinds of ^ I' — one a corporal, the other an unchangeable personality ; it is with reference only to the first that we say by doing right 1 Or, it may be translated thus, " if all living creatures have a per- sonal existence, every where diffused, then this is what we may call a definite unity." 176 A CATENA or BUDDHIST it goes to Heaven^ and by doing wrong it goes to Hell. Buddha replied : Illustrious youtli, ■with respect to this uni- versally diffused '1' — what is it? if it is the corporal per- sonality of which you speak, then it is changeable and imper- manent? if it is a bodily nonentity, how can it be universally diffused? Sena replied : Gotama, suppose a house were set on. fire, and the master escaped, you couldu^t say that when the house was burnt the master was burnt; so we say that although this bodily ' V is not permanent, at the time of its dissolution the true ' V goes out, and so our conception of personality is both an universally diffused substance and also a permanent one. Buddha said : According to your explanation, this is not possible, for there would be two sorts of universal existence: first, that which never changes; and secondly, that which is subject to change ; and again, a material and an immaterial substance. But, in fact, in your figure of the house and the master, there is no connection between the two ideas ; the house and master are quite separate and distinct entities, and cannot possibly represent two conditions of the same thing. In point of fact, if your definition is a true one, and the ' I^ be a universally difi'used existence, then the distinction of father and son, mother and daughter, enemy and friend, etc., all disappear ; every sen- tient existence is one and the same. Sena replied: I do not say that all sentient creatures are the same as the ' 1,' but what I say is all men have one individuality. Buddha re- plied: If this be so, then there must be many individualities (as there are many men), which is impossible, for, as you said before, the ' I ' is universally diffused ; and, if so, then all crea- tures must have one common basis of life; and so, whatever experience one class of being has, the same another must have ; for, if not, I insist the individuality of which j^ou speak cannot be universal. Sena replied : Gotama, the two things are unlike: you compare all creatures with the 'V of which I predicated my thesis, but you cannot do so ; and I deny that all sentient creatures are thus universally diffused, Buddha replied : But are not all things in common sul)ject SCRIPTURES FROM THE CHINESE, 177 to Karma ? Sena replied. Yes. Then in this respect they are all one. What then ! the Karma which influences my condition must, on your hypothesis, influence the condition of all creatures, and all must obtain the same reward and return of their actions. Sena replied : There may be a thousand lamps in a house, the wicks all difierent, but the light they give one ; so the ' I ^ of which we speak is one, but the individuals different. Buddha replied : This will not bear examination, for if these difierent lamps be placed in difierent houses, then the illumination is confined to their several limits ; but you say the ' I Ms a universally diffused existence. And again, when the wick of the lamp has burnt out, the light disappears j but this will not hold good with your comparison, for the ' V which you compare to the light is permanent. Sena replied : Gotama, you are twist- ing my comparison unfairly, for I did not say there would be any light if the wick were used out, I only spoke of the light given by the lamp while the wick lasted, and during this time I said the light was like the '^ I ^ of which we are speaking ; so that, whether you limit the light to one place or not, I repeat my argument is a just one. — Illustrious youth, your position is altogether false ; the comparison is an inadequate one. You say I deal with it unfairly, but in fact it is the result of your own ill-chosen figure, which will not bear examination ; you have brought the ruin of your argument on yourself. [And much more to the same effect, after which the argument is resumed.] Sena rejoined : Gotama, if, as you say, there is no such entity as ^I,' who is it remembers and thinks ? Buddha answered Sena : If there is such an entity as '1/ who is it that forgets? Illus- trious youth, if it is the 'I^ that remembers, in what way do unwelcome recollections and wicked ones occur to the mind, and how is it the 'I' cannot remember what it wants. Sena again said : Gotama, if there is no ^ I,' who is it sees and hears? Buddha said: Illustrious youth, there are six organs of sense (indriyas) and six objects of sense (ayatanas) ; by the harmonious union of each sense with its object is pro- N 178 A CATENA OF BUDDHIST duced the six species of knowledge. These various kinds of knowledge owe their several names to a causal concatena- tion j just aSj illustrious youth, we speak of Fire as a unity, but in distinction we speak of a wood-fire, or a grass-fire, or a dung-fire : so, also, are the various sorts of knowledge in the case of different creatures. For instance, because of the eye, and external form (rupa), and hght, and desire, we have what we call eye-knowledge. Illustrious youth, this eye-knowledge neither resides as an entity in the eye, nor the form, nor the hght, nor the desire, but in the harmoni- ous union of the whole ; and so throughout the different categories of ear-knowledge, taste-knowledge, down to mind- knowledge, the case is just the same ; every species of knowledge results from the harmonious blending of the different elements from which it results.