English
Then there is indeed the possibility that this is associated with joy. And as for association with equanimity, there is nothing to be said. The inclusion of dejection is to prevent that possibility. The inclusion of aversion is also to prevent the possibility of association with other phenomena. For example, those who are nihilists, non-causalists, or hold wrong views regarding action, believe that there is no demerit in killing living beings. And those who believe that demerit arises only from killing human beings, but there is no demerit in killing animals. And those who believe that by killing living beings and offering sacrifices, great merit arises, leading to a divine rebirth. These people, released from personality view, kill living beings themselves. Or send others to do so. Then there is the possibility that this is also associated with wrong view. Thus it is. But those fools among the right-viewed, sometimes taking the views of those wrong-viewed, killing living beings, are at first indeed full of doubt. Then for them, this might be suitable even for doubt, such a possibility arises. To avert that possibility, the taking of aversion is said. Otherwise, just as the previous mind's state of being with greed, this mind's state of being conjoined with aversion is established by the Cūḷanigama itself, so their taking would be meaningless. And here, the non-taking of envy, stinginess, and remorse, and of sloth and torpor, should be understood in the same way as pride, sloth, and torpor in the previous mind. This is the ultimate exposition here. [28] But in the Vibhāvanī and the Mahāṭīkā, it is said: "The taking of displeasure is for the purpose of characterizing the mind by way of its uncommon qualities." There, "by way of its uncommon qualities" – this is not fitting. [29] Even though this (mind) is accompanied by joy and equanimity, because the meaning arises that it is for the purpose of characterizing this (mind) by displeasure alone, which is not common to others. Just as, even though the previous mind and this mind are accompanied by delusion, the taking of 'accompanied by greed' and 'conjoined with aversion' is for the purpose of characterizing by greed and aversion alone, which are not common to others. And 'for the purpose of characterizing' should not be said. For if it were so, it would imply that the manifest displeasure characterizes the presence of other unmanifest feelings here. Just as 'a prince who has obtained a parasol'. [30] And what is said in the Vibhāvanī: "The state of being conjoined with aversion is stated to show the absolute concomitance of both." That too is not good. Because that meaning is established by the Cūḷanigama itself. 27. And here, the inclination to hatred, shallow nature, lack of learning, or the conjunction with an object of resentment, or the conjunction with an undesirable object, are the causes of displeasure and aversion. There, the inclination to hatred should be seen as coming from a state of being abundant in hatred. Shallow nature is a base inclination. And for one with little learning, an undesirable world... For one touched by phenomena, there is no reflection, "Where is that obtained here?" The method of arising for these two should also be taken from the Visuddhimagga. The meaning of the word 'pi' is just as stated. The ultimate exposition of the hate-rooted consciousness is finished. 28. In the delusion-rooted consciousness, the meaning of the terms doubt and restlessness will come later. But because this consciousness, due to the absence of other roots, having gained opportunity, is conjoined with very strong delusion, and with doubt and restlessness, which creep and scatter. Therefore here, even feeling cannot experience the object intensely, so only equanimity-feeling is appropriate. Even so, this consciousness arises immediately after those accompanied by joy and sorrow. Therefore, the implication arises that this might be conjoined with both feelings, so to prevent that implication, the mention of equanimity is made here. For the purpose of defining this consciousness by a quality not common to other consciousnesses, the mention of doubt is made. But restlessness, though conjoined with all unwholesome states, having gained opportunity here, to show that it becomes very strong, should be understood as mentioned only here. For that very reason, in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, in the section on the enumeration of phenomena, restlessness, in other evil consciousnesses, not being explicitly stated in its own form, is mentioned only as an implied state. Only in this last consciousness it is explicitly stated in its own form, it should be understood. And because this pair of consciousnesses are the natural state of beings, by any effort or means, there is no need to produce them. At all times, like the life-continuum consciousness, not being pushed back, not sinking, it proceeds without difficulty or trouble. Therefore, considering that it is entirely unprompted, the distinction of prompting is not taken here, it should be understood. And for that very reason, in the Pāḷi text, unlike in the previous consciousnesses, the second clause "with prompting" is not stated here. This here is the ultimate exposition. [31] But in the Vibhāvanī, These two consciousnesses, due to extreme delusion and extreme agitation, in all cases, are free from attachment and aversion. Therefore, accompanied by equanimity. That is not good. For the association of equanimity with greed-rooted consciousnesses, which are accompanied by attachment, has been seen. [32] And what is said in the Great Commentary there: “And because there is no exceeding of their own nature, and no need for exertion, there is no division of formations for them.” Here, by “because there is no exceeding of their own nature,” it rejects their unprompted nature. By “because there is no need for exertion,” it rejects their prompted nature. And it shows that these two consciousnesses are entirely free from formations. That does not even agree with the commentaries. For in the Commentary on the Analysis of Dependent Origination, only the twofold nature of ignorance, by way of the division of formations, is stated. If these two were free from formations, then in this case, delusion would also be free from formations. And that is just ignorance, so a threefold nature of ignorance should have been stated there. But it is not stated. Thus, it does not agree with the commentaries. [33] And because here, the term “sharp nature” means the ability to arise solely by the power of natural conditions, without formations. And this consciousness arises in that very way. Therefore, it cannot be said that this is not sharp by nature. Because they are thoroughly deluded by delusion that has found opportunity, they should be called “mohamūhānī” (delusion-deluded), but by the rule of etymology, they are called “momūhānī.” 29. “Iccevanti” and so on is the great conclusion. There, “iccevanti” means “iti evaṃ” (thus, in this way). This is a collection of particles. The latter word “evaṃ” (thus) explains the meaning of the former word “iti” (thus). Or “iccevanti” is a single particle. In any case, the meaning to be understood is: “in the manner stated by ‘accompanied by joy’ and so on.” And this should be understood as an adjective for “twelve” here. “In any case” means: even in the way stated in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, it is twelve. Even in the way analyzed in the Vibhaṅga, it is twelve. Even in the way stated in the Dhātukathā and so on, it is twelve. Even in the way stated in those various suttas, it is twelve. Time, place, lineage, etc. Even by way of distinction, there are twelve. How are there twelve? Thus, it should be understood as twelve. [34] However, in the explanation: The mode of association, etc., mentioned below, is explained. And that is established by this "thus" itself. "Unwholesome states of mind" are minds that have thus obtained their name because their nature is contrary to wholesome states. And here, faith and so forth are exclusively called wholesome. Delusion and so forth are exclusively called unwholesome. But mind itself, like contact and so forth, is of an indifferent nature. For the knowing of an object is not exclusively blameworthy, like delusion and so forth, nor blameless, like faith and so forth. But when it is conjoined with unwholesome states, it is called unwholesome. When conjoined with wholesome states, it is called wholesome. But the contrary nature of faith and so forth, and delusion and so forth, should be understood respectively as that which eliminates and that which is to be eliminated. Unwholesome states are indeed weak. Like imitation gold, they are hollow, unworthy of cultivation. Even when repeatedly practiced, they merely waver and scatter. Even when they enter a fixed course, they enter it only in one existence, leading to a state of woe. They are not able to completely cut off the roots of wholesome states and make beings fixed in the stream of transmigration. But wholesome states are strong. Like pure gold, they are substantial, worthy of cultivation. When repeatedly practiced, they attain greater firmness. In the mundane, they are states of growth and development up to the performance of psychic powers; in the supramundane, up to the path of arahantship. When they enter a fixed course, they completely eradicate the stream of woe or the stream of transmigration, and enter into the portion of Nibbāna without remainder. Therefore, wholesome states are indeed called the eliminators. And the others are indeed called the eliminated, so it should be understood. Furthermore, wholesome states, even a mere gift of a morsel of alms food, are prescribed and performed by the wise for the elimination of unwholesome states, just like medicinal remedies in the world. Therefore, they are indeed the eliminators. But unwholesome states, like various kinds of diseases in the world,