English
" For an Arahant, however, both impulsion and apperceptional cognition are primary. Therefore, it is said, "The Arahant discerns the wholesome as impermanent, as suffering, as non-self." But it is not said, "When the functional indeterminate has ceased, resultant apperceptional cognition arises." If this were said, then apperceptional cognition would be made primary. Even without stating it, by "discerns," apperceptional cognition is also included. Therefore, what is said in the Paṭṭhāna: "Wholesome... arises," and "apperceptional cognition is stated only after wholesome and unwholesome [states], not after indeterminate [states]," and "if it exists, there is no reason for not stating it"—that is not appropriate. In the analyses of the contiguity condition, however, wholesome of rising, unwholesome, of rising, functional, of rising, and also, the aggregates that are vipāka-dhammas, of rising, and also, the aggregates that are neither vipāka nor non-vipāka dhammas, and so on, the place spoken of as "rising" for tadārammaṇa, together with bhavaṅga, immediately after functional javana, is indeed seen. Therefore, what was said, that the place spoken of as tadārammaṇa is never seen immediately after functional javana, that too is not fitting. Nor is it that the functional javana of an Arahant, who is tranquil in conduct, due to the six-limbed equanimity, is not expansive. Like wholesome javana, it too arises from gross bodily and verbal exertion. [135] But for clarification: What was said by the commentator in reply to the Tīkā-vāda, "If tadārammaṇa were said to occur immediately after indeterminate states, one might think its occurrence immediately after determining a limited object; therefore, tadārammaṇa is not said to occur immediately after functional javana," that is not good. For there is no such thing as something unsaid in the Paṭṭhāna, where if this were said, one might think that. Nor is there any connection with the five-door limited object section in the place spoken of in the manner of insight practice, such as "the Arahant discerns the wholesome as impermanent, as suffering, as non-self." Grief-accompanied, etc. Only equanimity-accompanied states arise. Not joy-accompanied states. Why? Because joy and grief are mutually contradictory. Therefore, in the Paṭṭhāna, their mutual immediate conditionality is not stated. And here, the Elder, by showing the rule of tadārammaṇa immediately following only functional javana and grief-accompanied javana, has shown that such a rule does not exist immediately after other wholesome and unwholesome javanas. Therefore, immediately after the eight sense-sphere wholesome javanas, the eight greed-rooted javanas, and the two delusion-rooted javanas— that is, eighteen javanas— all tadārammaṇas and bhavaṅgas occur according to the object. However, mostly, immediately after unwholesome javana, tadārammaṇa is rootless. Immediately after two-rooted javana... ṃ, only dvihetuka. After tihetuka javana, only tihetuka, this is the general rule. But for one for whom dvihetuka or tihetuka wholesome javanas occur frequently, sometimes, when unwholesome javanas have arisen, after the unwholesome, dvihetuka or tihetuka tadārammaṇas arise. For one for whom unwholesome javanas occur frequently, sometimes, when dvihetuka or tihetuka wholesome javanas have arisen, after the wholesome, ahetuka tadārammaṇas arise. This has been said in the Paṭṭhāna: "When ahetuka aggregates are seen as impermanent, .La. Domanassa arises. When wholesome and unwholesome have ceased, sahetuka vipāka, tadārammaṇatā, arises. Ahetuka vipāka, tadārammaṇatā, arises." For some tadārammaṇas, even though produced by one kamma that generated rebirth, they are of various kinds in various thought-processes. But regarding those produced by various kammas that generate vipāka in the course of life, there is nothing to say. Therefore, since there is no arising of somanassa after domanassa, therefore, for one whose rebirth is accompanied by somanassa, meaning, for a being whose rebirth was grasped by one of the four somanassa-accompanied great vipākas, the possibility of tadārammaṇa, the cause for the arising of tadārammaṇa, or indeed the arising of tadārammaṇa itself. Whatever, meaning, whatever among agreeable and disagreeable sense objects, like visual objects. Familiarized before, meaning, in this very existence, at moments prior to that moment, it has been frequently grasped, meaning, frequently practiced. A limited object, meaning, an object that is a limited phenomenon. Having taken as object, meaning, having relied upon. Upekkhāsahagata santīraṇa, meaning, among the two upekkhāsahagata santīraṇas, the wholesome vipāka in agreeable objects, the unwholesome vipāka in disagreeable objects, the upekkhāsahagata santīraṇa. But for those for whom the other four upekkhāsahagata vipākas naturally occur frequently, it should not be said that these do not become adventitious bhavangas. In the Commentary, however, according to the view of Mahādhammarakkhita Thera, by way of the general rule. Because they have fallen, corresponding to unwholesome impulsion, the two rootless equanimity investigating consciousnesses are said to be. Therefore, indeed, later, in the place where the Theravādins considered, showing that the view of that Theravādin who demonstrated only rootless resultant consciousness immediately after unwholesome impulsion was an incomplete view, it is said in the commentary: "When unwholesome impulsion arises in between wholesome impulsions, then, at the end of the unwholesome, just as at the end of the wholesome, resultant consciousness with roots is appropriate." And when resultant consciousness is appropriate, this too is indeed appropriate. Therefore, it should be understood that all six equanimity-accompanied resultant consciousnesses are indeed adventitious life-continuum. And here, for one reborn with equanimity, when generating displeasure towards extremely vast and manifest objects like the Buddha's form, etc., which are very desirable, there is no possibility of resultant consciousness. Thus, immediately after the displeasure impulsion, there is a fall into the life-continuum. But for one reborn with joy, when generating displeasure towards all six objects, whether desirable or undesirable, vast or not manifest, there is no possibility of resultant consciousness. And because there is no possibility of the root life-continuum, immediately after displeasure, one of the six equanimity-accompanied resultant consciousnesses arises appropriately as an adventitious life-continuum. Similarly, for that same person, when generating displeasure towards the six objects that are extremely desirable, extremely vast, and extremely manifest, or towards supramundane concepts. And here, because in the Abhidhamma, in the Analysis of Elements, it is said that "first is attention to all phenomena." And in the Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta: "Friend, when the inner eye is unimpaired, and external forms come into range, but there is no corresponding attention, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding consciousness-part. But, friend, when the inner eye is unimpaired, and external forms come into range, and there is corresponding attention, thus there is a manifestation of the corresponding consciousness-part. And, friend, the inner ear... (and so on for other senses). Abandonment. Tongue. Body. The mind is unimpaired. And external phenomena come into range. And there is no such conjunction. And so, the appearance of that part of consciousness does not yet occur. But, friend, when the internal mind is unimpaired. And external phenomena come into range. And there is such a conjunction. Thus, it is said, the appearance of that part of consciousness occurs. Therefore, process-thoughts do not arise without advertence. If by advertence, by nature or by time, whatever is adverted to with determination, they grasp that very thing. If, without determination, whatever is adverted to, they also grasp it in the same way as adverted. But it should be understood that in one advertence-process, all process-thoughts do not have different objects by advertence, or by each other, or by nature, or by time. Here it might be. If that adventitious bhavanga, in one process, at the beginning, without taking the object adverted to by advertence, arises taking some other previously familiar, minor object. If so, this would be called non-advertence. And with advertence etc., it would be called having a different object by nature and by time. True, but just as in the path-process, the gotrabhu and vodāna, and in the fruition-attainment process, the fruitions, and the fruition-consciousness of one emerging from cessation, are indeed without advertence and have different objects. So for this too, there is no fault in being without advertence and having different objects. And what is said here and there about the bhavanga in one existence being non-different from rebirth-linking by nature and by object. That too is said with reference to the root bhavanga. And this is an adventitious bhavanga, so there is no fault. "Tamanantaritvā" means making that adventitious bhavanga its immediate condition. The teachers say. But in the Pāli and the Great Commentary, this arrangement is not found, is the meaning. They desire that object only at the end of sense-sphere impulsion. Not in the exalted at the end of the highest impulsion. Why is that? Because only sense-sphere impulsions are agitated. And the others are not agitated. [136] But in the Vibhāvanī, the reason given is: “Because it is produced by kamma rooted in sense-craving.” That is not a reason. Moreover, the exalted and highest impulsions, excluding supernormal knowledge, have unlimited objects. But their resultant objects are limited objects. So there is no possibility of the arising of resultant objects at their end. And some impulsions of supernormal knowledge,