English
Having reached the distinction of elements, the diversity of elements is considered. Mental element is stated separately, making "thinking" distinct from "knowing." But having reached the distinction of consciousness, whatever thinking is included in knowing, is said to be eye-consciousness, etc., the six consciousnesses. The six thought-processes, which are occurrences at the doors, are to be connected with the occurrences of consciousness. The thought-process occurring at the eye-door is the eye-door thought-process. The meaning is: the series of consciousness occurring due to the modification of the eye-door. Similarly in the rest. The thought-process characterized by the unique eye-consciousness is the eye-consciousness thought-process. But the pure series of mind-consciousness is the mind-consciousness thought-process. In the Vibhāvanī, however, it is said, "The thought-process connected with eye-consciousness, because of its co-occurrence with it, having the same object and the same door, is the eye-consciousness thought-process." "Occurring at the doors" means arisen at the doors. The meaning is: arisen due to that particular door's modification. "Occurrences of consciousness" means series of consciousness. "Very great" is a nominative singular in the sense of the genitive. The occurrence of a very great five-object, etc., the occurrence of a very minute five-object, is fourfold at the five doors. But at the mind-door, the occurrence of a clear six-object, and the occurrence of an unclear six-object. The occurrence of objects should be understood as twofold and sixfold, this is the connection. Here, the state of being extremely great, etc., should be understood, either by light and other conditions, or by the object being extremely great, etc. Therein, even subtle and minute, even distant, the supporting object of forms, when light and conditions are complete, is indeed extremely great. Thus indeed, at the Buddha's first going forth, at the miracle of revealing the world, they see, remaining here, even subtle, minute, and distant forms, even in Avīci hell, even in Akaniṭṭha heaven, even in other world-systems. At that time, a magnificent light appeared. By means of that, all earth, Sineru, world-systems, mountain ranges, become like masses of pure crystal. "A great, magnificent light appeared, surpassing the devas' divine power," thus it is said. But for devas and brahmas by rebirth, who are the basis of clarity, even by the arising of light, earth, mountains, etc., cannot make an obstruction for eye-forms, etc. Similarly, even distant forms like mountains, by the object's extreme greatness, and forms like moon, sun, stars, by the sense object's greatness, and by the arising of light, are indeed extremely great. But for light and other conditions, and for supporting objects, the state of being great, etc., should be stated in the order of weak, weaker, weakest. But those five objects, having passed one mind-moment, come into range, those are called extremely great objects. Those having passed two or three mind-moments, those are great objects. Those having passed four, five, six, seven, eight, nine mind-moments, those are small objects. But those which, having passed ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen mind-moments, come into range, those are extremely small objects. And the aspect is that which has passed one mind-moment, etc. "Vibhūtassa" means manifest, "Avibhūtassa" means unmanifest. Thus, having described the six sixes in their own nature, now, having combined them all, expanding on the occurrence of thought-processes... Having asked "how?", to show the duration of formations and non-formations, it is said "arising, standing," and so on. There, "how?" means, "in what way does the process of thought-moments occur?" [118] In the Vibhāvanī, however, it is said, "Having asked, 'how?', 'in what way does the determination of the object occur, in terms of being very great and so on?', to explain that by means of thought-moments, 'arising, standing,' and so on, was begun." That does not seem appropriate. For if it were so, there would be no place for the five groups of six, beginning from the first. Nor could it be understood that "arising, standing, etc., the life-span of material phenomena," was said only for the purpose of determining the object. Arising is uppāda, meaning the attainment of its own nature. Standing is ṭhiti, meaning the non-cessation of the nature as it has been attained. Breaking is bhaṅga, meaning its decay and disappearance. A single thought-moment is the moment of a single thought. That moment, however, should be understood as one hundred thousand ten millionth part of the moment of a finger-snap or the moment of an eye-blink. For it is said in the commentary that "in the moment of a finger-snap, hundreds of thousands of ten millions of feelings arise." According to the opinion of the Elder Ācariya Ānanda, here, a moment of two parts, in terms of arising and breaking, is called a single thought-moment. Just as in the world, lightning, immediately after its appearance, breaks. There is no distinct standing between its appearance and its breaking. And just as a clod of earth, thrown straight upwards, rises and falls. There is no distinct standing between its rising and its falling. So too is thought. For it also falls into the phase of dissolution immediately after the phase of origination. There is no distinct, countable standing phase found between these two phases, as there is for material phenomena. And having done so, in the Yamakas, the arising and breaking of thought are mentioned here and there. Especially in the Citta-yamaka, "arisen, arising." Arisen at the moment of breaking. But not arising. At the moment of arising. Here, arisen and arising, only the arising and ceasing of consciousness are spoken of. And in the Kathāvatthu, "Does one consciousness last a day?" "Yes." Half a day is the moment of arising. Half a day is the moment of ceasing. This should not be said. "Does one consciousness last two days?" "Yes." One day is the moment of arising. One day is the moment of ceasing. This should not be said. "Does one consciousness last four days?" "Yes." Two days are the moment of arising. Two days are the moment of ceasing. This should not be said. Similarly, a month, two months, four months. Similarly, a year, two years, four years. Similarly, an eon, two eons, four eons, etc. Only the two parts of arising and ceasing are spoken of for consciousness. Not the abiding part. If that were separately apprehended. "Does one consciousness last a day?" "Yes." The first part of the day is the moment of arising. The second is the moment of abiding. The third is the moment of ceasing. Thus, it would have been considered by the Great Elder. Three days, three months, three years, three eons. These too would be objectionable. Here, it might be said: "Are there not, monks, in the suttas, these three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned?" "Which three? Arising is discerned. Ceasing is discerned. The alteration of what has abided is discerned," it is said. Similarly, for feeling: arising is discerned, ceasing is discerned, the alteration of what has abided is discerned. For perception. For formations. For consciousness: arising, etc., is discerned, it is said. Therefore, the third part of consciousness, the abiding part, is indeed separately apprehended. No. Because only continuity-abiding is spoken of there. If it is asked, "How is it understood?" Because, having first spoken of arising and ceasing, then again, "the alteration of what has abided is discerned" is spoken of separately. Otherwise, it would have been said: "Arising is discerned. The alteration of what has abided is discerned. Ceasing is discerned." Is not continuity-abiding a concept? And that is unconditioned. And the suttas concern the characteristics of the conditioned. Therefore, if it is said that the continuous duration is mentioned there, and thus cannot be understood. No, it can be understood. Even in the Abhidhamma, in the descriptions of conditioned phenomena, descriptions are seen through groups, shapes, continuities, and concepts. Thus, in the descriptions of the sense-sphere of form, etc., by "long, short, fine, coarse, round, circular, square, hexagonal, octagonal, sixteen-sided, hollow, solid," and so on, and in the Vibhaṅga, by "hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth," and so on, conditioned phenomena are described by way of concepts. In the Suttas, there is no need to say. For in such places, even a teaching that proceeds by way of concept stands by referring to conditioned phenomena themselves. Therefore, just as for arising and passing away, each a single moment of consciousness is obtained, not so for duration. This is the meaning of the teacher Ānanda's statement. And this view is found in the Saṃyutta Commentary itself. But it is rejected by the compiler. For it is said there: "Others, however, say: 'The moment of decay of immaterial phenomena cannot be designated.' But the Perfectly Enlightened One, saying, 'The arising of feeling is evident, the passing away is evident, the alteration of what has endured is evident,' designates three characteristics even for immaterial phenomena. Saying that these are obtained by taking the moment of existence, they prove that meaning with this verse of the teacher: 'The existence of all phenomena is called duration; Its dissolution is death; Always for all beings.' Or they say, 'Duration should be understood by way of continuity.' But in this Sutta, there is no such distinction. Therefore, without rejecting the Sutta with the teacher's verse, the Sutta itself should be made the authority." There, the moment of decay is said to be the moment of duration, which is a distinct field for decay, between the moment of arising and the moment of passing away. Alteration is decay itself.