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And that specific meaning will become clear later. This is the ultimate meaning explanation here. But in the Vibhāvanī, Not having properly understood this meaning, what was said: "If 'associated with mind' is intended merely by simultaneous arising, then even material phenomena arising together with the mind would become 'associated with mind'— this is the acceptance of one cessation. Even so, the implication of the two kinds of intimation that follow the mind cannot be avoided. Likewise, for one who conceives 'simultaneous arising and cessation' as 'these have either simultaneous arising or cessation,' there is the acceptance of one object even for material phenomena that arise earlier and cease at the moment of the mind's dissolution. To show that 'those which have these three characteristics are necessarily of one basis'— this is the acceptance of one basis. Enough of this excessive elaboration!" All that is indeed meaningless. 69. And having asked, "How are there fifty-two?" first showing the nature of the fifty-two by dividing them into three groups, (he begins with) "How..." Well. There, it touches, thus it is contact. Associated phenomena touch by this, thus it is contact. Or, it is merely touching, thus it is contact. And here, touching should be seen as the grasping of the agreeable or disagreeable flavor of the object, by striking and impinging. From which, feeling arises, experiencing that. For it is said: "Feeling is conditioned by contact." This is characterized by touching. But is this not an immaterial phenomenon? And immaterial phenomena, being non-impinging in nature, do not touch anything. True, but this touching occurs in a certain way. And what is to be accomplished by those that touch, that function it accomplishes. Therefore, it is called contact, and characterized by touching. But what does it accomplish? The mind's modification according to the flavor of the object. Or the arising of specific feelings. And this meaning is evident in the salivation, etc., of another upon seeing sour food, etc. [73] In the Vibhāvanī, however, it is said: "It should be seen like the arising of saliva, etc." If so, this might be merely an analogy. But it should be seen as an illustration of the very evident occurrence of contact. 70. It feels, thus it is feeling. It experiences the flavor of the object. Or, it makes the unknown flavor of the object known and evident to its associated phenomena or to the individual endowed with it— this is the meaning. Or, beings find by this, they obtain pleasure or displeasure, thus it is feeling. Or, it is merely feeling, thus it is feeling. But in the Pāli (canon) – "It feels, it feels, monks, therefore it is called feeling." "And what does it feel? It feels pleasure. It feels pain. It feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure," it is said. But are not all mental and mental concomitant phenomena of the nature of experiencing the object's flavor, so they too would be called feeling? They would not be. They are engaged in other functions. They cannot directly experience the object's flavor. While performing their own respective functions, they experience it only partially. But feeling, due to having no other function and being pre-eminent in the function of experiencing, experiences as a master, therefore it alone is fit to be called feeling. And thus... having made the royal chief meal, in the experience of tastes, their similarity to a cook, and in feeling, their similarity to a king, is said. 71. It cognizes, thus it is cognition. It means it makes a sign for knowing again. Indeed, this, even at the time of cognizing with a previously grasped sign, makes a sign for knowing again. And this, by repeatedly making a sign in this way, arising, attains the state of firm cognition, and even reaching the end of life, and even reaching another existence, accomplishes the non-forgetfulness of beings. And by attaining the state of wrong adherence cognition, it makes these beings unteachable even by omniscient Buddhas. Thus, it is said to be like a carpenter in making a sign for cognizing again. And like a blind elephant-viewer in adhering according to the grasped sign. And like a deer fawn among grass men in grasping the present object. In the Pāḷi, however— “It cognizes, it cognizes, O monks, therefore it is called cognition. What does it cognize? It cognizes blue. It cognizes yellow,” and so on, is said. 72. It intends, thus it is intention. It means it repeatedly directs, repeatedly strives, the associated phenomena towards that particular object or function, making them continuously proceed in a connected manner there. Or it plans them. It arranges or prepares for the acquisition of an object or the accomplishment of an action. Or it gathers them. It means it collects them on the object, making them proceed together as one. Thus, it is said to have the characteristic of gathering and the manifestation of arranging. For when it proceeds continuously with zeal and activity, its associates, performing their respective functions, also proceed in the same way there. Therefore, it is said to be like a chief disciple, a great carpenter, and so on, who accomplishes its own tasks and the tasks of others. [74] In the Vibhāvanī, however, Having said, “It intends, it engages in activity for the formation of the conditioned,” what is said to accomplish that meaning, “In the Vibhaṅga, in the Suttanta division, the aggregate of formations is divided…” saying, "They are called 'formations' because they form what is formed." This is not appropriate. For in the Suttanta-bhājanīya of the Vibhaṅga, it is not said, "They are called 'formations' because they form what is formed." But it is said in the Khandhasaṃyutta. 73. That which has a single object as its excellent part or apex is called one-pointed (ekagga). It is the mind, and its state is one-pointedness (ekaggatā). For an object, though one, can have various aspects. Therefore, the mind, even when it is fixed on one aspect of that single object without being distracted by its various aspects, even for a moment, has a steady, unwavering nature. This is taken as the reason for the application of the term 'one-pointed' and the concept of one-pointedness to it. Indeed, it is said that it is to be seen as the stability of the mind, like the steady flame of a lamp in a windless place. [75] But in the Vibhāvanī, it is said, "That which has a single object as its excellent part is one-pointed." There too, the word 'agga' (excellent part) is appropriately used in the sense of a part or an apex. Some, however, say it refers to the object. That is not good. For the word 'agga' is nowhere seen as a synonym for 'object'. 74. That by which associated phenomena live is called life (jīvita). 'Inda' means lord. Here, however, it refers to the state of being a lord. That which causes the state of being a lord is an faculty (indriya). It is both life and a faculty, hence the life-faculty (jīvitindriya). For without me, your life does not exist. Therefore, it acts as if saying, "Make me your lord in the matter of your living," dominating the co-arisen phenomena. Thus, it is said to be the sovereignty over the continuous flow and like water that sustains lotuses and water lilies. Here, the continuity of consciousness that flows without interruption until the complete cessation of the aggregates is called the 'continuous flow' (pavattasantati). The state of being a lord is 'sovereignty' (ādhipateyya). The compound means 'sovereignty in the continuous flow'. For even though the continuum of consciousness repeatedly ceases, by its power, it repeatedly comes to life and continues to flow until the complete cessation of the aggregates. For in things devoid of life, in phenomena not bound by a faculty, From the beginning there is a special quality in the continuous flow of becoming. 75. Making the mind not empty of an object, or making the mind constantly inclined towards an object, is attention. It is of three kinds: the pathway-initiator, the impulsion-initiator, the object-initiator. Among these, the five-door adverting is called the pathway-initiator. For it leads and connects the five-door mind-continuum to the object. The mind-door adverting is called the impulsion-initiator. It also leads and connects the impulsion-continuum to the object. This very pair is called, in various places, wise attention and unwise attention. For it, by nature, being supported by factors such as habitual inclination and regulation, makes the mind-stream wisely or unwisely inclined towards the object. But from the rebirth-consciousness onwards, the continuously flowing mind-continuum, even after letting go of the object and ceasing, arises again by the power of which phenomenon, in that very object, if there is no special cause. That is called the object-initiator. This is what is intended here. For this leads and connects the object to the mind, or the mind to the object. Thus indeed, it is said to have the characteristic of guiding, and the function of connecting the associated states with the object. And in the sense of initiating the object, it is said to be like a charioteer for the associated states. There, "characteristic of guiding" means the characteristic of making the associated phenomena proceed straight towards the object, like a charioteer for horses. They hold equally, thus they are common. Common to all minds, common to all minds. 76. It thinks, it applies, thus it is initial application. Having resolved in various ways, it means it ascends to the object. But when it thus ascends, the associated phenomena also ascend to it. Then it itself is said to be placing them onto the object; therefore, initial application is said to have the characteristic of placing onto the object. Relying on a king's favorite, the villagers ascending to the king's palace is an example here. For even a mind without initial application (is associated with) phenomena