English
Nibbāna is merely the destruction of defilements, and therefore, in those various discourses and Abhidhamma teachings, it is said in the manner of 'the destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred'?" No, because of the unity of Arahantship and Nibbāna. For Arahantship too, "That, friend, which is the destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion, this is called Arahantship," having arisen at the end of the destruction of lust, etc., Arahantship is conventionally called the state of the destruction of lust, etc. Likewise, Nibbāna should be understood as being spoken of as the state of the destruction of lust, etc., because it is the cause of the destruction of lust, etc. Otherwise, the multiplicity of Nibbāna... It would follow that the destruction of many defilements, such as lust, would also entail the destruction of many things. And since the destruction of all defilements is a single event, the destruction of all defilements would occur with the first path, when wrong view and other defilements are destroyed. And its grossness would be evident, since even animals manifestly experience the destruction of lust that has arisen, leading to the attainment of Nibbāna. And even in the moment of change of lineage, there is destruction of lust and other defilements, since the change of lineage has Nibbāna as its object. But the path would not have Nibbāna as its object. For the path does not arise in relation to the destruction of defilements that are being destroyed by itself. And its non-existence would follow, since the non-existence that is the destruction of lust and other defilements is a void, being on the side of conditionality. And since that too is either existent or non-existent, the characteristic of seclusion would not exist, and its conditioned nature would exist. For something that is sometimes perceived cannot be unconditioned, since it would follow that everything is without cause. And even if it were conditioned, it would not be Nibbāna, since it would be characterized by suffering, being associated with arising, aging, and dissolution. And thus, there would also be non-existence of non-existence, and instability, with the lust and other defilements of those who are depleted arising again, since the non-existence of those very defilements has perished. Moreover, if lust and other defilements arise due to another cause, there is no loss. For the arising of one thing does not mean that another thing disappears. If you say, "Non-existence is the opposite of existence, and in the presence of an opposite, the other disappears," what is this disappearance? If that too is a form of existence, it would have the same faults, and there would be instability, and no purpose would be achieved. If it is a void, why go far to embrace what was already embraced as a void from the beginning? Therefore, Nibbāna, which is the destruction of lust and other defilements, is a void, a non-existence, and non-existence is not Nibbāna. There would be attainment of Nibbāna through the non-existence of past and future faults, and the non-existence of present faults is called non-existence. Non-existence is not merely the cessation of defilements, but rather in the sense of non-arising. If you say, "Complete cessation is also accomplished by Nibbāna," no, because it is a cause. If you say, "Insight is the cause," no, without seeing the conditioned phenomena that generate notions of self and other things, From the arising of insight, which is the first thought. For if it were to arise, all beings would be liberated, and would never ask questions, due to the absence of seeing contradictory things. For thought does not arise without seeing, and the seeing of form, etc., which gives rise to the thought of self, does not give rise to the thought that contradicts it. If it is said that in the Buddhas, the thought of insight arises in form, etc., through a succession of teachings? No, because even in them, insight thought does not arise due to the absence of seeing contradictory things. For the kind of effect that arises from a certain combination of causes, the opposite of that does not arise from the same combination, because that would lead to causelessness. And because of the absence of seeing contradictory things, the succession of those who lack the ability to generate insight thought and their teachings are possible. But for the Buddhas, the realization of Nibbāna is accomplished immediately after teaching the three characteristics, and therefore the complete abandonment of defilements and the ability to teach insight are accomplished, so Nibbāna itself should be understood as the cause of both, and not anything else. But why is it that by seeing Nibbāna, there is complete abandonment of greed, etc., and the three characteristics are seen? For is it reasonable that by seeing one thing, the abandonment of greed and the knowledge of the three characteristics of another thing occur? No, because by seeing the unconditioned, the conditioned or the fault becomes clear. For those who have seen ultimate happiness, the notion of happiness in the happiness of the round, and in its dependent objects, etc., and delight in the round are abandoned, just as the liking and delight in a part of the boat are abandoned by a navigator who has seen the far shore. Moreover, greed, etc., which cling to conditioned things, cannot stand in the unconditioned, like flies in a fire mass, or aquatic creatures on land. For the mind of one whose fault is abandoned by seeing Nibbāna, the seeing of the three characteristics in those conditioned things as they really are is possible, just as the seeing of forms such as pots is possible for the eye whose cataract defect has been removed by applying medicine, and in those conditioned things whose faults have been seen, the arising of greed, etc., does not occur again, it is known. It should be understood as a cleansing with good intention. But why is the realization of Nibbāna possible for some beings, and not for all? Because it depends on the unbroken lineage of the Buddhas' teachings, and the absence of those teachers everywhere and at all times, and the extreme rarity of the opportune moment for listeners, and the infinity of world-systems. Therefore, it should be understood that only some, at the time of a Buddha's arising, realize Nibbāna by receiving the teaching of the three characteristics, not all. How is the complete cessation of defilements such as lust achieved through Nibbāna here? Not through the past and future ones, as they are now non-existent, and because it existed before, but through the cessation of the present ones. And how can Nibbāna, being an empty phenomenon, prevent the occurrence of the aforementioned faults? No, because it is a real phenomenon. For, through the practice of the preliminary path, the path arising in relation to Nibbāna, by way of not generating latent tendencies, is itself the non-arising and cessation of defilements, due to its non-arising in the future, just as the potential for sprouting is absent in a stalk of rice that has arisen in the presence of fire, due to the non-arising of sprouts. For there is no such thing as non-existence in the ultimate sense that is generated by a cause, but rather the arising of a state that is opposed to it, just as the non-arising of a heap is produced by the arising of many moments. Therefore, Nibbāna is spoken of as "the complete fading away and cessation" etc., because of the supporting condition of the Noble Path, which is the non-arising and cessation of defilements, by way of transference of the supporting condition. Why is it not spoken of in its own form? Because of its extreme subtlety and because it has never been experienced before. And its subtlety should be understood from the Blessed One's statement of non-attachment, and because it is to be seen with the Noble Eye. Here, however, an opponent says: "Nibbāna simply does not exist, because it cannot be experienced." It is not that it cannot be experienced, because it is established. For it is experienced by the Noble Ones through practice that is in accordance with it. Moreover, it should not be said that Nibbāna does not exist, because if all beings have conflicting qualities, there would be no possibility of liberation. And that is not fitting, since, like cold, etc., are the opposite of heat, etc., Nibbāna, as the opposite of becoming, is also necessarily existent. And it was said: "Just as when there is heat, there also exists coolness; So too, when the three kinds of fire exist, Nibbāna should be desired." (Buddhavamsa 2.11) – And so on. And because the instruction on insight is for the purpose of the complete cessation, Nibbāna certainly exists, since without it that is impossible, so this meaning has been stated. But if this is so, because of the absence of a first beginning, there is no origination, and therefore no aging or death, and it is permanent; and if even atoms, etc., become permanent, is Nibbāna alone permanent? No, because the characteristic of a cause is not applicable due to the difference in locus. But if even atoms, etc., are unconditioned? No, because the unconditioned is not established, and because the unconditioned cannot be multiple. For if there were such a thing as the unconditioned, it would have to be one, since difference of place, time, and nature is a cause of difference, and if things of different natures were without a cause, there would be an extreme consequence. But how can Nibbāna, which is different in nature from conditioned things, be without a cause? Because, being of an unconditioned nature, it is independent of causes, being different from conditioned natures.