English
If in the commentary, in "that phenomenon which is a phenomenon that helps in the sense of a root," and so on, the power of the phenomenon is explained by the phenomenon, then why here is only the power of the phenomenon explained by "being a condition by way of cause"? Having considered this objection, it is said, "And here too... (etc.)... shows." And here, the explanation of the power of the phenomenon cannot be denied, showing this, he says, "For not..." and so on. "Attho" means "it has meaning," meaning "a word that expresses meaning." It is said, "the meaning of 'eti' (goes) is 'vattati' (occurs)," therefore, "attho" means "a word of meaning." Therefore, he says, "And that is a common word for origination and subsistence." "Tañca" (and that) refers back to the word "vattati." Or, the meaning of "eti" is "attho," meaning the action of occurring in "vattati" (occurs). "Tañca" (and that) refers to that occurring. And in "a common word in this meaning," the word "vacana" (word) should be understood as a synonym for "attha" (meaning), because it is "said." Lest someone should suspect that if it is a condition for origination, it is also a condition for subsistence, to dispel that suspicion, it is said, "For some... (etc.)... causes and so on." And here, just as the origination of those capable of originating, Indeed, when there is a condition, there is arising, not when there is no condition. Thus, for those things that exist, their existence is due to the condition of existence, just as for co-arisen phenomena, it is due to the life faculty. This should be understood. As for those who reject the existence of formless phenomena, what needs to be said has already been stated below. Just as the word "hetu" (cause) is an instrumental derivation meaning "that which stands firm," so too is an instrumental derivation meaning "that which brings forth" appropriate, thus it says "hinoti" (it sends forth) and so on. From statements like "Greed is the origin of actions, of their arising," the causal nature of causes for actions should be understood. By "this" (etena) means by the statement of the attainment of wholesome nature by a condition other than the causal condition. Some teachers. By "by its own nature" (sabhāvatova) means just as for a lamp illuminating other forms, there is no need for another illuminator of forms, because it is by its own nature an illuminator, so too for causes that establish the wholesome nature of others, there is no need for another establisher of wholesome nature, because they are by their own nature wholesome. This is what it shows. The wholesome nature of non-greed and so on is not established by its own nature, because it has a dual nature, like the contacts and so on associated with it. This meaning is shown by "yasmā pana" (but since) and so on. That wholesomeness and so on, however, is dependent on others. No phenomenon does not exist: Among the six kinds of phenomena, divided into form and so on, conditioned, unconditioned, and conceptual, no phenomenon whatsoever is not an object condition. This nature of being an object condition has already been stated below in the commentary on the analysis of elements. "Purimābhisaṅkhārūpanissayaṃ" (relying on previous volitional formations) means the reliance, called mental volitional formation, previously established in the manner stated by "chandavato" (one who has desire) and so on. "Citteti" (in the mind): This designation should be understood as referring to the mind as the head. For it is not the mind alone that is thus volitionally formed, but also the phenomena associated with it. "Sādhayamānā" (bringing about, mastering) means bringing under control. And bringing under control here means conforming to that nature. For when desires and so on are inferior, middling, or excellent, their associated phenomena also proceed accordingly. Therefore, it says, "because of their following it in its inferior and so on nature." By "tena" (by that) means by bringing it under one's control. or by acting according to their will. By them, desire and so on, are conditions of predominance, because they arise as masters of themselves. The object to be esteemed is a lofty dhamma, a desirable dhamma, and so on. "Arising immediately after that" means arising immediately after that very mind. "Possessing a special quality due to those respective assisting conditions" means having attained a special quality, namely, the capacity to produce it, due to those respective assisting conditions, such as the object. "By that very same" means by that very same capacity to bloom when the veil is removed, which was present when the veil was taken away. It is said that "a special meaning arises even by the force of a prefix," meaning "a differentiation from the mere meaning of the word." "From the meaning of what is to be spoken" means from the meaning of the state of being. For even the state of being, being knowable according to the grasp of the word, is called "what is to be spoken." "Due to the absence of an interval between cessation and arising" means due to the absence of anything that separates the former cessation and the latter arising. "The capacity to arise without interruption" by this, the theory of simultaneous arising of cessations with cessation is refuted. For if there were simultaneity, there would be no doubt of separation, due to the absence of a fixed position. The construction is: "as if bringing oneself to unity," due to the absence of division, "this is below, above, and across." For by the absence of a fixed position, which is characterized by non-resistance, the absence of division, and by that, the bringing to unity, establishes perfect immediacy; but by the absence of co-existence, it is an immediate arising. "It is made by knowledge from division" is "form," the difference in the arising of phenomena. The construction is: "due to the immediacy of cessation and arising of the attainments of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception." "Former passing away" means the passing away before the arising of the non-percipient beings. If there is no interval of time, how is this statement, "having attained cessation for seven days, and having passed over five hundred aeons," made? He says, "For they... (etc.) ...would be said." But do not their material continuities continue in between? Referring to this question, he says, "And not... (etc.) ...because they are other continuities." If so, they should also be mutually beneficial, like other distinct continuities. Regarding the food, it was said: “Form and formless… …they are.” By this, it shows: Even if form and formless phenomena existing in one person occur with a special mutual helpfulness, yet, because of their dissimilar nature, existing as separate continuities, they are not obstructors, as they are not mutually included in terms of continuity. Thus it was said: “mutually disjoined, unmixed.” And a helper can exist even for those with completely distinct continuities, so it does not mean a non-division of continuities; thus, their non-obstructiveness should be understood even more. Just as the uninterruptedness of citta-arisings of the same kind is clearly evident as being immediately subsequent, not so for those of dissimilar kinds— with this intention, it was said: “like a javana immediately after a javana, like a bhavaṅga immediately after a bhavaṅga.” “Paccaya-state here”— here, the word “ca” (and) is contrastive. It illuminates the specific characteristic by which the moment of arising exists here. “Of anantara-paccaya and so on”— by the word “and so on,” it includes samanantara-paccaya. “Prior and posterior states, or arising and ceasing that are dependent on them, a demarcation of beginning and end”— the meaning is: “of those encompassed by that, included in the three moments.” Therefore, it says: “for those not obtaining the statement ‘it arises’.” For, one endowed with the moment of arising is called “it arises.” Thus it was said: “at the moment of arising, it is arising, but not arisen; at the moment of dissolution, it is arisen, but not arising” (Yama. 2.cittayamaka.81). That is, the anantara-ādi-paccaya-state. “Undemarcated”— without demarcation in terms of time. “Because”— because of the absence of demarcation in terms of beginning and end. “For that very reason”— because phenomena are grasped only by being demarcated in terms of time. “Evident by the paccaya-state of arising”— this is an illustration of its illustrative nature. For, an illustration is established. “Paccaya-uppanna”— meaning, produced by the paccaya, those that are their own results. “By co-arisen state”— by the state of having arisen together. “Of phenomena co-arisen with oneself.” Indeed, helpfulness by way of co-arising is co-nascence conditionality. Therefore, their helpfulness should be understood even at the moment of persistence. Thus, the example "like a lamp for light" is very fitting. For a lamp is a condition even for the persistence of light. By "only by way of mutuality," it shows the absence of confusion of characteristics, that mere helpfulness of one's own helper by way of co-nascence, etc., is not mutuality conditionality, but rather by way of being a mutual condition; not the occurrence of mutuality conditionality without co-nascence, etc., conditions. Therefore, it is said, "not by way of co-nascence, etc." Although mutuality conditionality does not occur without co-nascence, etc., conditions, co-nascence, etc., conditions, however, do occur without it. Thus, showing the occurrence of mutuality conditionality in a way devoid of co-nascence, etc., having said "co-nascence, etc. ... does not occur," to make that very meaning clearer, it says, "nor pre-nascence, etc. ... do occur." And by "co-nascence, etc.," the inclusion of support, presence, non-disappearance, etc., should be understood by the word "etc." It is said, "the earth element for the other elements