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B030305Pañcapakaraṇa anuṭīkā(five treatises supplementary commentary)

English

Therefore, they are included in the aggregate of mental formations through the function of conditioning conditioned things. Thus it is said, "conditioned... akin." And by this, the non-exclusive ultimate function of the aggregate of mental formations should be understood. Similarly, "of two kinds" means that, as stated, they are of two types due to their arising, etc., as material and immaterial phenomena. "By that" means by the aforementioned similarity. "By those aggregates, etc." means by the aggregate of form, the aggregate of mental formations, the sense-base of phenomena, and the element of phenomena. The explanation of the terms of inclusion and non-inclusion in the first method is finished. 2. Second Method: Explanation of the Term "Included and Not Included" 171. In "Included and Not Included," the words "included" and "not included" should not be taken as referring to different subjects, as they are intended to be a qualifier and a qualified. For the phenomenon that is characterized by the quality of being included and was mentioned below as "not included," it is that very phenomenon that is asked about and answered in terms of its "not included" aspect. This is shown by the statement, "That which... showing that very thing." The phenomena that are included by the eye-sense-base through the aggregate-inclusion, and not included by the sense-base and element-inclusion, are again asked about and answered in terms of their non-inclusion by the aggregates, etc. Thus it is said, "by the eye-sense-base... said." "Everywhere" means in all methods and turns. Kh Of the generalities of the collections of aggregates and so on, of the collections of aggregates and so on, spoken of without distinction, by "by the collection of aggregates" and so on. He says, "The illumination of generality stands in particularity," because "it always looks to particularity." It is said that questions and answers are for the understanding of particularity, "because questions and answers depend on distinction." The enumeration of aggregates and so on is with particularity. Even though spoken of without distinction by "by the collection of aggregates" and so on, the enumeration of aggregates and so on is with particularity, by the form aggregate and so on. The meaning is collection by aggregates and so on. Pure means complete, without remainder. It is said to be of the nature of generality. Therein, in the second method as stated. Because it is specifically indicated by the illumination of generality, he says, "collected... and so on... determined." In the three collections, that is, in the three collections of aggregates and so on. By others, that is, by the remaining two or by one. They should be shown by this much, for by that much, the state of being collected or not collected is revealed. Of those dhammas spoken of as being collected or not collected. Of such kinds, of those whose particulars are not determined by "the eye base, the ear base" and so on. Impossibility, because it is impossible to indicate in the manner stated. The mere showing of the method of collection and so on is the function of the matrix of methods. But where there are collections and so on, those aggregates and so on, and wholesome states and so on, are their objects. Thus, without them, there is no occurrence of collections and so on. Therefore he says, "because the matrix of methods looks to the internal and external matrices." It should be said: that which collects and that which does not collect. For the dhamma which is spoken of here as a collector is also spoken of as a non-collector. "Which dhammas are collected by the collection of aggregates, but not collected by the collection of bases and elements?" "And which dhammas are not collected by the collection of aggregates, but collected by the collection of bases and elements?" where there is no determination of the particular dhammas to be questioned and answered, there, in the first method and the sixth method, "By how many aggregates is the form aggregate collected? By one aggregate." (Dhatu. 6), "By how many aggregates is the form aggregate... Is it conjoined with them? No. It is disjoined from the four aggregates. And thus it should be asked and answered. In the others, that is, in the second and subsequent methods. Of each, that is, whatever is to be asked and answered, which is defined in an unspecified way as "those phenomena," of each of those, "these phenomena" in a definitive sense. Here, that is, in this treatise. By whatever, by the eye-base and so on, as a collector. In the collections of aggregates and so on, that is, in the collections of aggregates, bases, and elements. By that, that is, by the collection of aggregates and so on. Other, that is, other than that collector. Whatever class of phenomena, to be collected or not to be collected, is disjoined from it, that very thing is extracted as "those phenomena which are collected by the eye-base in the aggregate collection, are not collected in the base and element collections," in the manner of collector and non-collector. There is no other phenomenon of its own kind, because there is no such collector. But it might be that there is a collection by a part of its own kind, rejecting that, it says, "nor is that... etc. ...it is." And by "whatever" and so on, it resolves the intervening statement. And by "if" and so on, it clarifies the absence of collection of that by that, by showing the absence of the text. There, "that very one," that is, the aggregate of form and so on, which is stated as a collector, that very one would be collected by that aggregate of form and so on, it would be collectable. Showing the characteristic of the absence of its collection by that very one, it says, "for that very one is not its own kind or a different kind." Like the eye-bases and so on are parts of the whole, of the aggregate of form and so on. The aggregate of form is neither a collector nor a non-collector of the eye-bases and so on, because there is no state of being its own kind or a different kind. This method applies to the rest as well. By "those included in the whole" and so on, it makes the meaning already stated clearer. There, by which, that is, by division. Those, that is, the parts. Of those, that is, of the parts. Here, it should be understood that there is no division because of being included in it, there is no state of being its own kind or a different kind because there is no division, and therefore there is no state of being a collector or a non-collector. Just as in every respect, by every respect, its own kind Because of the absence of a similar part, a collection of individual parts is neither inclusive nor non-inclusive. Thus, showing the similar and dissimilar individual parts, it says, "likewise," and so on. There, "just as," and so on, clarifies the meaning previously stated by showing an example. It is to be connected as: "inclusive and non-inclusive by the aggregate collection." Likewise in the remaining cases. For indeed, an individual part… …is dissimilar, by which a collection would be inclusive or non-inclusive— this is the intention. And here, assuming the question in mind: "Let inclusiveness not be, but why is non-inclusiveness rejected?" it says, "therefore," and so on. There, "therefore" refers to the meaning already stated as a reason. It is to be connected as: "even if there is non-inclusiveness of something other than oneself, of something other than what is included in oneself, of something other than a similar part of oneself." And this is said with reference to the three types stated by "the aggregate of form is neither included nor not included by the aggregate of form," and so on. That these have no inclusiveness— for these, namely, oneself, what is included in oneself, and a similar part of oneself, there is no state of inclusiveness because of the absence of similarity. Therefore it is said, "for indeed, that itself is not similar to that," and so on. "By which" means by inclusiveness. "Of such kinds" means the non-inclusion of the three types previously stated is to be understood, even if there is a state of dissimilarity— this is the intention. "By that" means by the statement "sense-sphere of phenomena," and so on. The inclusiveness of an individual part, such as the aggregate of feeling, in the collection of the sense-sphere of phenomena, means the state of the collection being included by the individual part. The inclusiveness of the collection of the aggregate of form in the individual parts of the sense-sphere of eye and the sense-sphere of ear means the state of the individual part being included by the collection. If it does not show this, then what does it show? It says, "by the divisions of the four aggregates," and so on. There, "by the divisions of the four aggregates" means by the divisions of the enumeration of the four aggregates, such as form. "In five ways" means the collection of the four aggregates, such as form, and the collection of the aggregate of consciousness— thus, in five ways. by which it is distinguished. Therefore it says, "by way of being countable and uncountable." In "by one aggregate" and so on, the instrumental case is in the sense of an instrument, not an agent, and so it says, "independent of the gatherer and the gathered." Therefore it says, "having only the state of being the action and the instrument." The second and other methods, however, are "showing non-counting and so on," meaning showing non-counting and counting. But are not counting and so on also found in the second and other methods? It is true that they are found, but they are subordinate, being qualifiers, and so it is said this way based on the principal things to be qualified. Since the agent and so on are specified by "those phenomena that are gathered by the aggregate collection through the eye-base" and so on,